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Publisher’s Note
The 2010 Brigham Young University Prelaw Review (the “Journal”), like other volumes in the past, continues to demonstrate
Brigham Young University’s commitment to excellence in scholarship and student development. Throughout this past year it has been
a privilege to work with ambitious students who want to produce the
best possible undergraduate legal journal.
Continuing the vision of the Journal, this year’s staff has worked
arduously to present professional and current legal scholarship. As
undergraduates the depth and breadth of the topics addressed required that these students do much more than just editing. The authors and editors studied to find court cases and law review articles
to support their arguments. During the year, as new information
became available, authors and editors continually updated and refocused their arguments to provide timely discussions of the current
issues. Consequently, each of these articles reflects the latest decisions from the courts and scholarship from the legal community.
It is always the goal to produce a reputable legal journal. However, this experience also provides the opportunity for the staff to
prepare his or herself as members for future professional scholarship
and work in the legal field. Each student has become proficient in the
Bluebook system of legal citations and all have spent countless hours
editing and source checking each other’s legal articles. The students
have also learned to analyze pressing issues, incorporate legal citations, and present cogent legal arguments, while receiving training
in journal publishing. These students leave the 2010 edition of this
Journal possessing the ability to excel in law and other professional
pursuits.
We continue to be grateful for the endowment from the Rawlinson Family Foundation that funds the Journal and the support of
Brigham Young University’s resources to create and print this publication. As you read the topics addressed in this Journal, I’m sure
that you will agree that this is an impressive work produced by these
v

BYU undergraduate authors and editors. It continues to be a pleasure to work with such fine individuals and students on a daily basis.
Kris Tina Carlston, J.D., MBA
Prelaw Advisor, BYU
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Editorial Board’s Note
Over the past year, the BYU Prelaw Review staff has worked
diligently to produce what we believe to be another excellent edition.
This student-run journal has continued the tradition of improving on
the work of previous years by increasing the academic nature of each
article. Our students have written, edited, re-written, and re-edited
again and again to produce quality research worthy of publication.
Authors have covered complex issues of domestic and foreign law
and have done so in a comprehensive and current manner.
While the publication of our journal is the most tangible product
we have, we do not think it is the most valuable contribution we will
make to the legal field. Rather, the improvement we have seen in
each of the authors and editors will be what brings lasting change to
the legal field. Each member has researched tirelessly, become proficient in Bluebook, and prepared themselves to contribute in whatever field they choose to pursue.
We want to thank our lead editors, Aubrey Carr, Anna Reeves,
and Hwanhi Chung, for the extra mile they went to make each paper
the best it could be. This journal and each article in it would not be
ready for publication if it weren’t for the tireless effort of the Prelaw
Advisor, Kris Tina Carlston. Professor Carlston has not only helped
the journal to succeed, her good natured attitude also helped all of us
be confident in our work.
We must also thank the other faculty and staff at Brigham Young
University who have helped each of our students develop individually so they could research and write so well. We hope that you enjoy
this year’s edition of the BYU Prelaw Review.
Bryan Gividen
Editor-in-Chief
Andrew Selman
Managing Editor
vii

The Second Amendment, Incorporation and the
Right to Self Defense
by Jason Bentley*

T

I. Introduction

he District of Columbia v. Heller shot off the next round of
gun litigation in the twenty-first century. The landmark case
said the Second Amendment codified an individual’s right
to have a gun (specifically a handgun) in the home for self defense,
and struck down a longstanding ban on handguns in the District
of Columbia.1 Chicago’s gun ban would be the next target for gun
rights groups since Chicago’s ban is virtually identical to the D.C.
law that was ruled unconstitutional. Hours after the Heller decision,
Otis McDonald and other petitioners sued Chicago, saying that the
Heller decision meant they, as U.S. citizens, also had a right to own
handguns. Although Heller and McDonald v. Chicago both deal
with the constitutionality of handgun bans, the constitutional roads
to reach a decision in these cases couldn’t be more divergent. While
Heller dealt primarily with interpreting the Second Amendment, the
McDonald decision will hang on the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2
Although the Court already ruled that citizens under federal jurisdiction, like the District of Columbia, have a right to keep a handgun
in their homes as a right of citizenship, the Court did not explicitly
extend that right to be enforced against states and local governments.
*
1

Jason Bentley is a student at Brigham Young University majoring in communications with an emphasis in broadcast journalism.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817—18 (2008).

2

NRA v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (2009).
1

2
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The reason the Court needed to explicitly specify when a part of the
Bill of Rights applied to state and local governments was because
originally the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government
and a state was free to ignore the provisions it didn’t like. However,
in the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has used a process known
as incorporation to deal with this issue. Incorporation is when the
justices use the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to implement specific provisions in the Bill of Rights to apply at the state
level and not just the federal. Currently, there are few rights recognized in the Bill of Rights that haven’t been incorporated, namely the
Second and Third Amendments, as well as the right to be indicted by
a grand jury for high crimes in the Fifth Amendment.
When legal scholars and pundits debate the issue of incorporation
it often gets heated because it strikes at one of the most fundamental
issues in constitutional reasoning: where is the line drawn between
the people’s right to write their own laws through their elected representatives and those rights which individuals retain that no government has a right to violate, even if that government is democratically
appointed? In essence the Court must asnwer whether popular sovereignty trumps Second Amendment rights or vice-a-versa? To answer
this question, this paper will first briefly examine the history of the
Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to give context
to the case. Second, it will examine past judicial formulas used to
determine whether an aspect of the Bill of Rights ought to be incorporated to give a means of judging the merits of McDonald’s claims.
Finally, it argues that all past judicial formulas require that the Court
rule in favor of Otis McDonald and the right of all citizens to own a
handgun in their home.

II. History
A. Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms, the Militia, and
Self Defense
Most controversy surrounding the Second Amendment prior to
Heller concerned whether the Amendment only protected the use
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of firearms in militia service or whether it also included the right to
own firearms for personal defense. Originally the Second Amendment was ratified specifically to ensure that the people could form
a militia3 because the founding generation was suspicious of standing armies. They feared that a professional army supported by the
government during peacetime would eventually abuse its power, as
they perceived the British army did just before the Revolutionary
War. Thus, Americans saw standing armies, even if raised by their
own government, as a threat to liberty.4 Instead, they wanted to entrust the people5 themselves with the duty and the right of defending their own liberties with their own arms.6 Beyond these duties,
the militia also maintained security against local threats, such as
bandits, pirates, and Native Americans.7 With time, Americans became increasingly more comfortable with government-run standing
armies, and today many people consider soldiers in standing armies
to be performing the most patriotic service imaginable. Regardless
of modern attitudes towards militias and standing armies, these concepts must be understood in order to understand why the Second
Amendment was seen as necessary in the first place.

3

It’s interesting to note that this is agreed upon by all sides, as can be seen
in the Heller case itself. The dispute comes over the nature of the militia,
as well as whether or not the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”
extends beyond militia service. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801, contra id.
2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

4	Stephen P. Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment 179—82 (Ivan
R. Dee 2008).
5

It should be noted here that the term “the people” had its limits. People
did not necessarily mean the general public since women did not serve
in militias. Like the right to vote or sit on a jury, the term “people” here
means all adult males. Akhil R. Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal
Reasoning, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 145, 166—67 (2008).

6

Doherty, Gun Control on Trial at 9—10 (2008); Halbrook, supra note
4, at 330.

7

Akhil Amar wrote, “In the Founders’ world, individual self-protection and
community defense were not wholly separate spheres.” Amar, supra note
5, at 164.

4
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Unfortunately, early nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions do not shed much light on how to properly interpret the Second
Amendment since there were no cases that went to the nation’s highest court until after the Civil War.8 This is not surprising since, at the
time, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government and
had no power over the states.9 Cases addressing the right to keep and
bear arms were dealt with at the state level, and state courts generally used that specific state’s Bill of Rights—and not the U.S. Constitution—to come to a decision, even though most decisions generally
favored an individual rights interpretation.10
However, the understanding of what it meant to keep and bear
arms changed significantly by the Civil War and the years following.
Americans no longer feared standing armies and thus were much
less enthusiastic about militias than the founding generation.11 In the
Reconstruction Era, arms bearing was no longer seen through the
prism of maintaining liberty against tyrants and standing armies,
but as maintaining safety and protection against private threats like
mobs and bandits. The right to firearms was also a civil rights issue
because many blacks in the South were being denied that right and
were often helpless against groups like the KKK. To help remedy the
problem, the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment and a series of laws like the Freedmen’s Bureau Act to protect
the right of blacks to keep and bear arms.12
Additionally, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment also
put restrictions on states that had previously only applied to the
federal government,13 thus allowing litigation involving the Second Amendment to be taken to the Supreme Court. The first major
Second Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court asked if the
8	Doherty, supra note 6, at 12—13.
9

Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).

10

Doherty, supra note 6, at 13.

11

Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights 258 (1998).

12

Stephen P. Halbrook, Freedmen, The Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Right to Bear Arms (1998).

13

Id. at 40-41; Amar, supra note 11, at 164—65.
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Fourteenth Amendment applied to conspiracies and mobs, which
threatened to take away life, liberty, or property, or if it only applied
to state governments. In 1873, a white mob surrounded a church in
Colfax, Louisiana, where a predominantly black group had taken
refuge with arms. The mob ordered those in the church to hand over
their arms and later opened fire, killing over a hundred black men.
Although originally nine men were charged in the incident, they
were all eventually released after the Supreme Court ruled in their
favor in United States v. Cruikshank. The Court decided that neither
the First nor Second Amendments applied to states and even struck
down provisions in certain civil rights bills passed by Congress.14
The next major case involving the Second Amendment was
Presser v. Illinois. Herman Presser, an Illinois citizen, had organized
and led a militia made up of mostly ethnic German workers who
were associated with the Socialist Labor Party. Presser was accused
of drilling and marching a militia without a license issued by the
governor. Presser appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds
that the law violated his Second Amendment rights; however, the
Court followed the precedence set in Cruikshank, reaffirming that
the Second Amendment did not apply to states and requiring Presser
to submit to state law.15
The issue of whether the Second Amendment protected a right
to self defense was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1939
in U.S. v. Miller, and even then, only indirectly. Miller challenged
the National Firearms Act which required that all automatic weapons and sawed off-shotguns to be registered and taxed.16 When Jack
Miller and Frank Layton were arrested on the charges of possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, they sued, claiming that the
NFA violated their Second Amendment right.17 But the Supreme
Court upheld the NFA, declaring that the Second Amendment did
not protect sawed-off shotguns because they were not used for mi14	Halbrook, supra note 12, 173—75; Presser v. Illinois 116 U.S., 252, 265
(1886).
15

Presser, 116 U.S., at 265.

16

Doherty, supra note 6, at 15—18.

17

Id. at 16.
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litia service.18 Because the case didn’t give much analysis to the
Second Amendment, its history, and its proper interpretation, the
implications of the decision were so vague that gun rights advocates
and gun control supporters later both claimed the case supported
their position on the issue. Gun rights advocates said although Miller
did the NFA, it was reasonable to uphold that specific restriction
because the firearm in question could not be used for militia service.
They further argued that had the restriction been placed on arms
needed for a militia the Court would have found such a measure
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, Gun control proponents said Miller
showed that the Second Amendment only protected a right to weapons used in military service. While gun rights activists believed the
firearm in question was the key to determining the constitutionality of a gun restriction, gun control advocates believed the decision
said that the arm bearer had to be involved in some sort of military
service to have a Second Amendment right. Following the Miller
decision, lower courts generally sided with the latter interpretation
of the Second Amendment.19
Heller provided the analysis that Miller lacked, and ruled that
the Second Amendment protects both militia service and an individual right to own a gun. First, the Court found that the preamble
of the amendment, “A well regulated militia, being necessary for the
security of a Free State,” did not limit the operative clause that “the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”
Beyond just providing analysis of the original Second Amendment,
Heller interpreted the Miller decision to mean that individuals did
have a right to own guns, just not guns that would be useful for militia service.20 Ultimately the case ruled that the Second Amendment
did codify an individual right to keep and bear arms for self defense
and struck down the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns.21

18

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).

19

Doherty, supra note 6, at 18—19.

20

Heller, 128 S. Ct., at 2815—17.

21

Id. at 2882.
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B. Incorporation
Heller left a major question asked but unanswered: if the right to
bear arms is an individual right, should state and local governments
also have to respect it?22
As was stated above, the original Bill of Rights was designed to
limit the federal government. Early in the nineteenth century, there
was some dispute whether aspects of the Bill of Rights should be
incorporated using the “privileges and immunities of citizenship”
clause in the Constitution.23 The Supreme Court, however, ruled in
1833 that the Bill of Rights was meant only to restrict the federal government. If the founders wanted to restrict the states, Chief
Justice James Marshall reasoned, they would have specifically said
so. Thus, states, and more pertinent to our case, local governments
could ban weapons.24
But the Fourteenth Amendment changed the relationship between states and the federal government demanding that certain
rights of citizenship be respected at the state level as well. Now, “no
state shall make…any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities” of citizenship. Nor could they take “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”25
Unfortunately, the case that defined what the Fourteenth Amendment meant virtually left the privileges or immunities clause useless. The Supreme Court ruled in Slaughterhouse that the Fourteenth
Amendment only protected a very limited set of rights of citizenship.26
The next major blow to those who believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to protect individuals from state abuse was United

22

Id. at 2811.

23

David R. Upham, Protecting the Privliges and Immunities: Founding
Civil War and Reconstruction, in Challenges to the American Founding
141-45 (Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West eds., 2005).

24

Amar, supra 11, at 160-161

25

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

26

Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, at 67 (1873)
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States v. Cruikshank, which reaffirmed that the Bill of Rights (specifically the First and Second Amendments) did not apply to states.27
Eventually, the Court began to acknowledge that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected more than the very limited rights enumerated
in Slaughterhouse. But in the 1950s, Justice Hugo Black argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment did incorporate the first eight amendments.28 Although the court never embraced Justice Black’s view of
mechanically incorporating the entire Bill of Rights, it did change its
attitude towards incorporation in general. During the Warren Court,
practically all of the Bill of Rights was incorporated one right at a
time under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which in essence
says that the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights.29
Today, virtually the entire Bill of Rights has been incorporated, with
a few exceptions, including the right to keep and bear arms.

III. Incorporation and the Chicago case
A. Current Case
The heart of the McDonald case isn’t about what the Second
Amendment means. Rather the case is about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires cities like Chicago to allow their citizens to
own handguns. The Heller decision itself acknowledged both Cruikshank and Presser as saying the Second Amendment didn’t apply
to states, although it neither outright rejected nor endorsed the precedent set by their decisions. Rather, the opinion recognized that the
issue would probably find its way back to the Supreme Court, but
that the court did not feel it necessary to rule on the matter since it
had no direct relation to the Heller case.30
27

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552—54 (1875).

28

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (5-4 decision) (Justice
Black, H., dissenting).

29

Amar, supra note 11, at 139.

30

Heller, 128 S. Ct., at 2823.
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As noted in the introduction, shortly after the Heller decision was
announced, McDonald was filed challenging the city of Chicago’s
authority to ban handguns.31 The Seventh Circuit Court ruled in favor
of Chicago because it felt that it was not the place of a circuit court
to incorporate anything (since its jurisdiction was limited) and also
because precedent clearly favored the view that the Second Amendment only applied to the federal government and not to the states.32
The Supreme Court has now decided to hear the case, thus leaving the Seventh Court’s first concern resolved. The Supreme Court
now is left with the second question: should the right to self defense
be incorporated against Chicago or should it follow Cruikshank and
only apply to the federal government?
B. Different Criteria for Incorporation
There have traditionally been three different methods to incorporation: the fundamental fairness approach, selective incorporation, and mechanical incorporation. The mechanical incorporation
approach was championed by Justice Hugo Black, and is based primarily on his textual and historical analysis that the writers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had intended to incorporate the first eight
amendments to the Bill of Rights.33 The second is the fundamental
fairness doctrine which says that the Fourteenth Amendment has
no relation to the Bill of Rights. Rather, it simply protects citizens
in those rights which are fundamental to ordered liberty.34 The final
and thus far the most used is selective incorporation. It disagrees
with the total incorporation in that it concedes that the first eight
amendments are not necessarily incorporated across the board, but
says that some rights of the Bill of Rights certainly are incorporated
against the states.35
31

NRA v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 856 (2009)

32

Id. at 858.

33

Adamson, 332 U.S., at 89-91 (Black, H., dissenting)

34

Amar, supra note 11, at 139.

35

Id. at 139—40.
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C. Applying McDonald to the Three Methodologies
According to any of the three traditional methods of incorporation the Second Amendment ought to be incorporated. First, any
judge or scholar who falls into the Hugo Black camp of total incorporation will believe the first Eight Amendments to the Constitution
ought to be incorporated outright. Although some may argue over
the meaning of the Second Amendment, unless the Court decides
to reverse its Heller decision it made just two years ago, total incorporation of the Second Amendment would require striking down
handgun laws across the country.
The same legal reasoning also follows using the selective incorporation model as well. The Court in Heller said the Second Amendment protected a pre-existing right and spent a great deal of the
opinion reviewing the history of how that right has been respected
throughout American history.36 Once a right is declared fundamental
it is extremely difficult to get the Court to reverse itself—especially
considering the Supreme Court declared the right to own a handgun
for self defense a fundamental right a mere two years ago.
The hardest judicial test for incorporating the Second Amendment is the fundamental fairness test. This requires proving a right
to be absolutely essential for ordered liberty, which is difficult to do
because what one judge might consider essential to ordered liberty
another may not. However, a closer look at congressional debates
of the Thirty Ninth Congress makes a very powerful case to incorporate the Second Amendment, even under the fundamental fairness test. Consider that proponents of the fundamental fairness test
advocate it because it protects the right of the people to write their
own laws through their elected representatives. The advantage to
this method has traditionally been seen as protecting the separation
of powers and the structural integrity of the Constitution. But even if
proponents of fundamental fairness don’t think the right to firearms
for defense is considered necessary to ordered liberty, certainly the
right to amend the Constitution is.

36

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.

The Second Amendment, Incorporation, and the Right to Self Defense

The right to firearms for self defense was discussed extensively
as a right which the Thirty-Ninth Congress considered to be a right
of citizenship and one which it wished to protect by the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment.37 This commitment to protecting the
right to keep and bear arms is not only seen in congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment but in laws passed in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The virtue of fundamental
fairness is that it properly acknowledges that some modern questions and dilemmas simply cannot be answered by the Fourteenth
Amendment since the authors themselves might not have considered
the problems we face now. And in such cases, caution and restraint
should be used. But the right of all citizens to bear arms—including groups that wouldn’t have been protected by the original Second
Amendment like blacks, women and men who weren’t part of any
militia—was discussed extensively as one of the fundamental rights
they wanted to protect. To fail to incorporate the right to arms for
self defense when there is compelling evidence that the writers and
people who ratified the Amendment specifically wanted it to be protected is to rob ordered liberty of one of its basic necessities: the right
of the people to amend the Constitution.

IV. Conclusion
Although the Court ought to side with Otis McDonald in this
case, it should be noted that this will not end all gun regulations in
the city. The Supreme Court specifically said in Heller that a right to
own a gun is not an absolute right. Cities and states will still retain
their right to regulate firearms in public buildings. It will still be up
to these local governments to regulate other issues like concealed
weapons permits. However, no government—federal, state, or local—has the right to take a citizen’s right to possess a handgun to
defend their family, property and own person within the walls of
their own home.
37

Halbrook, supra note 12, at 5—9, 15—16.§

38

Id. at 11—13, 15.
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The Need for a Compelling Interest Test on a
State Level
by Eva Brady*

T

I. Introduction

hough religious freedom has been held among the most highly esteemed of all American rights, in the past twenty years,
this freedom has been drastically reduced by the loss of the
Sherbert Test—the compelling interest test for cases involving religious rights. This test mandates that citizens are to be exempt from
laws of general applicability when these laws conflict with their free
exercise of religion. Laws of general applicability are laws that are
not aimed at restricting religious freedoms but happen to do so as an
unintended consequence. This exemption holds except in cases in
which the burden on the person’s religion:
(1) “Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”1

*

Eva Brady is a senior at Brigham Young University studying philosophy
with minors in Spanish and logic. She will graduate in December, 2010, at
which time she plans to serve a mission for her church before beginning
law school in 2012.

1

Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (1993).
13

14
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II. Background
A. Institution of the Compelling Interest Test
Two main cases originally established the compelling interest
test for cases concerning religious freedom: Sherbert v. Verner2 in
1963 and Wisconsin v. Yoder3 in 1972. In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh Day Adventist woman was fired from her job in South Carolina
because she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons. Unable to find other suitable work because of her religious convictions,
she filed for unemployment. However, South Carolina denied her unemployment because she rejected suitable work when it was offered
to her. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the state and
appellate courts by ruling that the denial of unemployment compensation was an infringement of the appellant’s First Amendment right
to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court also argued that
there was no compelling state interest (or strong governmental interest) in denying the appellant unemployment because of her religious
convictions. They also ruled that allowing for an exception to South
Carolina’s unemployment policy on behalf of a Seventh Day Adventist was not “establishing” the religion.4 This case laid the framework for the compelling interest test.
Nine years later, Wisconsin v. Yoder upheld the ruling and cemented the precedent set in Sherbert v. Verner. In this case, Amish
and Mennonite parents were convicted by the Green County court of
Wisconsin for violating the Wisconsin state law requiring compulsory school attendance by withdrawing their children from school
when they had completed the eighth grade. After eighth grade,
these children were educated by their parents in practical work that
would help them to benefit their communities. The parents argued
that the compulsory school attendance laws restricted the practice
of their religion which valued keeping themselves and their children
2

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

3

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

4

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 1799.
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“aloof from the world.” The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed
the previous court decision and ruled that the compulsory school attendance laws were a violation of their rights to religious freedom.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this ruling on the
grounds that there was no compelling state interest to burden these
people’s beliefs by making them adhere to the compulsory school
laws.5 However, despite these and other cases6 that successfully applied the Sherbert Test, the test was soon to come under scrutiny in
Employment Division v. Smith.7
B. Overthrow of the Compelling Interest Test
In 1990, twenty-seven years after the institution of the Sherbert
Test, one case was able to revoke the compelling interest test. It was
replaced instead with a rational basis test for religious cases, which
came to be known as the Smith Test. The case was brought before
the courts by two men who had been fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation facility because they had ingested the drug peyote
during their religious sacramental services in a Native American
church. Peyote use was against Oregon’s criminal law, and thus they
were dismissed from their jobs on the basis of work-related misconduct. Because they were fired for misconduct, they were unable
to receive unemployment compensation. On remand, the Supreme
Court of Oregon ruled that prohibiting the sacramental use of peyote
was a violation of the First Amendment. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed this ruling on the grounds that the state law regarding
peyote use was constitutional and not aimed at restricting the individuals’ religious beliefs; thus the state could deny the defendants’
unemployment compensation.8
The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that under the free exercise
clause of the Bill of Rights, such laws of general applicability did
not need a compelling interest test, but would rather be subjected
5
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to a rational basis test.9 The Smith Test, or rational basis test for
cases involving religion, examines the law that burdens the citizen’s
religious belief to see if the law was aimed at restricting such a belief and if the legislature had a rational reason for enacting such a
law. If the law was not aimed at a religious belief and was rationally enacted, then the law is upheld, regardless of the burden that it
may place upon religious convictions. The Smith Test denigrated the
strict scrutiny that was required by the compelling interest test; this
was a big change.
C. Restoration of the Compelling Interest Test
The Sherbert Test was not completely eroded with Employment
Division v. Smith. Just three years after this case many religious, political, and other organizations joined forces to support the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).10 This act was passed in 1993 by
an overriding majority: unanimously in the house and ninety seven
to three in the Senate.11
The Congress found when implementing RFRA that:
1. the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to
the Constitution;
2. laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
3. governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
4. in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify bur9
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dens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
5. the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.12
For these reasons, Congress enacted RFRA in order to restore the
compelling interest test and to ensure that it was applied in all cases
in which religious freedom was substantially burdened, even by laws
of general applicability. RFRA was to be a defense for all citizens
who felt their religious freedom was being substantially burdened by
the government and was to apply to all cases, both state and federal.13
D. Compromise of the Compelling Interest Test
Although RFRA was passed almost unanimously by Congress,
its validity was soon to be questioned by the Supreme Court of the
United States in City of Boerne v. Flores.14 This case was brought
before the courts by an Archbishop in San Antonio, Texas. A parish
of his church in the nearby town of Boerne, Texas, had outgrown its
church building and the Archbishop had given permission to make
plans to enlarge their building. A few months later, however, the city
passed an ordinance requiring its Historic Landmark Commission to
pre-approve any construction that may affect historic landmarks in
the city. The Boerne church building was among these historic landmarks and upon applying for a building permit, the Archbishop was
denied permission to enlarge the building. The Archbishop brought
his case to the Western District of Texas Court, appealing to RFRA
for protection. The District Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional on the basis that Congress had superseded the powers given
to it in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 states that
“the Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legis12
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lation, the provisions of this article.”15 The provisions mentioned in
Section 5 refer back to Section 1, which states that no “state [shall]
deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”16
In 1997, this case was brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, which
agreed that RFRA superseded Congress’s authority and added that it
was impractical and unconstitutional.
First, the Court determined that RFRA was an overextension of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment right to ensure that all citizens
were not deprived of liberty without due process of law.17 According
to the ruling in South Carolina v. Katzenbach as well as the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended only to extend to remedial powers.18 The court
claimed that RFRA alters the meaning of the free exercise clause and
that it does not have the power to impose the Sherbert Test upon the
states. Such an action infringes upon the division of state and federal
powers and is damaging to the constitutional structure of the United
States. Second, the Court argued that RFRA was unconstitutional by
an appeal to Marbury v. Madison, which established the precedent
for judicial review.19 Judicial review allows for the Supreme Court
to determine the constitutionality of any statutes, laws, or acts of
Congress. The Supreme Court had ruled in Employment Division
v. Smith that the courts did not have to demonstrate a compelling
state interest in order to enforce laws of general applicability that
may substantially burden religion.20 In spite of this, Congress passed
RFRA, which mandated that the Sherbert Test must be applied to
all federal and state cases in which the free exercise of religion was
threatened. The Supreme Court’s ruling as to the constitutionality
of the Sherbert Test should take precedent to the RFRA because it
endangers the separation of powers between Congress and the Judi15	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
16
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ciary.21 For these reasons and others, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that RFRA was unconstitutional as it applies to the states.22 In other
words, RFRA would be maintained on a federal level and would
still be appealed to in federal cases, but Congress could not impose
RFRA upon the states. Thus, it was left up to the states to establish a
compelling interest test within their own states if they chose to do so.
In response to this ruling, many states did exactly that; they adopted the compelling interest test within their states in the form of
state RFRAs. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.23 These states have all
taken this important measure to better protect religious freedom.
The compelling interest test protects religious freedom much more
effectively than the rational basis test does. The following analysis
explains why states that have not yet adopted a compelling interest
test to protect religious beliefs ought to do so.

III. Compelling Interest Test v. Rational Basis Test
In Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Flores, she concluded:
It has long been the Court’s position that freedom of
speech—a right enumerated only a few words after the
rights to Free Exercise—has a special Constitutional status. Given the centrality of freedom of speech and religion
to the American concept of personal liberty, it is altogether reasonable to conclude that both should be treated
with the highest degree of respect . . . the rule the Court
declared in Smith does not faithfully serve the purpose of

21
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the Constitution. Accordingly, I believe it essential for the
Court to reconsider its holding in Smith.24
Although Justice O’Connor’s opinion failed to persuade the court in
Flores, it made evident the importance of sustaining the compelling
interest test. Though both tests have their benefits, the benefits of the
compelling interest test are much more defensible and far outweigh
those of the rational basis test.
A. Benefits of a Rational Basis Test
As the opinion of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
stated, one concern regarding the compelling interest test that would
support a rational basis test is that a compelling interest test could
allow for too many anomalies in the law.25 In other words, it could
justify the breaking of many laws in the name of religion. For example, there have been instances in which the compelling interest test
has permitted the use of illegal drugs where the rational basis test
would not.26 However, as Justice O’Conner argued in her concurring
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, a compelling interest test
would not necessarily create too many anomalies in the law because
it is not very difficult to find a compelling state interest.27 For example, she claimed that in the Smith case the government did have a
compelling interest in regulating drug use. O’Connor’s opinion can
be backed by the fact that there are many cases in which appeals
to RFRA or the compelling interest test have failed. These cases
tend to fail for several reasons: (1) because they are faulty claims to
RFRA, in which the case at hand does not really deal with religious
convictions,28 (2) because they are fraudulent claims, in which the
individual does not really hold the religious conviction that he claims
24
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he does, but is simply using the façade of religion to fulfill his or
her purposes,29 and (3) because there is a compelling governmental
interest and upholding the law of general applicability, despite the
burden that it would place upon religion, is truly the least restrictive
means of upholding that interest.30 There have been cases that have
exemplified each of these three instances. Thus it seems evident that
the compelling interest test does not create too many anomalies, but
rather simply allows for sufficient exceptions in order to properly
protect religious freedom.
Another argument of the Court in Employment Division v. Smith
is that the compelling interest test had only been used in hybrid cases
(cases involving religious freedom in conjunction with another right),
and thus that it did not extend to all cases in which religious freedom
was concerned.31 It is true that the compelling interest test had only
been used in such cases, as well as in cases involving unemployment
compensation; however, it does not follow that the compelling interest test should not extend to all cases concerning religious freedom.
Religion should be defensible simply by an appeal to the first amendment, and should not need to be in conjunction with another right in
order to deserve full protection.
A third argument in behalf of the rational basis test was addressed
by Justice Stevens as a concurring opinion in Flores. Justice Stevens
argues that RFRA is a “law respecting an establishment of religion,”32
which is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment that prohibits Congress from making laws respecting the establishment of religion. However, the compelling interest test does not
establish a religion, but is rather legislation designed to protect the
free exercise of religion as it is protected by the First Amendment.
Another supposed benefit of the rational basis test is that with the
compelling interest test it may seem difficult for the courts to decide
29
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if a religious conviction is sincere. In using the rational basis test,
there is no need for the courts to make such a decision. However, in
many cases it will be obvious whether or not a religious conviction
is sincere. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,33 it seems evident that
the Amish people’s beliefs are sincere because they date back to the
1600s and are strictly adhered to by the Amish population. If the
plaintiff was an honest follower of the Amish faith, it would appear
that his convictions would likewise be sincere. However, though the
sincerity of one’s beliefs in many cases may be obvious, there will be
cases in which the decision may not be as clear.34 Yet even if the court
is faced with some cases in which the line is not apparent, such situations should not prohibit all others from the right to appeal for a defense of their religious freedom against laws of general applicability.
The rational basis test may also make it easier for the courts to
draw a firm line: if the law is rational and not aimed at burdening
religion then it stands, regardless of the burden that it may place
upon religion. Having a firm line in deciding cases may be convenient; however, is this really a line that we want to draw? If such
were the case, then the Amish children would have been forced to
go to school regardless of the fact that such a law would severely affect the Amish way of life. Allowing this exception does not
dramatically affect others, and thus it seems extreme not to allow
such an exception. However, under the rational basis test there is
no room for such exceptions. Though the rational basis test may
reduce the difficulty of deciding when a religious belief should take
precedence over a law of general applicability, religious freedom is
something important enough to not be discarded simply because it
is “too difficult” to protect.
One final concern is that a compelling interest test may allow for
discrimination. It is true that there are some cases in which people’s
religious preferences have allowed for discrimination.35 However,
while allowing discrimination may not be preferable, it is necessary
33
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in some instances in order to protect religious freedom. Protecting
religious freedom over antidiscrimination is justifiable as religious
freedom is explicitly protected within the Constitution and the right
against discrimination is not. In addition, not allowing for religious
rights to trump anti-discriminatory rights can in effect turn the discrimination against religion. Thus, religious freedom should take
precedence over anti-discriminatory laws.
B. Benefits of the Compelling Interest Test
Perhaps the greatest defense of the compelling interest test is
that it does a better job protecting religious freedom than does the
rational basis test. There are many cases that show that when the
compelling interest test is used, religious freedom is more likely to
be upheld. For example:
One recent case that applied the rational basis test rather than
the compelling interest test was North Coast Women’s Care Medical
Group Inc. v. The Superior Court of San Diego County. In this case,
which was brought before the California Supreme court in August
of 2008, a lesbian woman was being treated at a fertility clinic to try
to become pregnant.36 However, the doctor she was working with
informed her in advance that if an intrauterine insemination (IUI)
became necessary, the doctor’s religious beliefs would prevent her
from performing the procedure on an unmarried woman. Another
doctor at the clinic also refused to perform the procedure for
religious purposes, and they referred her to another doctor at another
clinic who would be willing to perform the procedure. However,
there were complications in the procedure and the woman was
unable to get pregnant for almost another year. She sued the North
Coast Women’s Medical Care clinic for damages, claiming that they
unfairly discriminated against her on the basis of sexual orientation.
The claimant in this case appealed under Unruh, one of California’s antidiscriminatory statutes. The court applied the rational basis
test and found that Unruh was a valid law of general applicability
and that under the ruling in Smith no further compelling interest
36
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test was necessary. The doctors at the medical clinic were required
to perform artificial inseminations regardless of marital status or
sexual orientation, notwithstanding their religious convictions. The
rational basis test upheld the antidiscriminatory law over the defendant’s right to religious freedom.
Another case that failed to use the compelling interest test, Sunderland v. United States, had similar results. In this case a man was
convicted of marijuana use, though he appealed to his First Amendment right to use the drug for religious purposes.37 The Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that RFRA was not applicable to the states
and that therefore they would hold to the ruling in Smith. Because
they used the rational basis test rather than the compelling interest
test, the court ruled that the drug law was generally applicable and
not a hybrid right case and therefore was not subject to exceptions,
regardless of the burden that it placed on the individual’s religious
convictions. Once again, the law of general applicability did not even
have to undergo a two pronged test in order for it to burden a citizen’s
religious freedom.
On the other hand, there have been many cases concerning religious freedom in states that have adopted mini RFRAs that have
been successful in protecting religious freedom because of the application of the compelling interest test. Two examples of these cases
are Merced v. Kasson and Barr v. City of Sinton.
In Merced v. Kasson,38 a priest whose religious beliefs required
the sacrifice of animals lived in a city in Texas that had six ordinances against animal sacrifice. However, by an appeal to TRFRA,
Texas’s state RFRA, he was given an injunction to allow him to
sacrifice animals for religious purposes despite the city ordinances.
TRFRA was able to allow for this because the court saw that the
city ordinances were substantially burdening the priest’s religion
without furthering a compelling governmental interest using the
least restrictive means possible. In this case, the use of the compelling interest test helped the court to see that there was no interest
more important than this person’s religious freedom. However, this
37

Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, (1924).

38

Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, (2009).

The Need for a Compelling Interest Test on a State Level

does not mean that there will not be instances in which the government does have a compelling interest. For example, if this case
had concerned human sacrifice, the government would have had
a compelling interest to prohibit the religious practice in order to
preserve human life.
In Barr v. City of Sinton,39 a man offered housing and religious
education to recently released prisoners as part of his religious ministry. In response to this, the city passed an ordinance that forbade
such actions. This case was brought before a trial court and a court
of appeals, both of which found no violations with TRFRA. However, it was soon to be brought before the Supreme Court of Texas,
which said that TRFRA requires strict scrutiny of every case that
appeals to religion, and that zoning ordinances were not exempt
from the scrutiny. Applying this strict scrutiny to the case, the Court
found that the man was acting on sincere religious beliefs and that
there was no compelling governmental interest to impose this ordinance upon him and thus stop his ministry. Once again, appealing to
the compelling interest test allowed this man to practice his religion
without burdening his religious practice by laws of general applicability.
Another interesting case that shows the crux of the issue is
Yang v. Sturner.40 Originally applying the compelling interest test,
the Yangs were granted a summary judgment motion on the basis
that their free exercise of religion had been burdened when a doctor
performed an autopsy on their dead son without their permission
(desecrating a corpse in any way was against their religious beliefs).
However, Smith concluded right before the damages portion of the
case and under the newly instituted rational basis test, the Yangs
were unable to collect damages. It seems as if the compelling interest
test had remained, they would have collected damages for the burden that had been placed upon their religion. As evidenced in these
cases, the compelling interest test often does a more effective job of
preserving religious freedom than the rational basis test does.
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However, the plethora of cases that demonstrate its success is not
the only reason for adopting a compelling interest test over a rational
basis test. As Congress found in enacting RFRA, the compelling interest test also seems to “strike a reasonable balance”41 between freedom of religion and governmental interests. The rational basis test
gives almost complete preference to governmental interests; in contrast, the compelling interest test allows for religious freedom while
still giving preference to governmental interest when appropriate.
For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are obviously not justifiable simply because they were done in the name of
religion, and the government has a duty to prevent such acts (even on
a much smaller level) that detract from other citizens’ basic rights,
such as life and liberty. It is the duty of the government to protect
the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of its citizens, and individuals should not be able to infringe upon these fundamental human
rights, even in the name of religion. The compelling interest test is a
sensible balance between the two extremes—it allows for religious
freedom as far as possible but curtails it when the government has
a pressing interest that must be maintained. The compelling interest
test contains the flexibility necessary to weigh the interests of religion against the interests of the government, while the rational basis
test does not allow for such flexibility.
In addition, the Constitution explicitly protects religious freedom,42
and it does not seem that the rational basis test protects religious freedom sufficiently from laws of general applicability. Some may argue
that this was not the intent of the First Amendment;43 however, the
Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion].”44 Many laws of general applicability
can inadvertently prohibit the free exercise of some religions just as
can laws directly targeted at prohibiting religious freedom. The com41
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pelling interest test most effectively protects religion from laws that
would prohibit its free exercise.
An additional defense of the compelling interest test was brought
up in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. She claims that very few states would be naïve enough
to create a law directly targeting religious freedom.45 Though there
are some exceptions to this in which the rational basis test was effective46 it is usually not the case that a law is directly targeted at
religion or otherwise not rationally legislated. Thus, there are not
many cases in which the rational basis test would actually protect religious freedom because under this test if the law does not meet one
of these two criteria, it automatically takes preference over religious
freedom. Therefore, in order to best protect religious freedom, it will
be necessary for states to adopt a compelling interest test.
Upholding a compelling interest test in cases regarding religious
freedom is also imperative because the compelling interest test is
the highest level of judicial review, while the rational basis test
is the lowest level of judicial review.47 Should not our religious
freedom be a precious enough right to protect it with the strictest
scrutiny that our judicial system has to offer? Compelling interest
tests are utilized in cases involving constitutional rights (such as the
right to freedom of speech and the right to vote) as well as in cases
involving suspect classes (such as race).48 Our religious freedom is
just as valuable as our other constitutional rights and ought to be
protected equally. This is why freedom of religion had previously
been protected by the compelling interest test and ought to continue
to be so protected. In addition, if classes such as race or gender can
qualify as suspect classes, should religion not qualify as well? In
45
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either case, it is only just to apply the compelling interest test to
cases involving our religious freedom.
Continuing along the lines of justice, in 2000 Congress
enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUPIA).49 This act mandates a compelling interest test in religious
cases involving land use or prisoners. So, in many states, prisoners
are currently enjoying far greater protection of their religious
freedom than the rest of the population. It seems counter-intuitive
and unjust to give convicts greater religious protection than lawabiding citizens.

IV. Conclusion
Since Flores, it has been left up to the states to adopt their own
compelling interest test, as it was ruled that RFRA could not be imposed upon the states. While many states have already taken measures to provide for this test, there are still many that are relying on
the rational basis test to protect the religious freedom of their citizens. However, as we can see from this analysis of the benefits and
costs of both the compelling interest test and the rational basis test,
the benefits of the compelling interest test far outweigh those of the
rational basis test. In order for those states that have not yet provided
for a compelling interest test within their legislation to better protect the religious freedom of their citizens, it is expedient that they
replace the rational basis test with the compelling interest test. The
compelling interest test truly is the most sensible balance in protecting religious freedom.
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The Implications on Education of United States
Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child
by Alyssa Brown*

T

I. Introduction

he Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is a human
rights treaty declaring a government’s duty to protect children and to provide for their material and immaterial needs.
This document has been greeted with open arms as it has been ratified by all United Nation’s parties except the United States and Somalia.1 The issue is of immediate concern because following Senator
Barbara Boxer’s push for ratification the Obama administration has
declared that they will “take it up as an early question.”2
This article informs readers’ perspectives on ratification specifically focusing on the child’s educational rights under the proposed
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CRC. Furthermore, it provides an evaluative analysis by (1) comparing United States law with the intents expressed during drafting and
as outlined in articles 28 and 29 of the CRC, and (2) examining the
effects of ratification on principles of United States’ law including
federalism and constitutional mechanisms. In this article, education
will be used as a case study to demonstrate some of the hesitations
concerning ratification of the CRC. The reservations that will be emphasized are: (1) the CRC is unnecessary because the United States
already fulfills the purposes of the CRC and (2) the CRC could infringe upon the balance of federal and state powers.

II. The United States already fulfills the purposes of the
CRC
The first reason that the United States does not need to ratify the
CRC is because legislation in the United States already fulfills the
purposes of the CRC. To understand the purposes of the Convention,
it is important to look at the historical context of the CRC. Children’s
rights that were compromised during WWII led to the Declaration
of the Rights of the Child (Declaration),3 which comprised ten statements concerning children’s rights. Despite the need for the Declaration it was not adopted until 1959 (long after WWII ended), and
shortly after its adoption Poland saw the need for an internationally
binding treaty concerning children’s rights—because the Declaration did not have legal force. In addition to this concern, some felt
that the Declaration was too broad and should incorporate the new
movement towards children’s right to choice (e.g. freedom of expression, privacy, and friendship). Though several nations were in favor
of the Polish proposal, “representatives of Western states questioned
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both the need for a convention and the timing of the project.”4 Despite these hesitations, Poland’s proposal became more specific and
was adjusted to fit the language of international treaties; by 1989 the
proposal (now the CRC) was presented for ratification. The CRC improves upon the Declaration of the Rights of the Child by providing a
more narrow interpretation of children’s rights contained in previous
human rights documents, addressing current issues concerning children’s rights, focusing on the government’s duty to protect children,
and declaring the child’s right to choose.
The assembly drafting the CRC sought to ensure the material
and immaterial needs of the child.5 One of the prominent immaterial
needs that concerned the assembly was the government’s responsibility to provide for the educational needs of the child. The United
States fulfills the intents of the CRC, outlined in the travaux preparatoires6 as well as articles 28 and 29 of the CRC, specifically
concerning free and compulsory education, attendance and dropout
rates, family planning, and higher education.
First, without ratifying the CRC, the United States already fulfills one of the most basic stipulations specified in article 28.1.a of the
CRC: the child’s right to education that is “compulsory and available
free to all.”7 The United States already requires compulsory edu4
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cation under the 1959 Declaration that mandates that, “the child is
entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory,
at least in the elementary stages.”8 Though this Declaration is not
legally binding, between 1852 and 1913 the United States enacted
compulsory education laws on a state-by-state basis, which laws
continue to fulfill the requirement contained in article 28.1.a of the
CRC.
The second requirement, free education, was widely debated
as shown in the travaux preparatoires, which indicate that “several
delegations expressed reservations concerning the obligation to provide for cost-free education, even at the level of primary education”;9
these hesitations resulted in the words “cost-free” being excluded
from the CRC and allowing states’ parties to require school fees or
taxation. The United States passed the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) allocating funds to public schools,
fulfilling the CRC’s requirement of education “available free to all”10
before the creation of the CRC. In addition, ESEA goes beyond the
elementary education requirement, allocating funding for secondary education, which funding not only fulfills but exceeds the hopes
expressed in the travaux preperatoires. The travaux preperatoires
indicate an obligation, “[to develop] various forms of secondary education, with a view to introducing cost-free education at that level.”11
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child, compulsory education
legislation, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act are
indicative of the United States’ complete compliance with article
28.1.a of the CRC.12

8

Supra note 3, at 20.

9

Detrick, supra note 6, at 477.

10

CRC, supra note 7, at 20.

11

Id, at 477.

12

Susan H. Bitensky, Chapter 9: Educating the Child for a Productive Life
(articles 28 and 29), in Children’s Rights in America: U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child Compared With United States Law 167-196
(C. Cohen & H. Davidson eds., 1990) (jointly published by the American
Bar Association and Defense for Children International – USA).
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Second, the United States is making efforts to encourage regular
school attendance and to reduce drop-out rates, both of which are
concerns expressed in article 28.1.e and recorded in the travaux preparatoires. During negotiation of the CRC a representative expressed
concern that negative measures would be taken for children “who
failed to attend school regularly.”13 As a result of these concerns, the
assembly determined that “[the CRC] was meant to promote positive measures by States’ parties to encourage regular attendance at
schools”14 rather than to punish those who did not attend.
To demonstrate that the United States is seeking to encourage
school attendance, Americans recognize the issue of truancy “as
one of the top ten problems facing schools”15 and are taking measures to discourage it. One of these efforts, mentoring, encourages
“attendance by providing the truant student a support system and a
sense of belonging.”16 An additional effort, Learnfare, seeks to “induce poor children to attend school on a daily basis”17 by denying
public assistance to families whose children regularly miss school.
These two programs are efforts to encourage regular school attendance; other measures suggested in the travaux preparatoires are
also met by the United States, including “the provision of schools
within a reasonable distance from children’s homes; transportation
to schools, in particular primary and secondary schools; and nutrition at schools, e.g. school lunches.”18
Third, the United States fulfills the intents of the CRC concerning family planning education, a requirement found in article
24.1.f of the CRC. Furthermore, even if adopted the CRC would not
necessarily increase the rights of minors to family planning educa13

Detrick, supra note 9, at 484.

14

Id.

15

Doug Rohrman, Combating Truancy in Our Schools—A Community Effort, 77 NASSP Bulletin 40, 40 (1993).

16

Rachel Spaethe, Survey of School Truancy Intervention and Prevention
Strategies, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 689, 697 (2000).

17

Michael K. Gottlieb, Pennsylvania’s Learnfare Experiment: Real Welfare
Reform or Politics as Usual?, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 151, 161 (1995).

18

Detrick, supra note 5, at 485.
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tion. Some scholars feel that ratification would provide “symbolic
significance”19 of the right to sexual education but would not cause
any significant change because the United States already provides
this service on a local level. By adopting the CRC, family planning
education would most likely be moved to the federal level in order to
more easily comply with the requirements of the CRC.
The federal government does not require public school curricula
to teach sexual education, but allows “each community and school
system to make determinations on what form sex education should
take in their particular school system.”20 Though it is not required
on the federal level, sexual education of some sort21 is required by
thirty-five states and the federal government dedicates more than
one hundred and fifty million dollars a year towards abstinence-only
sexual education.22 Some feel that ratification would be a positive step towards approaching sexual education from the perspective of minors’ rights, but others feel that this change must come
about through domestic law and could be made without adopting the
CRC.23 Thus, the United States already provides sexual education in
most states and proposed changes would “remain aspirational ideals
19

Leah J. Tulin, Can International Human Rights Law Countenance Federal
Funding of Abstinence-Only Education?, 95 Geo. L.J. 1979, 1989 (2007).

20

Alyssa Varley, Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: III.
Education Law Chapter: Sexuality in Education, 6 Geo. J. Gender & L.
533, 547 (2005).

21

“Thirty-five states…require public schools to include education about
sexually transmitted diseases, disease prevention, or reproduction in their
curricula” Alyssa Varley, Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality
Law: III. Education Law Chapter: Sexuality in Education, 6 Geo. J. Gender & L. 533, 547 (2005).

22

One federal funding program administered by the Department of Health
and Human Services began in 2000 and is called Special Programs of
Regional and National Significance---Community-Based Abstinence Education (SPRANS-CBAE) Leah J. Tulin, Can International Human Rights
Law Countenance Federal Funding of Abstinence-Only Education?, 95
Geo. L.J. 1979, 1989 (2007).

23

As Tulin states, “it is ultimately domestic law that must change” Id. at
2009.
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rather than concrete legal rights attaching to individuals”24 even with
ratification of the CRC, so with regard to family-planning education
the CRC is unnecessary.
Fourth, the United States complies with the CRC’s intentions
concerning higher education under article 28.1.c, which requires
states to make “higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means.”25 Community colleges provide
higher education in the form of associate and bachelor degrees for
a low-cost; they frequently offer merit-based awards, which comply
with the “basis of capacity” clause of article 28.1.c. In addition, the
Federal Government provides need-based grants—Pell Grants—to
undergraduate and post-baccalaureate students. Through community colleges and Pell Grants, the United States appropriately encourages higher education.
These four examples demonstrate that the purposes of the CRC
contained in the document itself and the intents expressed in the traveaux preperatories are fulfilled and even exceeded under current
United States law. It is therefore unnecessary to adopt the CRC in
order to fulfill the intents of the CRC concerning education.

III. Effects of Ratification on United States Law
Another concern of ratifying the CRC is that the stewardship
over education would be transferred from the state to the federal
level. This action would take power from the states, upsetting the
delicate balance of federalism. The principles of federalism which
would be endangered by ratifying the CRC have generally served
to strengthen the nation’s family law policies. This federalism has
allowed states to “adopt different family policies, and that has provided diversity, allowed experimentation, and fostered pluralism in
our nation’s family laws.”26
24

Id. at 2007.

25

CRC, supra note 7, art. 28.1.c, at 8.

26

Lynn D. Wardle, We Need A Federal Marriage Amendment, National Review Online, http://old nationalreview.com/comment/wardle200402170918.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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First, ratification of the CRC could jeopardize United States’
sovereignty in the field of education. If ratified, a United Nations
Committee would evaluate United States’ compliance with the
treaty. The Committee’s interpretation of article 29 of the CRC is
outlined in a document, “The Aims of Education.” This document
expresses that ratification will require implementation of the CRC
on “educational policies and legislation at all levels”27 by reworking curricula and revising “textbooks and other teaching methods
and technologies, as well as school policies.”28 While acknowledging
that reworking the educational system of the United States could be
beneficial, giving United Nations’ officials authority to monitor the
United States’ compliance with these articles does not appear to be
beneficial. The Committee further declares, “approaches which do
no more than seek to superimpose the aims and values of the article
on the existing system without encouraging any deeper changes are
clearly inadequate.”29 Even though the United States has not yet ratified the CRC, while evaluating the Optional Protocols that have been
adopted by the United States the Committee expressed its concern
that “the United States has accepted only what is already the law of
the United States.”30 Thus it appears that if the United States were
to ratify the CRC, they would in turn cede governance to an outside
body, diminishing principles of federalism essential to the United
States legal system.
Second, ratification would be detrimental to the principles of
federalism because it would override constitutional mechanisms
already in place. The United States’ judicial precedent, the Bill of
Rights, already reserves educational autonomy to the states. It explicitly states: “the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
27

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 1 (2001):
The Aims of Education, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001).

28

Id. at ¶ 18.

29

Id.

30

Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee United States of America, ¶ 279, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.50, A/50/40 (1995).
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states respectively, or to the people.”31 Education falls under these
rights not delegated to the federal government. Though there has
been much debate on this issue (as can be seen by the controversial
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)), nowhere in the Constitution is education enumerated as a federal responsibility, and thus
that right must be retained by the states.
Furthermore, increasing involvement by the federal government
in the educational system has had disadvantageous effects. The
NCLB is a significant example of some of the issues that arise when
educational decisions are taken away from the community and given
to a higher governing body.
In order for a state to receive federal funding, public elementary
and secondary schools must meet academic standards created by the
state.32 This achievement is demonstrated by yearly progress regarding economically disadvantaged students, students belonging to major racial and ethnic groups, and disabled students.33 Similar to the
CRC, the NCLB attempts to provide states the incentive to extend
equal education opportunities to children of all backgrounds within
the United States.34 However, this extension of federal power often
resulted in the exact opposite: lower testing scores for minorities as
well as lower standards for higher achieving students, all because
state standards were lowered in order to help more state education
systems qualify for funding available through the NCLB.
Moreover, the CRC is similar to the NCLB because it “calls
upon States parties to develop a comprehensive national plan of action to promote and monitor realization of the objective listed in [the
CRC].”35 The CRC does differ in expected outcomes and values when
compared to the NCLB, yet the failure of the NCLB is an example of
how local communities and parents feel about preserving their role
31

U.S. Const. amend. X.

32

20 U.S.C.S. § 6311 (2010).

33

See id.

34

The travaux preperatoires demonstrate the drafter’s concern that children
have equal opportunity to receive an education. Detrick, supra note 13, at
485.

35

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 26, at ¶ 23.
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in education. Adopting the CRC will conflict with communities and
parents’ interest in maintaining their essential position in education.
Third, in addition to upsetting Constitutional mechanisms,
adopting the CRC has potential negative consequences even if these
effects are not intentional.
The first possible situation would be the government going
beyond its Constitutional interest in the outcomes and educational processes. Although one of the CRC’s goals in education is to
“make primary education compulsory and available free to all,”36
the CRC Committee expanded this statement in the United Nations General Comment no. 1 Aims of Education to mean, “the
child’s right to education is not only a matter of access (see Article
28) but also of content.”37 As previously shown, the United States
already requires each state to provide free and compulsory education for all children, but the federal government would be required
to expand its current systems to ensure that the content of every
educational institution reinforces the values defined by the CRC38
including tolerance, equality of sexes and the principles enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations.39
For example, in a specific section of the Committee’s interpretation of the CRC entitled “Implementation, Monitoring and Review,”
the Committee specifies in exactly what areas education must be reworked with the adoption of the CRC. It states, “the effective promotion of article 29 (1) requires the fundamental reworking of curricula
to include the various aims of education and the systematic revision
of textbooks and other teaching materials and technologies, as well
as school policies.”40 Without mentioning exactly how this would
be done, and overlooking any potential conflicts with doing so (e.g.
without considering who will provide funding to accomplish this
task or how long it could take to review every educational material
36

CRC, supra note 7, art. 28.1.a, at 8.

37

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 26, at ¶ 3.

38

See id. at ¶ 13.

39

See CRC, supra note 7, art. 29.

40

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 26, at ¶ 18.
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that is currently being used) the CRC simply delegates this authority to the federal government. According to the Committee, nations
have too frequently failed to contain the elements embodied in the
CRC, and it “therefore calls upon all States parties to take necessary
steps to formally incorporate these principles into their education
policies and legislation at all levels.”41 If the United States were to
adopt the CRC, the federal government would need to be expanded
in order to ensure that every school provides the values promoted
by the CRC (e.g. tolerance and the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter). Though these values are not disadvantageous,
having a United Nations Committee determine whether the United
States is in compliance with those values could be. So, although the
CRC does not explicitly state the changes that must be made if ratified, the Committee’s interpretation of articles 28 and 29 exposes
some negative consequences of ratification.
A second possible effect of ratification concerns the possible
infringement on the freedoms currently given to private and home
schooling curricula. Though the CRC allows private individuals to
“establish and direct educational institutions,”42 they are “subject
always to the observance of the principles set forth [in the Charter
of the United Nations] . . . and to the requirements that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum
standards as may be laid down by the State.”43 This statement concerns home schooling organizations because parents are responsible for the education of their children. This right was confirmed by
the case Wisconsin v. Yoder, which indicated parents’ fundamental
right to “direct the upbringing and education of their children.”44
Current law in the United States does not require much approval
in order to educate one’s children; in some states (e.g. Illinois) the
only requirement to homeschool one’s child only requires a form

41

See id. at ¶ 17.

42

CRC, supra note 7, art. 29.2.

43

Id.

44

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
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indicating the name of the curriculum to be used as well as the
subjects that will be taught.
As the Committee has indicated, ratification would require the
federal government to regulate not only the educational outcomes
but also the processes whereby children are educated including the
content of the curriculum and the values taught therein, the pedagogical methods, the educational processes, and the “environment
within which education takes place.”45 The Committee specifies
one way of ensuring compliance: home and private school teachers would be required to attend “pre-service and in-service training
schemes.”46 These regulations that would be imposed upon parents
reject the fundamental right and obligation to educate their children.
A third situation in which the CRC would most certainly conflict
with current United States law concerns corporal punishment. Article 19 of the Convention states:
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the
child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury
or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, . . . while in the care of parent[s], legal guardian[s]
or any other persons who has the care of the child.47
Though corporal punishment (e.g. spanking) is not explicitly listed
as one of the forms of physical violence prescribed in the CRC, the
CRC Committee has made it clear that the CRC should be interpreted as prohibiting it. The Committee explains that “the use of corporal punishment does not respect the inherent dignity of the child
nor the strict limits on school discipline,”48 and that the practice “is
incompatible with the Convention.”49
45

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 26, at ¶ 8.

46

Id. at ¶ 18.

47

See CRC, supra note 7, art. 19.

48

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 26, at ¶ 8.

49

U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child Report on the Seventh Session, 63, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/34 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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While the physical protection of the child is paramount, article
19 prohibits actions that are currently allowed according to the Supreme Court. In the decision of Ingraham v. Wright (2007), Justice
Powell states that a prohibition of corporal punishment in public
schools—created by an extension of the rights found in the Eighth
Amendment—was not justified. He writes, “public schools [are]
open to public scrutiny and [are] supervised by the community,”50
and that such actions would “entail a significant intrusion into an
area of primary educational responsibility.”51 By handing over the
educational responsibilities of American children to the United Nations, the adoption of the CRC would entail such an intrusion. Responsibilities that have been delegated to schools’ communities (one
of those being the decision to allow corporal punishment) would no
longer be in the communities’ hands, but would instead belong to a
panel of international representatives.
The question of corporal punishment is still commonly addressed. For example, in Serafin v. Sch. of Excellence in Educ. (2007)
the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals rejected a
petition to challenge the allowance of corporal punishment. The ruling states, “there is a rational basis for allowing corporal punishment of students, and it is sufficient to survive an equal protection
challenge.”52 The “rational basis” mentioned above refers to what has
been discussed in the preceding paragraph: corporal punishment is a
decision left up to the individual communities (the states). Attempts
to prohibit these types of decisions would interfere with responsibilities that the Supreme Court has repeatedly delegated away from the
federal government.

50

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1976).

51

Id.
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Serafin v. Sch. of Excellence in Educ., No. 05-CV-62, at 4 (D. W.D. Tex.
Oct. 30, 2007).
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IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, ratification of the CRC on the grounds of education is unnecessary because the intents recorded in the travaux
preperatories and the aims of the CRC (outlined in Articles 28 and
29) are fulfilled by United States law. These purposes include providing children a free and compulsory education at the elementary
and secondary level, encouraging higher education where possible,
providing family planning education, and encouraging school attendance. These are all privileges currently enjoyed by children of
the United States without ratifying the CRC. In addition, the CRC
would upset principles of federalism and other principles underlying
United States law including the right and duty of the people to create
their own laws—ratification would require yielding discretion to a
foreign body. Furthermore, ratification would override constitutional
mechanisms contained in the Bill of Rights53 by putting education
into the hands of the federal government—a stewardship they do
not currently possess. Based on past experiences (e.g. the NCLB) it
seems that transferring responsibility over education from the state
to the federal government is not efficacious. Finally, ratification of
the CRC would take away the parental right to educate one’s child
and override long-standing precedents regarding corporal punishment. It follows that ratifying the CRC would be an unwise decision because ratification would provide few, if any, benefits while
overriding existing legislation, judicial precedents, and fundamental
principles upon which the United States is founded.

53

U.S. Const. amend. X.

Examining the Legal Foundations of Boumediene
v. Bush
by Dan Castellano*

I

I. Introduction

n Boumediene v. Bush1, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court
held 5-4 that enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, were entitled to the constitutional right of habeas corpus
and that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) combined
with the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) review process inadequately
substitutes for habeas corpus. As a result, Guantanamo detainees
may now petition the federal district court for a writ of review.
This monumental decision not only influenced the closing of the
Guantanamo facility, but demonstrated the Supreme Court’s willingness to go beyond the boundaries of law to define its role and
assert its power.2 The DTA system instituted by Congress constitutionally, and adequately substituted for habeas corpus; however, the
court provided inadequate reasons for striking down the DTA review
system. In addition, the decision neither improved the Guantanamo
detainees’ situation, nor did it speed up the process they must go
through to obtain judicial review. By examining the arguments made
by both sides and reviewing the Supreme Court’s majority opinion,
*
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Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
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Megan Gaffney, Boumediene v. Bush: Legal Realism and the War on Terror, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197, 197 (2009).
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I will show that the DTA had provided a review system that was a
constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed The
Authorization for Use of Military Force,3 which approved the use
of U.S. Armed Forces against “those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.” This law justified President Bush’s detention of suspected terrorists and ordered military
tribunals to conduct governmental prosecutions of the detainees.4
Furthermore, president Bush cited Johnson v. Eisentrager5 as precedent to establish the prison at Guantanamo Bay.6 In Johnson, the
Court decided that the U.S. judicial system did have jurisdiction over
German criminals of war detained in U.S. prisons in Germany. As of
October 2009, 221 detainees remain in Guantanamo Bay.7
In 2002 however, several detainees began disputing the legality of their detentions including Rasul v. Bush,8 which was the first
case to go to the Supreme Court for review. Rasul claimed that he
was entitled to habeas corpus review and challenged his status as an
enemy combatant.9 Although the district court previously dismissed
Rasul’s claims on the grounds of a lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the district court’s decision and
granted judicial review.10

3

Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).

4

Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665-68
(Nov. 13, 2001).

5

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, (1950).

6

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008).

7

The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study,
Governance Studies at Brookings (2008),www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_wittes.pdf.

8

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004).

9

Id.

10

Id. at 473-475.
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In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 11 decided shortly after Rasul v. Bush, the
Court reviewed the denial of habeas corpus to Hamdi, an American
citizen held at Guantanamo. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan
like Rasul; however, unlike Rasul, Hamdi was an American citizen.12
The majority held that “the Constitution guaranteed an American
citizen challenging his detention as an enemy combatant the right
to notice of the factual basis for his classification.”13 The majority
also stated that a “constitutionally adequate collateral process could
be provided by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal.”14 The process that was struck down as inadequate
in Boumediene provided a tribunal that met these conditions, as will
be shown hereafter.
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and
Hamdi, Congress established the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT). The CSRT permitted detainees to “contest their designation
as an enemy combatant.” This law allowed detainees to participate
in the proceedings by calling witnesses and presenting evidence.15
CSRT proceedings have resulted in the release of a few detainees,
but the majority of proceedings affirmed the detainees’ status as enemy combatants.16
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) to
prevent federal courts from having jurisdiction over petitions from
detainees at Guantanamo.17 The DTA provided that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien

11

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).

12

Id.

13

Id. at 533.
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Id. at 533, 538.

15

See Combatant Status Review Tribunal Process, sec. B, at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.

16

Robert M. Chesney, Boumediene v. Bush, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 848 (2008).

17

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680
(2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §2241(e) (2005) (amended 2006)).
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detained at Guantanamo Bay.”18 Guantanamo detainees were thus
prohibited from invoking habeas corpus.
Finally, congress later passed the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA),19 which “authorize[d] trial by military commission for
violations of the law of war” and prevented the federal courts from
hearing habeas corpus petitions from detainees.20

II. Case and Decision
In Boumediene, the petitioners sought review in district court for
two reasons: first, their lengthy detention without cause, and second,
their designation as enemy combatants by military tribunals. The
district court held that the MCA prevented all federal courts from
hearing petitions by stripping them of jurisdiction.21 Soon afterwards
the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.22
The Court of Appeals also held that the removal of jurisdiction by
the MCA was legal because the petitioners were foreign nationals
being held outside the United States.23
On June 29, 2007, after an initial refusal to review the case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Detainees argued that the right
to the writ of habeas corpus extends to detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. In addition, the petitioners argued that by enacting the MCA
Congress had violated the Suspension Clause, which prohibits the
suspension of habeas corpus except under certain conditions.24 However, because detainees outside the de jure territory of the United
States do not possess constitutional rights, including habeas corpus,
the actions of Congress did not violate the Suspension Clause.
18

Id.

19

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).

20

Id.

21

Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

22

Id. at 987-89.

23

Id. at 988-94.

24

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
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In their decision, the Court analyzed the history of the writ of
habeas corpus and noted that the Suspension Clause permits suspension only when public safety requires it.25 The writ of habeas corpus
protects individuals from unlawful imprisonment; the Court characterized it as a “vital instrument” and an “essential mechanism in the
separation-of-powers scheme.”26 The Court then turned to the issue
of whether the United States has legal sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. After acknowledging that Cuba, and not the United States,
retains de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, the Court held
that the U.S. maintains de facto sovereignty over the territory.27 The
Court held that the detainees have a right to review, and any abridgement of that right must follow the Suspension Clause.28
The petitioners also argued that the CSRT procedures under the
DTA inadequately replaced the writ.29 The government contended
that the DTA created a more efficient procedure that adequately substituted for habeas corpus review.30 After examining the CSRT procedures in detail, the Court agreed with petitioners that the tribunal
had the potential risk of detaining prisoners for unreasonably long
periods.31 As a result, the Court held that the DTA review process
was an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus review.

III. Legal Merits of Decision
In their opinion, the majority acknowledged that “practical
considerations principally influenced” its decision.32 One of those
practical considerations was that a few of the petitioners had been
detained for six years already and would likely be detained further if
25

Id.

26

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).

27

See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).

28

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.		

29

Br. for Petitioners, supra note 69, at 18-19.

30

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262.

31

Id. at 2256.

32

Id. at 2275.
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the Court required them to complete the DTA review; the “costs of
delay” were too high.33 In truth, the DTA procedures were adequate
substitutes for habeas review because they met all the established
requirements for a constitutionally adequate substitute. The majority
made legally weak objections to the DTA, which I will examine for
their legal merit.34
The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision held that the DTA was inadequate, but failed to specify which rights of detainees were not
protected under the DTA. In addition, the DTA processes required
less time than the new procedures. In describing these new processes, Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia pointed out in their dissenting
opinion: “Before bringing their habeas petitions, detainees must …
complete the CSRT process. Then, they may seek review in federal
district court. Either success or failure there will surely result in an
appeal to the D.C. Circuit—exactly where judicial review starts under Congress’s system.”35 In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision
added additional steps in the judicial review process for detainees,
with the original system requiring less time than the new procedures.
The DTA review process also adequately protected the detainees’
constitutional right of habeas corpus, which exists for the purpose of
testing the legality of executive detention.36 The DTA effectively protected this important right by providing an Article III court that possessed the power to hear claims and order the release of detainees.
The majority admitted that the DTA provided an Article III court
with the power to order release, but disputed the process.37 However,
in Hamdi, the majority held that “an appropriately authorized and
properly constituted military tribunal” provided a constitutionally
adequate process.38 This is exactly what the DTA provided and therefore, adequately safeguarded detainees’ habeas corpus rights.
33

Id.

34

Id. at 2274.
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Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2272 (2008).

36

Id. at 2273.
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Id.
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Furthermore, the majority mistakenly concluded that DTA review was the only opportunity available to Guantanamo detainees to
challenge their enemy combatant status; the majority also wrongly
characterized the CSRT process as a quick review of the Executive’s
battlefield determination.39 In reality, the Executive’s determination
of a detainee’s status is only made after a lengthy process involving “multiple levels of review by military officers and officials of
the Department of Defense.”40 In addition, the CSRT functions in
essentially the same manner as a court would: it gathers evidence,
calls witnesses, hears testimonies, and makes decisions based on the
legality of the detention.41 In addition, the CSRT has the power to order a detainee released if it finds he or she has been illegally held—a
requirement for a satisfactory substitute of habeas corpus.42
There is more to the DTA system than just CSRT review. As
Justice Roberts pointed out in his dissent, “CSRT review is just the
first tier of collateral review in the DTA system.”43 The statute of the
DTA gives the D.C. Circuit the power to consider whether the determination of a detainee’s status is “consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”44 A separate court then determines
whether the CSRT procedures are constitutional and whether the procedures are followed correctly. According to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, this
review process adequately satisfies any due process requirement.45
The majority in Boumediene v. Bush continued to justify its
dismissal of the DTA system by alleging supposed limitations of
39

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2284 (2008).

40

Memorandum of the Secretary of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (July 29, 2004), App. J to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 06-1196, p 150

41
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the system. In truth, closer examination of the DTA system shows
that the majority’s argument lacks factual support. They argued that
evidentiary limitations and the lack of legal counsel for detainees
made the DTA unsatisfactory.46 They further argued that permissible evidence is limited to that which is “reasonably available.”47
The majority added that the DTA system was inadequate due to the
inherent difficulties in obtaining evidence for enemy combatants
detained abroad. Yet in reality, evidence will be difficult to obtain
regardless of whether it is done under habeas corpus review or the
DTA because often the evidence must be obtained from distant or
war-torn countries. Therefore, it makes sense that evidence would
be limited to that which is “reasonably available.” In addition, the
DTA system permits detainees to present evidence, call witnesses,
question witnesses, and testify in court. The court’s conclusion that
the DTA system is insufficient lacks supports as it creates supposed
“limitations” that do not actually exist.
The majority then argued that the DTA system is inadequate
because it does not allow detainees access to classified material.48
The court reasoned that there is the possibility of exculpatory evidence being found within classified documents. In truth, exculpatory evidence inside classified material was wholly available at the
CSRT stage. Each detainee is granted a personal representative who
can review classified material and search for any such evidence. The
detainee’s personal representative may assist in arranging witnesses,
gathering evidence, and other procedures. 49 The court failed to appreciate the fact that CSRT procedures granted detainees adequate
access to classified material through their personal representative.
When examined more closely, it becomes clear that the judicial
review privileges under the CSRT process are actually greater than
those afforded to prisoners of war. Under the Geneva Convention,
46

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2290 (2008).

47
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prisoners of war are not granted access to classified material.50 Since
it should not be expected that enemy combatants be granted greater
access to classified material than prisoners of war in full compliance
with the Geneva Convention, how can the majority criticize Guantanamo detainee’s lack of access to such material?51 Furthermore,
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have been determined to be unlawful
enemy combatants, and as such should not be entitled to the same
rights as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. Detainees
at Guantanamo Bay are afforded equal or greater access to classified
material than prisoners of war and for this reason the DTA system
cannot be struck down as inadequate.52
It is important to remember that all of this occurs at the CSRT
stage. Detainees receive an additional review process before the D.C.
Circuit. At this stage detainees are granted full access to appellate
counsel and may challenge the legal and factual basis of their detentions.53 The majority is well aware that access to classified material
has never been granted to alien enemy combatants. Therefore, the
court’s difficulty with the lack of access to classified material is insufficient and irrelevant.
An argument of the majority was that detainees may not introduce newly discovered exculpatory evidence after their CSRT proceedings have finished.54 The CSRT procedures grant detainees the
ability to introduce exculpatory evidence before military tribunals
if this ability is denied contrary to the Constitution or the laws of
the United States; the D.C. Circuit has the authority to correct the
problem. The Court seems to fear a situation in which the CSRT
process confirms a detainee’s status as an enemy combatant based
upon evidence that is later shown to be false. The Court wrongfully
supposes that an enemy combatant would have no means of redress.
50
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This hypothetical situation that the Court fears has yet to come to
pass. Even if this situation were to occur, both the petitioners and the
Solicitor General agree that the DTA system allows the D.C. Circuit
to remand the case back to the CSRT stage.55
There exists another possible solution to the Court’s hypothetical situation: when new evidence is discovered, the Secretary of Defense can “direct that a CSRT convene to reconsider the basis of the
detainee’s. . . status in light of the new information.”56 In fact, the
DTA statute specifically directs the Secretary of Defense to “provide
for periodic review of any new evidence that may become available
relating to the enemy combatant status of a detainee.”57 As Chief
Justice Roberts wrote, “if this is the most the Court can muster, the
ice beneath its feet is thin indeed.”58

IV. Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush to grant habeas corpus privileges to enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay
rests on a weak legal foundation. The Court failed to understand and
evaluate the DTA system as a legal and adequate substitute for habeas corpus review. Closer examination shows that the Court’s decision
was not based on solid legal precedent but must have been influenced
by non-legal considerations. Therefore, it is imperative that judges
rely more on legal precedent in making their decisions. The DTA
system provided an Article III court with the power to order release
and allowed detainees to present evidence, question witnesses, and
testify with the assistance of a personal representative at the CSRT
review stage. It also contained adequate protections for detainees
55
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who might be wrongfully determined to be enemy combatants at
the CSRT stage. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision to strike down
the DTA as inadequate will force detainees to follow a new process:
detainees will now be required to complete the CSRT process before
bringing their claim to the federal district court and eventually to
the D.C. Circuit. This new process guarantees additional delay by
increasing redundancy to an already difficult process.

The Reasonableness Standard: Why School
Strip Searches Require a More Definitive Legal
Precedent
by Brandon S. Healy*

Q

I. Introduction

ualified immunity is “a defense for an official who is being sued in his or her individual capacity for damages.”1
It “allows public officials to carry on their duties without
the fear of liability or the burdens of litigation”2 and often applies
in Fourth Amendment cases where an official’s capacity to search,
seize, or detain when acting reasonably in the line of duty is called
into question. The guidelines that govern the application of qualified
immunity are well-established in terms of legal precedence in general cases. However, for school searches, the concept is defined by
just a few cases contesting Fourth Amendment rights, most notably
New Jersey v. T.L.O.3
New Jersey v. T.L.O. involved two girls in a New Jersey high
school who were caught smoking cigarettes in the restroom. One
of the girls, named T.L.O., denied smoking until the vice-principal
*
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searched her purse and found marijuana, a pipe, rolling paper, a wad
of dollar bills, and a list of students to whom she had dealt marijuana. After T.L.O. filed suit, lower courts determined that her rights
were violated by the search. However, the decision was appealed to
the Supreme Court in 1985, who ruled that the vice-principal was
justified in her search due to qualified immunity, and that T.L.O.’s
rights had not been violated.
For the first time in history, New Jersey v. T.L.O. separated qualified immunity from the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment
to provide for the unique circumstances of school searches. The case
explained that school administrators are required to have “reasonable suspicion” to search or detain students without a warrant, rather
than the stricter “probable cause” required by the text of the Fourth
Amendment.4 This means that school administrators are less liable
than police officers while conducting searches for contraband on
school grounds during school hours because states have a preeminent responsibility to ensure the safety of public school students.
T.L.O. likewise established a set of guidelines for assessing
where “reasonable suspicion” applies. These guidelines were collectively named the “reasonableness standard.”5 According to the reasonableness standard, a search must be “justified at its inception,”
meaning that an official needs “reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.”6 Second, a
search needs to be “permissible in scope,” such that “the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.”7
The purpose of this article is to explain how T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard is too ambiguous and subjective to sufficiently determine reasonable suspicion, a problem which has precluded and will
4
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continue to preclude students from Fourth Amendment protection
against invasive search and seizure.

II. Ambiguity of New Jersey v. T.L.O.
T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard is too vague to sufficiently assess reasonable suspicion in school strip search cases due to its lack
of definitive content. “Reasonable suspicion,” a term created by the
reasonableness standard, is too broad and susceptible to different
court interpretations.
When T.L.O. created “reasonable suspicion,” it completely separated the term from association with “probable cause,”8 which was
the previous justification for strip searches. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion of T.L.O., argued that its ruling “sanctions school
officials to conduct fullscale searches on a ‘reasonableness’ standard
whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”9
If this is true, the content of reasonable suspicion should not directly
draw from the precedence of probable cause. Thus, when the concept
of reasonable suspicion was created, it lacked definitive precedence
to help clarify its meaning or determine how and when it could apply.
Additionally, T.L.O. did not include any definitive clarification
of the most fundamental phrases in its reasonableness standard:
“reasonable grounds,” “excessively intrusive,” or “whether the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of a search.”10
This ambiguity has led courts across the nation to disagree on how
to apply the reasonableness standard. Since the T.L.O. ruling, reasonable suspicion has been used as the standard for school searches,
but in the past twenty-five years, lower courts have “reached divergent conclusions regarding how the T.L.O. standard applies.”11 This
divergence has often lead to a paradox in which defendants who are
8

Id. at 341.

9
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found guilty of violating the Fourth Amendment are granted qualified immunity and exonerated.12
Ornelas v. United States interpreted the standards for reasonable suspicion as “fluid concepts that take their substantive content
from the particular contexts.”13 A more recent ruling read the standard as “a series of abstractions, on the one hand, and a declaration
of seeming deference to the judgments of school officials, on the
other,” rendering it impossible “to establish clearly the contours of a
Fourth Amendment right...[in] a wide variety of possible school settings different from those involved in TLO” itself.14 Adhering to this
reasoning should compel courts to discontinue the use of T.L.O.’s
reasonableness standard in a majority of strip search cases, limiting
its use to cases whose circumstances closely match those of T.L.O.

III. Safford’s Contributions to Qualified Immunity
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding15 highlights
the ambiguity and subjectivity of T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard
and provides additional evidence that the guidelines for assessing
school strip searches remain insufficient today. Safford involved
a 13-year-old girl named Savana Redding who was strip searched
when school administrators suspected her of drug distribution
on school grounds. The vice-principal and school nurse who performed the search did not find any drugs. A lower court determined
that her rights had been violated by this search. The decision was
appealed to the Supreme Court in 2008, who agreed that Redding’s
rights were violated based on T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard.
However, since the standard had a history of differing interpretations in lower courts and its legal precedence was therefore not yet

12
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14
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“clearly established”16 in school search cases, the school administrators were granted qualified immunity.
Because the Supreme Court determined T.L.O.’s reasonableness
standard was not “clearly established,” they created new directives
and further defined the content found in the reasonableness standard’s “permissibility in scope” test.17 Safford set the precedent in
defining strip searches as “categorically distinct,” requiring “distinct
elements of justification,” including at least a “suspicion that [the
search] will pay off.”18 This suspicion includes two directives: 1)
Was there reasonable suspicion of danger? and 2) Was there enough
reason to resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing
before intimate body parts were exposed? Safford also defined reasonable suspicion as “a moderate chance of finding evidence of
wrongdoing.”19 None of these directives or definitions were outlined
in the original reasonableness standard but were extensions of the
scope of permissible searches.

IV. Subjectivity of New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Assessing T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard as it applied in Safford yields evidence that the test both lacks definitive content and is
inherently subjective. The evidence also suggests that despite Safford’s efforts to clearly establish the law, courts will continue to be
uncertain of the correct application of the reasonableness standard.
Safford showed that T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard impels judges
to give unequal attention to the different requirements within the
reasonableness standard, which allows them to foster differing opinions based on subjective valuation.

16
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A. T.L.O. Impels Judges to Give Unequal Attention to Different
Requirements within the Reasonableness Standard
The judges in Safford assessed whether or not school administrators met the requirements of initiating a strip search according
to the reasonableness standard. These requirements extended to the
plausibility that Ms. Redding possessed dangerous drugs, the likelihood those drugs were in her underwear, and whether the testimonies of the witnesses involved were valid. Reasonable suspicion in all
of these areas was required to initiate a strip search. Unfortunately,
T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard forced the judges to give unequal
attention to these criteria based on their personal preferences.
An example illustrates the subjective application of the reasonableness standard and shows that Safford has not necessarily solved
it. Judge Clifton wrote the first Ninth Circuit majority opinion in
Safford and determined that Redding’s rights were not violated.20 He
found that administrators had sufficient reason to suspect Redding
of drug possession because both witnesses in the case gave valid
testimonies that Redding planned to distribute drugs to students.
Justice Souter, who wrote the final opinion of the Supreme Court,
determined that Redding’s rights were violated.21 He determined
that administrators had “no [reason] to suspect the drugs presented a
danger or were concealed in her underwear.”22
In their opinions, both judges commented on the validity of the
witnesses, the danger of the drugs, and their location on Redding’s
person. However, Judge Clifton clearly prioritized the validity of
witnesses, while Justice Souter gave more weight to the danger of
the drugs and whether they were concealed in Redding’s underwear. If the reasonableness standard were a more objective test, it
would allow judges to give equal consideration to all three criteria
and require all of them to be thoroughly addressed before proceeding. Instead, the judges were allowed to choose which criteria they
personally considered most important and ignore the others if they
20
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chose. Justice Souter dismissed the validity of the witnesses as a
negligible reason in and of itself, but he could have just as easily
dismissed the danger level of the drugs or determined reasonable
suspicion based on an arbitrary or invented reason, such as Savana’s
height or weight.
No legal precedent exists that establishes a formulaic hierarchy
of situation-specific reasons to warrant suspicion of a strip search
candidate. As previously noted, the standards for reasonable suspicion are “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the
particular contexts.”23 The reasonableness test needs to outline which
reasons the judges are to assess before rendering a final judgment.
Ultimately, judges cannot be expected to consistently determine
the reasonableness of a search if they are not giving equal priority to the same issues. While judges have the authority to disagree
concerning the contours of a right,24 a standard should exist which
requires them to assess all contours before coming to a decision.
T.L.O.’s standard enables subjectivity because it lacks guidelines to
equally assess all criteria. Safford achieved resolution because Justice Souter and the Supreme Court had the final say, but this disparity
in the reasonableness standard was never addressed. Additionally, if
judges have a difficult time determining reasonable suspicion, it will
likely follow that school officials will have difficulty deciding how
to proceed when faced with the option of performing a strip search.
B. If Safford Was Hypothetically Retried, Its New Precedence May
Not Have an Impact on the Judges’ Decision-making
In the instances where Justice Souter and Judge Clifton gave
equal attention to the criteria required by the reasonableness standard, they came to different conclusions concerning the criteria they
assessed. If the case were retried, this outcome would likely repeat
itself, despite Safford’s new precedence.
Justice Souter and Judge Clifton diverged on the issue of the
danger level of the contraband from the beginning. The first rule of
23
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Safford’s new test requires courts to assess the danger level of any
contraband that could potentially instigate a strip search. Both judges
considered this element in depth but arrived at different conclusions.
Justice Souter concluded that the items of prescription medication, though banned by the school board, were not sufficiently dangerous to justify a strip search. He argued that the school administration
“must have been aware”25 of that. Souter acknowledged that too much
of anything is dangerous, but “[administrators] had no reason to suspect that large amounts of the drug were being passed around, or that
individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.”26
Judge Clifton, on the other hand, focused on the testimony of
Shwallier, the school nurse, who informed administrators that the
pill in question was prescribed. She made it clear that the distribution of the pill to students without a prescription was a serious matter. The administration had experienced a similar situation at the
school earlier that year, in which Jordan, another student, had taken
nonprescribed medication and had become “violent and sick to his
stomach.”27 Jordan told administrators that students, including Redding, planned to distribute the drugs in large quantities.
Based on the preceding information, if Safford were retried under T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard in a future case, its new precedence would likely allow Justice Souter and Judge Clifton to reach
the same disagreement as before. Thus, Safford’s new precedence
was not aimed to specifically facilitate agreement among judges.
C. A Reasonableness Standard Which Fails to Facilitate Agreement
among Judges Is Not Ideal for Qualified Immunity Cases
While many cases may not be threatened when judges disagree,
and many more may be served by a diversity of viewpoints, qualified immunity presents a unique situation. When judges in qualified
immunity cases both use the reasonableness standard and disagree
about the contours of a right, problems arise.
25

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2009).
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Disagreement can create a quandary in qualified immunity cases, as qualified immunity is denied only if “no reasonable official
would have found the actions [of the defendants] justified.”28 Thus,
if even one judge finds the actions of a defendant justified, qualified
immunity should be granted. Because of the inherent nature of human preference (as illustrated by the track record of qualified immunity cases), qualified immunity is difficult to deny; it is far more
likely to be granted in ambiguous or subjective situations. Since Safford vindicates judges who disagree about the contours of a right,29
and since T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard demonstrates ambiguity
and subjectivity, it appears that the only solution is to alter the reasonableness standard itself.
If no amendments are made, Safford and other cases30 indicate that qualified immunity will continue to justify plaintiffs who
are found guilty of violating students’ Fourth Amendment rights.
To amend T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard such that its terms are
clearly established and qualified immunity is not liberally granted
to those who violate the Fourth Amendment, its subjectivity must
be tempered.

V. Conclusion: Establishing Contours
A strip search checklist may be a sensible solution to combat the
vagueness and subjectivity of T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard. The
checklist would be federally mandated in public schools, outlining
a step-by-step process required of school officials before performing a strip search. I suggest that the minimum requirements follow
the guidelines of T.L.O. and Safford, and specify the details Justice
Souter and Judge Clifton disagreed upon according to the following
criteria: (1) any contraband banned by the school board is considered
sufficiently dangerous to warrant a strip search, and (2) at least one
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reliable witness must specify that he or she saw the contraband hidden in the undergarments of the accused to warrant a strip search.
Although the checklist should be relatively extensive due to its
specific nature, it should not limit additional prerogatives instituted
by the state or school boards, including the ban of strip searches altogether. All prerogatives of the checklist should aim to explicitly
define the circumstances under which school strip searches may be
performed. This will allow public officers to be aware of the protections afforded by qualified immunity and allow students an awareness of their Fourth Amendment rights. Codifying directives will
compensate for excess time spent by future courts wading through
T.L.O.’s subjective standard. Unless the reasonableness standard is
dismantled and rebuilt, there may be twenty-five additional years in
which T.L.O.’s precedence is interpreted on a case by case basis.

Same-Sex Marriage and Polygamy:
A Non-Traditional Pairing
By David Lake*

I. Introduction

“

Organized chaos” is perhaps the best term to describe the scene.
Roughly 12,000 angry–yet peaceful–protestors converged on
Los Angeles City Hall in November of 2008, only a few days
after voters approved Proposition 8.1 They brandished signs declaring “No on Hate,” or “No More Mr. Nice Gay.” Passage of the highly
controversial proposition officially made homosexual marriage illegal in the State of California. Many voters felt that marriage should
only be permitted between one man and one woman, while others
believed that such ideology is discriminatory; “I hope that it shows
there are a lot more people affected by the choices we make on a ballot,” said Christine Pease, a protestor in Los Angeles.2 Although the
proposition brought the issue to a head in California, the controversy
was anything but new.
In April of that same year, just a few months prior to Proposition 8, a group of women shed tears as they spoke with reporters.
The women were part of a polygamist sect in western Texas, and
federal authorities raided their religious compound and had taken
their children. Photos of crying mothers appeared in the New York
*
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Times, causing many Americans to wonder if the raid was morally
justifiable. “I’m not going to just sit and wait,” said one of the mothers. “I have to do something every day to let them know that I want
my children back.”3
The two scenarios may seem disconnected; however, they both
display the controversy surrounding different forms of non-traditional marriage. Support for one of these non-traditional forms of
marriage may be greater than another, but modern culture’s understanding of “traditional” marriage appears to be changing. This article does not seek to advocate one form of marriage over another,
or even to argue the moral correctness of either, but rather to establish the legal relationship between same-sex marriage and polygamy. The inherent characteristics and legal implications of these two
forms of non-traditional marriage are similar. It follows, then, that
if same-sex marriage is determined to be legal, polygamy should
be legalized as well. Likewise, if polygamy is outlawed, same-sex
marriage must be also. The two institutions are conjoined, and legal
decisions concerning one will likely have ramifications for the other.

II. The Nature of Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Marriages

Even within the homosexual community, the connections between polygamy and homosexual marriage are recognized. In July
of 2006, an organization called Beyond Marriage issued a statement on rights for the Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender (LGBT)
community,4 which was subsequently signed by several hundred
people including university professors, labor union leaders, attor-
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neys, and activists.5 The statement outlines the political agenda of
the organization, which is essentially to “respond to the full scope of
the conservative marriage agenda.”6 The treatise declares that there
are other family relationships beyond “traditional nuclear families”
that are worthy of legal recognition, and that traditional marriages
“should not be legally…privileged above all others.”7 Among other
relationships, the statement notes that “households in which there is
more than one conjugal partner” are household relationships worthy
and deserving of legal recognition.8 Many proponents of same-sex
marriage recognize the similarity between polygamous and homosexual marriages and feel that both need to be advocated if either is
to be legalized.
To fully comprehend the similarities between polygamy and homosexual marriage, an understanding of how the two differ from
traditional marriage is necessary. Marriage, as it is traditionally understood in Western civilization, is a legal union between one man and
one woman, in which they form a family by becoming husband and
wife. Robert P. George, a professor of politics at Princeton University
and prolific author on marriage, delivered a forum address at Brigham
Young University on October 28, 2008 entitled, “On the Moral Purposes of Law and Government.”9 In the address, George said, “Marriage is a pre-political form of association, what we might call a natural
institution. It is not created by law, though law recognizes and regulates it in every culture.”10 Traditional marriage pre-dates politics and
thus, according to George, is natural to the human character.

5

Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision For All Our Families
and Relationships (Aug 4, 2006), http://www.beyondmarriage.org/signatories html.

6

Beyond Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 4.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Robert P. George, On the Moral Purposes of Law and Government (Oct.
28, 2008), available at http://www.byub.org/talks/Talk.aspx?id=2345.

10

Id.
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The union of marriage, George explains, is both emotional and
physical. In a marriage, the individuals express affection for one
another, as well as “permanence, monogamy, and fidelity.”11 Thus,
they become united emotionally. There is also a physical aspect.
As George explains, what makes marriage “different from all other forms of friendship and sharing, is the sharing is founded upon
bodily communion… Bodily union [is] made possible by the sexual
complementarity of man and woman.”12 By uniting both physically
and emotionally, the individuals in a marriage can become “one.”
Unions such as gay marriage and polygamy both seem capable
of fulfilling the emotional union required of marriage. Proponents
for the legalization of gay marriage argue that love is all that is needed for a marriage, and that homosexuals qualify for legal recognition of marriage rights. When speaking of marriage as an emotional
union, George states, “By this definition, two people of the same sex
can be emotionally united, but by the same token so can three or five
or seven.”13 Thus, the emotional connection in marriage (i.e. that of
expressing affection, permanence, fidelity, etc.) can be achieved in
both homosexual and polygamous marriages.
As noted previously, the physical aspect distinguishes traditional marriage from close friendships and non-traditional marriages.
According to George, “bodily communion” differentiates marriage
from friendship and sharing. “Two people can unite as a reproductive unit,” George explains, “but that’s not something three people or
five people do.”14 In a traditional marriage, the physical complementarity of husband and wife allow them to fulfill the physical aspect
of marriage and potentially form a family. Reproduction is a twoperson act, only possible between one man and one woman. Thus,
polygamy and gay marriage differ from traditional marriage in that
they fail to meet the physical criteria of having the potential to reproduce through bodily communion. Two individuals of the same
11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.
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gender are not physically complementary and do not have the potential to reproduce. Likewise, only two people can be involved in
the physical act of reproduction. Consequently, polygamous relationships fail to meet the physical criteria as well.
In order to be a “traditional marriage,” the union must meet both
the physical and emotional requirements outlined by George. If a
marriage does not fulfill both of these requirements, it is not traditional. The inherent characteristics of same-sex marriage and polygamy are similar, and the two can be considered connected. They
both fail to fulfill the physical aspect of traditional marriage because
individuals in these marriages are not physically complementary and
cannot form a reproductive unit. Proponents of same-sex marriage
advocate the idea that an emotional connection is all that is needed
for a marriage to be valid, and polygamous marriages fulfill the emotional aspect of marriage as well. Therefore, if such is the case, then
polygamy is as viable a form of marriage as is same-sex marriage.

III. The Reynolds Decision: Defining Tradition
In 1878, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that anti-polygamy
laws were constitutional, and that polygamy was not a viable form
of marriage.15 George Reynolds lived in the Utah Territory and was
a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which,
at the time, encouraged polygamous marriages. Polygamy, however,
was considered a crime.16 Feeling that the anti-polygamy laws violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion, Reynolds
appealed his case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided
that the law prohibiting polygamy was, in fact, constitutional. The
Court stated that a party’s “religious belief cannot be accepted as a
justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land.”17
Although polygamy was part of Reynolds’ religion, he was not justified in breaking the law that criminalized this non-traditional form
of marriage.
15

See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

16

Id.

17

Id. at 10.
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In his opinion, Chief Justice Waite describes part of the reason
why the statute prohibiting polygamy was constitutional. He explains,
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe…At common law, the second
marriage was always void…and from the earliest history of
England polygamy has been treated as an offence against
society…It may safely be said there never has been a time
in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an
offence against society.18
According to the Supreme Court, polygamy has always been seen
as an offense in Western civilization, especially in the United States
and under English common law. Chief Justice Waite implies that the
United States’ traditional abhorrence of polygamy derives from the
English tradition of the same. Thus, according to Reynolds v. United
States, laws prohibiting certain forms of marriage because they are
non-traditional are perfectly within the realm of the Constitution.
Polygamy was traditionally outlawed and “odious,” and therefore the
court was justified in upholding a law that criminalized it.
Although the law outlawing polygamy was upheld, the Reynolds decision presented a dilemma concerning homosexual marriage
laws. If laws prohibiting a form of non-traditional marriage, such
as polygamy, are constitutional because they are based on tradition,
then what does that mean for other forms of non-traditional unions,
such as homosexual marriage? As outlined by the previously noted
criteria, homosexual marriages do not fit the definition of traditional marriage. Reynolds v. United States set a precedent in declaring
that laws prohibiting non-traditional marriages are constitutional
if they are based on tradition, and the continuation of such ideas
has been seen recently in the raid on the aforementioned polygamist compound in Texas. Reynolds declared the criminalization of
polygamy to be constitutional, and set a precedent that continues
today for homosexual marriage as well. Consequently, laws prohibiting homosexual marriage are constitutional as long as the Reynolds
decision stands. If homosexual marriage is declared to be constitu18

Id. at 38-39.
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tional by the Supreme Court under the right to privacy and the “traditional marriage” argument is voided, then they may also overturn
Reynolds and legalize polygamy by default. This could be remedied,
however, if the court explicitly states that the marriage can only be
between two people.

IV. The Development of Privacy and the Erosion of Reynolds
Among the many arguments in favor of same-sex marriage, one
of the strongest is the issue of privacy. Supreme Court precedent
has established that whatever consenting adults do behind closed
doors is protected by the right to privacy.19 Proponents of same-sex
marriage infer the right to marry from the right to have an intimate
relationship without state intervention, as established through the development of the right to privacy in court cases such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas. In Justice Scalia’s
opinion for Lawrence v. Texas, establishing that consenting adults
have a right to privacy in their own homes, he states, “Today’s approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule an erroneously decided
precedent…if…its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent
decisions.”20 Therefore, as the argument for same-sex marriage has
been strengthened by the development of privacy rights, Reynolds v.
United States has been “eroded” away.
Griswold v. Connecticut established that the right to privacy exists in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,21 although it is not specifically enumerated.22 From the Griswold decision came the Roe v.
Wade and Lawrence v. Texas decisions. In the opinion of the court
on the Lawrence case, Justice Kennedy stated, “The most pertinent
beginning point [for the Lawrence decision] is our decision in Gris-

19

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 517 (2003).

20

Id. at 531.

21

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

22

See id. at 517. (“[T]he right of marital privacy is protected, as being within the protected penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights”)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
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wold v. Connecticut.”23 Thus, Griswold was the starting point for
the development of privacy rights that are now making way for the
legalization of same-sex marriage.
After Griswold v. Connecticut established that the right to privacy was implicit in the Bill of Rights, several other cases began to
emerge that defined the extent to which privacy is implied. In December of 1971, the Supreme Court reached a decision on Roe v. Wade.24
The Roe decision established a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy,
and laws prohibiting abortions were declared unconstitutional. In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the
Texas laws prohibiting abortion “were unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridged [Roe’s] right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”25 Thus,
the Court reinforced the jurisprudence established in Griswold by
reiterating that the right to privacy is implicitly found in the Bill
of Rights and that the right to privacy includes sexual decisions. In
speaking of a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, Justice Blackmun stated, “Appellant would discover this right in the concept of
personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy
said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras.”26 Therefore, the Court recognized that the right to privacy includes the right
to terminate a pregnancy, and likewise the Bill of Rights protects the
rights to “personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy.”27 To emphasize this idea, Justice Blackmun later explained that prior cases
establishing the right to privacy “also make it clear that the right has
some extension to activities relating to marriage,…procreation,…
contraception, …[and] family relationships,”28 so the constitutional
right to privacy protects sexual and marital choices.
23

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 517.

24

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

25

Id. at 158.

26

Id. at 163.
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As the right to privacy has developed through the Supreme
Court, so has the argument for same-sex relationships. After Griswold and Roe established a right to sexual privacy, Lawrence v. Texas emerged in the Supreme Court in 2003. In this case, the Court
found that a Texas law forbidding “two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct” was unconstitutional.29
The Court decided that if the act is consensual, then the government cannot intervene. In declaring the Texas law to be a violation
of the right to privacy, the court “placed emphasis on the marriage
relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”30 According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution shields whatever sexual
choices consenting adults make and creates the “marital bedroom”
as a private, protected area. In making this decision, the court declared, “Our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”31 Thus,
consenting adults can make whatever sexual choices they want, regardless of sexual preference. The court decisions and traditions of
the past fifty years, essentially beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, were deemed the most applicable in the case.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia makes several points
about the Lawrence decision that, at times, seem to echo the wording
of Reynolds v. United States. He states,
Our Nation has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting
sodomy in general–regardless of whether it was performed
by same-sex or opposite-sex couples… Proscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights.32

29

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 513 (2003).

30

Id. at 517.
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Id. at 538.
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Id. at 537.
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Thus, Justice Scalia argues that sodomy has traditionally been prohibited by law. Such laws, he claims, “have ancient roots.” Sodomy
was prohibited by English common law, which created a tradition for
American laws. All of the original thirteen States had laws against
sodomy when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Tradition, Scalia argues, is why sodomy should not be legalized.
If Lawrence v. Texas allows for same-gender sexual activity,
such as sodomy, in spite of a long-standing tradition of laws against
it, then what effect does that potentially have on other non-traditional sexual activities? Justice Scalia recognizes the potential snowball
effect that the Lawrence decision could have. He says,
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity… Every single one of these laws is called into
question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.33
If the Supreme Court permits non-traditional sexual and marital activities such as sodomy, which is protected by the right to privacy,
then the door may possibly open for other private, sexual acts as
well. The same right to privacy that legalized sodomy also extends
to “activities relating to marriage,” according to Roe v. Wade.34 If
the law permits same-sex couples to participate in certain sexual activities, and protects the privacy “of the marital bedroom,”35 then the
legalization of same-sex marriage is logically the next step. Justice
Scalia recognizes that laws against polygamy and same-sex marriage are called into question by the Lawrence decision.
Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence have all developed the right to
marital and sexual privacy, and the development of the right to privacy paves the road for same-sex marriage. With the development
of the right to privacy in the marital bedroom, laws concerning traditional marriage have been overruled and redefined. These decisions imply a change from the traditional laws regarding marriage
33

Id. at 533.

34

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 176 (1973).

35
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and sex, especially in the case of Lawrence. As Justice Scalia notes,
Lawrence v. Texas was decided in spite of legal tradition. Tradition,
however, compels the Supreme Court to declare anti-polygamy laws
constitutional in the Reynolds case. Consequently, if one form of nontraditional marriage is legalized, what does that mean for Reynolds
v. United States? As previously stated, Justice Scalia explains that
the Lawrence decision shows that a previous case can be overruled if
“its foundations have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent decisions.”36 The
Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence decisions have all eroded the foundations of Reynolds v. United States by ruling against tradition. If the
privacy cases eventually lead to a legalization of same-sex marriage,
then Reynolds will be eroded to the point that it will essentially have
been overruled. If one form of non-traditional marriage is permitted
in spite of long-standing legal tradition, then the other will need to
be permitted as well.

V. Canada: An Example of Things to Come?
As American society becomes more comfortable with the idea
of same-sex marriage, legislation and state court decisions are beginning to favor it. As of March 1, 2010, eleven states have either
legalized same-sex marriage or recognized a form of civil union or

36

Id. at 531.
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domestic partnership.37 How much time will pass until a Supreme
Court decision is handed down, and same-sex marriage is deemed
constitutional across the country? Once this happens, polygamy
laws are likely to follow suit.
This trend is already evident in Canada. Recently, in the case of
Blackmore v. British Columbia,38 a leader of a polygamous sect was
charged with marrying 19 women. According to his lawyer, their defense was based on the fact that Canada legalized same-sex marriage
in 2005.39 Blair Suffredine, former provincial lawmaker and Blackmore’s attorney in the case, stated, “If (homosexuals) can marry,
what is the reason that public policy says one person can’t marry
more than one person?”40 According to the British Columbia Attorney General, this case had the potential to be the first test of Canada’s polygamy laws.41 In September of 2009, this case was dismissed
on a technicality concerning the appointment of a special prosecutor,
and the court made clear that the case dismissal “[had] nothing to
37

The following states recognize same-sex marriage or some form of civil
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Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297 through 299.6 (2009); Connecticut: Civil Union,
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Dep’t of Pub. Health 440 Mass. 309 (2003); Maryland: Valid Marriages,
Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 2-201 (2010); Maine: Prohibited Marriages;
Exceptions, 19-A M.R.S. § 701 (2009); New Hampshire: Civil Union
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457:46 (2009); New Jersey: Civil Unions, N.J. Stat. §§ 37:1-28 through
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do with the merits of the alleged offences.” Thus, the court did not
make a decision on the polygamy charges, leaving the door open for
future interpretation.
Although about 85 percent of Canadians oppose the legalization
of polygamy,42 Blackmore’s defense was not as far-fetched as many
may believe. If people oppose polygamy and support same-sex marriage, their opinion is legally inconsistent. In 2006, Canada’s federal
Justice Department issued a report urging lawmakers in Ottawa to
legalize polygamy.43 According to the Canadian Press, the study was
“intended to provide the Liberal government with ammunition to
help defend its same-sex marriage bill,” which was passed in 2005.44
Although lawmakers in Canada have not followed the advice of the
Justice Department as of yet, Canadian governmental leaders seem
to recognize the legal connection between same-sex marriage and
polygamy. Clearly, Canada is a sovereign nation distinct from the
United States, but it is still a developed, Western, North American
nation that shares many of the same traditions and values of the
United States. If the legalization of same-sex marriage has opened
the door for the decriminalization of polygamy in Canada, who is to
say that the United States should be any different? Whether polygamy will be decriminalized in Canada following their legalization
of same-sex marriage remains to be seen, but the possibility is there
and is already presenting itself.

VI. Conclusion
The connection between same-sex marriage and polygamy is
an idea that some Americans have yet to consider. Many who have
examined it, however, may still dismiss it as a slippery-slope argu42
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ment and pay it no heed.45 Nonetheless, the connection between the
two exists, and the possibility of legalizing both is real. As traditional marriage is redefined in the minds of Americans in favor of
same-sex marriage, legal decisions are opening doors for polygamy
as well. The argument for same-sex marriage has been strengthened
by the development of privacy rights over the last 50 years. As privacy rights, including sexual and marital rights, have been strengthened and redefined, the foundation of Reynolds v. United States has
eroded away. Thus, as the argument for same-sex marriage has developed, the possibility of legalizing polygamy has become more
tangible. It is still possible that the Supreme Court will not permit
same-sex marriage, and that they very well may use Reynolds v.
United States as a precedent. However, if the court decides to legalize same-sex marriage, polygamy ought to, of necessity, be legalized
as well. They are twin issues, and any legal decision concerning one
will have ramifications for the other.

45

Id.

The Global Village and the Courts
by Tyson Lies*

I

I. Introduction

n this article, I will show how the “electronic global village” introduces unprecedented transparency in the courtroom. I will
investigate how the severity of this transparency places a strain
on both the due process rights of the accused as well as the dignity
of the courts. After considering some of the serious complications
that the global village creates for the United States’ state and federal
court systems, I will propose three courses of action that the courts
must take in order to adequately adjust.

II. History and Context
A. Public Trials and Cameras
According to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.”1 Drawing on a lengthy tradition of public trials
inherited from Britain,2 the framers of the U.S. Constitution hoped
*
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that keeping trials open would 1) guarantee that the accused would
be fairly dealt with and 2) provide a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution.3 For about a century following the drafting of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment
and its protection of public trials underwent little to no revision.4
Then, along came the camera.
B. Cameras
By providing the public with a new means for experiencing court
hearings, cameras brought a new dimension to the notion of a public
trial. Even after several decades of debate, the concept of a “public
trial” remains unclear. But even if the place of cameras within the
courtroom remains undecided today, it is clear that the idea of “public” and “courtroom” have been thrown into flux through the influence of cameras.
New Jersey v. Hauptmann in many ways marks the beginning of
the long and conflicted history of cameras in the courtroom. In 1935,
Bruno Hauptmann was tried for kidnapping the young daughter of
Charles and Anne Lindbergh. The media frenzy that erupted around
the proceedings was intense. For the first time in United States judicial history, newsreel cameras crammed into the courtroom balcony,5
bringing with them the disruptive “running about of messenger boys
and clerks.”6 The judge was eventually forced to bar all cameras
from the courtroom in order to preserve order in the hearing, and
Hauptmann was found guilty soon thereafter. Hauptmann stands out
in the historical legal landscape because it demonstrated for the first

3

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) as quoted in Estes v. Texas 381 U.S.
532, 538-39 (1965); see also Richmond v. Virginia 448 U.S. 555, 564-576
(1980) (presenting the history of public trials in greater detail).

4

Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 487, 492 (2009).

5

Christo Lassiter, The Appearance of Justice: TV or not TV—That is the
Question, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 928, 936-938 (1996).

6

New Jersey v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 444 (1935).

The Global Village and the Courts

81

time how “spectacular publicity and broadcast”7 could significantly
disrupt the basic functioning of the court. These disruptions in turn
unleashed a slough of questions that the courts had, up to that point,
never been forced to address.
One of the most significant questions to come out of Hauptmann
was whether courtroom walls can or should impose a limit on the
public’s ability to witness a trial. The pressing hordes of photographers and journalists that descended on the Hauptmann trial proved
that high-profile cases could garner substantial public interest.
Though cameras did enable journalists to become the intermediaries
between the interested public and the courts, the massive influx of
media representatives overwhelmed the court and made it difficult
for the trial to proceed. Consequently, court officials worried that
such media frenzies could lead to the “degradation [of] the court and
. . . misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public.”8
Hauptmann also increased concern over prejudicial publicity.
Though not a new subject of concern,9 prejudicial publicity before
Hauptmann was effectively limited to the printed word. With a camera, however, every picture could be a tool in declaring the guilt or
innocence of a party. Catch the defendant on a gloomy day or in a
sinister pose, for instance, and the photographer could create an unfairly compelling argument for a guilty verdict.
The disruptions that cameras caused overshadowed their potential usefulness and led the courts to eventually oppose their use inside
of the courtroom. Soon after Hauptmann, the American Bar Association, federal courts, many state courts, and Congress all took steps to

7

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 597 app. (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).

8

Rich Curtner and Melissa Kassier, “Not in Our Town” Pretrial Publicity, Presumed Prejudice, and Change of Venue in Alaska: Public Opinion
Surveys as a Tool to Measure the Impact of Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity,
22 Alaska L. Rev. 255, 262-263 (citing Model Code of Judicial Ethics
Canon 35 (1937)); cf. Estes, 381 U.S. at 596-601.

9

Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the
Court of Public Opinion, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1811, 1816 (1995).
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oppose cameras entering the courtroom.10 These restrictions did not,
however, preempt the possibility of future experimentation on the
state level.11 And as photographic technology progressed, the issues
that cameras presented in Hauptmann only seemed to multiply.
Sheppard v. Maxwell was one of a few different cases that reaffirmed many of the concerns that arose in Hauptmann. Sheppard
considered the potential for jury bias that is inherent with the encroachment of cameras on the courtroom and asked how due process
could be maintained in the face of greater transparency.
The trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard in 1954 fostered a “carnival atmosphere” like Hauptmann in large part because the details of the
case were so bizarre. 12 In 1954, Dr. Sam Sheppard was accused of
brutally murdering his wife, though he insisted that a “bushy haired
intruder” had bludgeoned his wife to death.13 The police and the public condemned Sheppard immediately, which led to a laxness in the
trial proceedings and enhanced the potential for jury bias.14 Coverage of the trial’s participants was constant, invasive, and one-sided,
placing enough pressure on the jurors15 that their verdict became
suspect.16 After an eleven year battle, suspicions of jury bias led to
Sheppard’s exoneration,17 a decision that underscored how visual
coverage could dismantle the judicial process.
Though cases like Hauptmann and Sheppard established some
unsettling precedents, the legal community’s opposition to cameras
began to yield over time. Though an affirmation of the courts’ long10

Joshua Sarner, Justice Take Two: The Continuing Debate Over Cameras
in the Courtroom, 10 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1053, 1066-67 (2000).
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1965, at E6.
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standing resistance to cameras, Estes v. Texas (1962) marked a turning point in the camera debate. In the first Supreme Court decision
related to cameras in the courtroom,18 Justice Clark noted that in the
future when “the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing
press or by television without their present hazards to a fair trial we
will have another case.”19 Estes therefore did not question whether
cameras should ever be allowed in the courtroom, but instead conceded that cameras would eventually find a place in the courtroom.
This concession, in turn, raised questions of how the courts would
in due course determine the appropriateness and manner in which
cameras entered a trial.
Building on the decision reached in Estes, the Court in Chandler v. Florida (1981) later considered whether the time of technical
advances foretold by Clark had been reached. Justice Burger, writing for the majority, still upheld the general rejection of “the argument … that the first and sixth amendments to the United States
Constitution mandate entry of the electronic media into judicial
proceedings,” yet he did note “the change in television technology
since 1962, when Estes was tried” and recognized that cameras did
not pose the disruption that they once did.20 In Chandler, the Court
also determined that “no per se constitutional rule exists barring still
photographic, radio and television coverage in all cases and under all
circumstances”21 and advanced pressing questions such as if cameras are no longer a physical disruption, to what extent are the actors
in the courtroom affected by their general presence?22
A similar contribution to the progressive immersion of cameras
into the courtroom, Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980) found
that the public and the media did retain certain rights of access to a
trial.23 These findings, in conjunction with the findings in cases like
18

Lassiter, supra note 5, at 938.

19

Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.

20

Chandler, 449 U.S. at 569, 576.

21

Id. at 573-574.

22

Id. at 572, 575-579.

23

Richmond v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78, 580 (1980).
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Chandler, have left us with a heritage in which the “fair administration of justice” is pitted against the rights of the media.24 Judges
always possess the authority to bar cameras from a trial if they feel
“that coverage may have a deleterious effect on the paramount right
of the defendant to a fair trial,”25 but beyond this restriction the fate
of cameras in courtrooms is still uncertain.
Understanding the impact that cameras have had on the courts
and the idea of a “public trial” provides an appropriate legal background for understanding the eventual impact that new media will
have on the courts. The issues surrounding Smartphones, social networking sites, and online forums all grow out of, or at least resemble, questions raised over decades of the camera debate. But while
cameras offered a limited venue for experiencing a handful of cases,
today’s technology has dismantled all barriers and opened the entire
world to greater public scrutiny. Technology has enabled the individual to connect with others constantly and access information effortlessly, and in the process has transformed the world into what noted
communication theorist Marshall McLuhan called a “global village.”
C. The Global Village
McLuhan notes that electronic technologies change the way we
interact and think, effectively shrinking the world and renovating
social and political operations in the process:
Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we
have extended our central nervous system itself in a global
embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet
is concerned…. Electric speed in bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion has heightened

24

Daniel Stepniak, A Comparative Analysis of First Amendment Rights and
the Televising of Court Proceedings, 40 Idaho L. Rev. 315, 346 (2004);
see also Chandler, 449 U.S. at 566.

25

Chandler, 449 U.S. at 566.
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human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree…. As
electrically contracted, the globe is no more than a village.26
Cameras introduce some serious concerns about the integrity of
a hearing, but cameras can be restricted at the court’s behest. The
global village, however, is more unwieldy, for as McLuhan notes it
compresses the world and enhances human ability to oversee social
and political processes. Through the power of Smartphones, posting,
texting, instant-messaging, uploading, etc. people can become “cameramen” capable of broadcasting the events of a trial to the outside
world. The key issues that cameras introduced have therefore not
only been revivified in the global village, but, because of increased
connectivity and enhanced speed of transmission, have been magnified to a new level of urgency.
The next three sections will detail some of the complications and
benefits that have arisen as the global village has encroached on the
courts. Rather than attempt to detail all the ways that the global village can affect the law I will only consider three key issues directly
related to the global village: transparency, threats to due process,
and the maintenance of court dignity. To further restrict the scope
of my considerations, I will show how these issues affect only four
of the basic players within the courtroom (jurors, judges, witnesses/
informants, attorneys). Taking into consideration the benefits and
issues set forth below, the final section will propose some general
actions that the courts can take in order to ease their transition into
the global village.

III. Transparency
The term “practical obscurity” has been used to refer to public
records that, though open to the public, are stored in such a way that
they do not easily lend themselves to public perusal.27 One could ar26

MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 3,5 (McGraw Hill 1964).

27

Will Thomas DeVries, Annual Review of Law and Technology: III. Cyber
Law: A. Privacy: Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 283, 300-02 (2003).
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gue that the courts as a whole have always operated with a measure
of “practical obscurity,” for though the judicial process is open to the
public the courts have always maintained a certain mystique which
distances them from public scrutiny. Centuries of judicial practice
have culminated in customs and procedures that assume the courtroom’s impregnability to exposure only to have the global village
threaten to strip this vital sense of security away.
A. Rising Issues Concerning Transparency
Cases like Hauptmann or Sheppard displayed early on that too
much transparency can overwhelm the courts’ basic functions. In
the global village, methods of communication like texting, posting,
uploading, or tweeting “broadcast” court proceedings just like cameras, but, unlike cameras, they do so inconspicuously. The global
village therefore allows for greater exposure of courtroom participants’ identities (like jurors, judges, or witnesses) while at the same
time helping to conceal the identities of those who would broadcast
such information.
The functional difficulty of protecting identities is obviously
a paramount concern as the courts move forward, yet it is not the
only concern that the courts must address in the global village. As
the public expectation to have information provided effortlessly and
abundantly grows, the traditional direction that jurors decide cases
based solely on the evidence before them destabilizes. For instance,
in a recent Florida drug trial eight jurors each decided to use handheld devices to perform outside research while they deliberated on
a case.28 These jurors’ offenses denote an underlying shift in the
public’s behavioral patterns which portend greater problems than
a simple “no search” policy may be able to amend. As people become accustomed to wirelessly searching the Internet, the tendency
to seek information becomes more of an ingrained behavior than

28

John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N. Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1; see also Editorial, Mistrial by
Google, The Boston Globe, November 6, 2009, at 15.
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a random action.29 Proscribing the use of handheld devices to perform online research therefore opposes the common tendencies of
potential jurors and thus demands that judges and courtroom officers
become more vigilant in patrolling for devices capable of connecting
to the Internet.
The global village not only undermines the directive that jurors decide cases based solely on the evidence at hand, but it also
augments the pressure that jurors feel by placing them under constant surveillance. This awareness of constant surveillance arises
out of the fact that as people have reached a level of comfort with
technology in their daily lives that same technology has introduced
more facets to the concept of a personal identity. For instance,
many people maintain presences on online social-networking sites.
Because these sites allow for the expression of personal beliefs and
interaction with other individuals, they become an extension of a
person’s identity. Just as a camera broadcasts a person’s image, social-networking sites broadcast a person’s reputation and allow for
criticism from other members of that person’s online community.
When people are called to serve on juries, therefore, the prospect
of audience members posting to online forums could influence juror decisions just as the broadcasting of their images might.30 As
Justice Burger noted with cameras, it is difficult to determine the
extent to which new technologies affect juror deliberations,31 and
thus courts must diligently monitor the tweeting, texting, or posting that takes place during a trial.

29

See PEW Internet & American Life Project, Wireless Internet Use
14-15 (PEW Research Center 2009) (“The rate at which Americans went
online with their handheld on the typical day increased by 73% in the sixteen months between the 2007 and 2009 surveys. The measure for “ever
having used the internet on a handheld” increased by 33% in that time
frame.”).

30

Cf. Audrey Winograde, Cameras in the Courtroom: Whose Right is it
Anyway?, 4 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 23, 36 (1997).

31

See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 Am. J. Crim. L.
63, 80-83 (1996) (the uncertain effect of publicity on a
verdict).
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A dramatic increase in transparency also means that judges must
worry about their performance before the eyes of the global village.
Some judges might feel as anxious by the presence of texters or bloggers as they would performing before a camera32 given the “instant
retrievability” of the Internet.33 On the flip side, the very possibility of public broadcasting, no matter what form, carries with it the
temptation for those judges up for reelection, as well as those judges
who just like attention, to show off for a Smartphone or other mobile
device.34 In either case, the ability of judges to control the trial and
deliver satisfactory and clear decisions may become impaired.
Anything that exposes witnesses and informants to the outside
world threatens their safety and thus undermines the role of informants in a trial. Texting or uploading posts on Twitter or Facebook
pose such a threat, but another more shocking example is the web
site whosarat.com. Whosarat.com was created in 2004 by Sean Bucci, a Boston disc jockey convicted in a marijuana conspiracy case,
and is devoted to revealing the names and identities of police informants. 35 A representative for the site claims that “it helps defendants
and their attorneys discover misdeeds by informants or government
agents—such as plagiarism or thefts of government funds—that can
be used to attack their credibility.”36 The possible negative and violent outcomes, not to mention the deterrent effect that sites like this
may have on witness and informant participation, have already been
exhibited in a recent federal drug trial. In 2006, a witness’s information and photo were posted on the site in order to intimidate the
32

See Sarner, supra note 10, at 1064.

33

Gene Policinski, The “New Media” and the Courts: Journalists and
Judges Consider Communications By and About Courts in the Internet
Era, 2009 Rehnquist Symposium 14.

34

See Sarner, supra note 10, at 1064. See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 548.

35

Emilie Lounsberry, Site that Snitches on Snitches Irks Judges: Whosarat.
com, Which Profiles Informants, Worries Some Jurists, Philadelphia
Inquirer, July 22, 2007, at B1.

36

Dan Browning, On the Internet: Controversial Website Names Names;
Its Founder Says its Goal is to Help Defendants and Their Attorneys, but
Others See an Effort to Intimidate, Star Tribune, Feb 15, 2008, at A10.
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witness. The witness’s safety was compromised and he had to be
relocated to a secret location.37 Though the witness still provided key
testimony that helped lead to a conviction, the impact that this event
had on future witnesses’ testimonies is indeterminable. Without reliable witness testimony in criminal cases, the judicial process suffers
and justice is left hanging in the balance.38
The courts have traditionally been removed from the possibility
of exposure, but now the global village has challenged the courts’
security. Of course, cameras opened the courtroom to the public
in a new and vivid manner, but the tools of the global village are
much more invasive and inconspicuous. If the courts wish to function within the global village, they must adjust their procedures and
customs to accommodate for unprecedented transparency.
B. Benefits of Transparency
Transparency can introduce so many problems that the potential for educating the public about the courts can often go
overlooked. Some modern technologies have, in fact, destructed
boundaries without destroying court dignity, and as Judge Lipez
noted in a petition hearing for Sony BMG et. al, “dramatic advances in communications technology have had a profound effect
on our society. These new technological capabilities provide an
unprecedented opportunity to increase public access to the judicial
system in appropriate circumstances.”39
In many ways, increased public exposure to court proceedings
through different media can be positive. Just as Justice Harlan noted
in Estes concerning cameras, the tools of the global village “might
37

Emilie Lounsberry, Stoking a Culture of Fear for Witnesses: A Web Site
Called the “New Enemy” of Those Aiding Prosecutions has Played a Key
Role in a W. Phila. Case, Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, July 26,
2007, at 1.

38

Id. (Philadelphia serves as a perfect example of how a “don’t snitch
culture,” enhanced by sites like whosarat.com, can create an environment
in which justice suffers. Police there have reported that witnesses and
informants are becomingly increasingly hesitant to come forward.)

39

Sony BMG et al., 564 F.3d 1, 11-12 (2009).
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well provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the public.”40 They might also be “capable
of performing an educational function by acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action.” 41 If the original thought behind
public trials was to ensure public oversight of the judiciary, then
the global village allows for the fulfillment of that ideal in a more
efficient and comprehensive manner. An educated citizenry could
mean a more engaged citizenry, which could mean more productive
and cooperative juries.
The global village also offers the courts efficiency and mobility
that they need in order to handle an ever-increasing caseload nationwide.42 For instance, judges and judiciary personnel can now perform business remotely over Smartphones and personal computers.43
The advancements of case-management systems, like CMECF and
PACER, have also made the court systems more efficient and increased public access to court records. 44
Though the prospect of transparency has some negative aspects,
some patrons of the global village have turned transparency on its
head and made it work for informants rather than against them. A
few different communities have initiated anonymous texting programs that allow people to send tips to the authorities without revealing their identities.45 Such systems are obviously in their infancy
and the legal ramifications are still yet to be determined, but these
40

Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring).

41

Id. at 589.

42

Workload of the Federal Courts Grows in Fiscal Year 2008 (Mar. 17,
2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/caseload.cfm.

43

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director 16 (2007).
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Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 481
(2009); see also Rebecca Love Kourlis & Pamela A. Gagel, Panel Three:
Systematic Justice: Reinstalling the Courthouse Windows: Using Statistical Data to Promote Judicial Transparency and Accountability in Federal
and State Courts, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 951, 952-53 (2008).
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Boston Globe, Nov. 29, 2009, at 6.
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systems offer an example of how the global village can be used to
increase transparency, bolster the pursuit of justice, and offer individuals greater opportunities for anonymity.
To navigate the transparency of the global village the courts
must alleviate the pressure of potentially constant exposure while
still managing to harness the opportunity to instruct the public and
increase efficiency. Though it may be difficult to negotiate a perfect
balance, the courts must address the dramatic increase in transparency if they wish to continue functioning properly. If the courts do
not address the global village, they will stumble in their ability to
carry out the demands of the law and the due process rights of the
accused will suffer.

IV. Due Process
The direct consequence of increased transparency is the endangerment of due process. Cases like Estes or Chandler have shown
that opening a trial and a courtroom to the world creates a constant
suspicion of the fairness and impartiality of that trial. Moreover, all
of the issues raised in the previous section can be viewed as obstacles to the proper functioning of the courts, but they can also be
viewed as direct threats to the due process rights of the defendant.46
A few more examples will show that the precedent set by cameras
translates directly into the global village, wherein threats to due process are inherent due to mass connectivity.

46

See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362 (“Due process requires that the accused
receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must
take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against
the accused…The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that
will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor
enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be
permitted to frustrate its function.”).

92

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

A. Threats to Due Process
From the beginning, opponents of allowing cameras into the
courtroom have insisted that the exposure of jurors could be damaging to the due process rights of a defendant in a criminal case.47 As
noted above, holdings in cases like Estes and Sheppard have powerfully displayed the potential for jury bias, and have introduced questions of whether a jury that is filmed (or, in the case of the global
village, observed and broadcast) can actually be fair and impartial.
The global village carries much of the same dangers for jurors
and due process that cameras introduced only the threat to due process has increased because the tools for broadcasting in the global
village are more personalized and unruly. The case noted above in
which numerous jurors performed outside research is an example
of how jurors in the global village can unwittingly complicate a
trial simply by performing actions that have become part of their
everyday behavior. In another case, a juror posted updates to Twitter
and Facebook as he sat through the corruption trial of Pennsylvania
state senator Vincent Fumo, an action that contributed to an eventual mistrial.48 These cases are not isolated incidents, but are part
of a growing epidemic that some have labeled “Google mistrials.”49
Of course, it would seem that by banning all cell phones and other
broadcasting devices from the courtroom the courts could stave off
any potential endangerments to due process. Such a move, however,
stands at odds with the general trend towards the acceptance of cameras noted above. Moreover, because Smartphones and other more
contemporary broadcasting devices are often for personal communication purposes, they do not easily fit into the same category as
the tools of the professional media.50 Banning the use of these new
47

Estes, 381 U.S. at 544-546

48

United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51581 at
*53-61 (D. Penn. June 17, 2009); see also Emilie Lounsberry & Craig R.
McCoy, Fumo Lawyers Target Juror, Deliberations, McClatchy-Tribune
Business News, Mar. 16, 2009.

49

Editorial, Mistrial by Google, The Boston Globe, Nov 26, 2009, at 15.
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See Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
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communication technologies raises new questions related to the audience’s freedom of speech and the suppression of public oversight.
Transversely, if witnesses are permitted to carry tools to communicate wirelessly inside and out of the courtroom, the legitimacy of
their testimony becomes suspect. Take a civil fraud case in Florida,
wherein a witness texted with another courtroom participant about
his testimony during a break in the hearing.51 This case shows that
seemingly harmless behaviors like texting and posting to web sites
are potential methods for coordinating and tampering with witness
testimony and can thus obstruct the defendants’ access to a fair trial.
The impact of transparency on defendants’ due process rights
is a major consideration for the courts as they move forward into
the global village. Prejudicial publicity becomes more of a reality
as channels of online communication open up new possibilities for
mobilizing public opinion. Not only is this a concern for high profile
cases, but even common cases with the proper online support have
the potential of “going viral.”
B. Benefits to Due Process
In addition to advancements like CMECF systems, the work
of judges and legal professionals in general has been enhanced by
blawgs—law-related weblogs—which allow for greater communication and peer review at a faster pace and with greater exposure.
Jack Balkin notes that the more numerous avenues of communication created by digital technologies “affect the style, subject matter, tempo, intermediaries, and audience for legal scholarship.”52
He also asserts that by decreasing the time it takes to publish legal
findings and increasing the opportunity for peer review and feedback, online media can shape future legal practice by opening up
the legal debate to individuals who previously were forced to sit on
51

Sky Dev. Inc. v. Vista View Dev. Inc., No. 07-32308 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009)
(order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice).
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116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 23, 25-26 (2006), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2006/09/06/balkin html.
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the sidelines.53 Obviously, anything that affects the quality of legal
arguments impacts judges, attorneys, and others in the legal process
and allows them to be better informed and to conduct better hearings. Moreover, more consistency or dialogue on legal issues could
help to streamline the legal process and could help the courts to
more adeptly handle their rising caseloads.
Facebook and other social networking applications can also
enhance the practice of the law in interesting ways. Recently, the
Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory accepted the service of a default judgment via the social networking site Facebook
when those being served proved nearly impossible to reach.54 As the
prominence of social networking sites grows, one can expect that
these sites will similarly become a useful way for tracking down
individuals involved in a case. Researchers have also begun looking
into how social-networking platforms like Facebook could assist in
streamlining the patent approval process.55 Because online forums
are so open and accessible, they hope that they will be able to enhance the “review and feedback” step in the approval process and
circumvent repetition of previously patented art.
As the world moves forward to even greater connectivity, the
boundaries for protecting due process must quickly be defined in
order to stem the crushing tide of transparency that the global village
creates. In doing what they can to control the effects of transparency, the courts can improve their own functioning as well as help
build a wall around individuals’ due process rights. By accomplishing both, the courts will then be able to protect against what cases
like Hauptmann posed as a serious concern: the degradation of the
courts’ dignity.
53

Id. at 25-26; see also Christopher A. Bracey, A Blog Supreme?, 116 Yale
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V. Degradation of Courts’ Dignity
Concerns over the dignity of the courts that arose in Hauptmann
have become even more pressing as the global village draws judges
and other courtroom participants into the spotlight. While cameras
provided only a single, straightforward view of the courtroom, the
global village allows for uncensored criticism of courtroom participants. If the courts sit by without continually assessing and, in some
cases, responding to this unrestricted commentary, their reputations
could be dragged into the mire with potentially harmful consequences for all involved. Judges stand to suffer the most by this potential
criticism, and by looking at how judges will be affected we can get
a sense of how the global village will negatively affect the dignity of
the courts in general.
A. Impact on Courts’ Dignity
Open, online forums create venues that, if not monitored properly, allow for the defamation of judges and thereby cast a pallor
over the legitimacy of judicial holdings. Web sites like RobeProbe
and The Robing Room, for example, each offer opportunities for the
public and legal professionals to comment on judges. While sites like
these can be a positive opportunity for public and professional oversight, the inherent bias of online forums could overshadow their use-
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fulness.56 Angry responses from frustrated judicial participants, if
not closely monitored by a web sites’ manager, could cast the courts
in a negative light and unfairly degrade judges in the eyes of view-

56

Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise
and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 Management
Science 1407, 1410, 1418 (Oct. 2003) (Dellarocos notes that feedback
mechanisms, like those found on online markets like eBay, have the innate potential for manipulation because they create a dialogue in spheres
where personal physical interaction is completely compromised (1410).
She describes the shortcomings of online feedback mechanisms, saying
“Economic theory predicts that voluntary feedback will be underprovided.
There are two main reasons for this. First, feedback constitutes a public
good: once available, everyone can costlessly benefit from it. Voluntary
provision of feedback leads to suboptimal supply, because no individual
takes account of the benefits that her provision gives to others. Second,
provision of feedback presupposes that the rater will assume the risks
of transacting with the ratee. Such risks are highest for new products.
Prospective consumers may, thus, be tempted to wait until more information is available. However, unless somebody decides to take the risk of
becoming an early evaluator, no feedback will ever be provided” (1418));
see also Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the
Challenges and Promises of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 741, 753-757 (2008).
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ers.57 Not only could this criticism undermine the public’s respect for
judges, but it could also encourage people to act rashly with only the
few isolated incidents recorded on a web site as justification.
Just as causes for criticism take many forms, backlash from increased exposure can range from a soiled reputation to threats against
the judges’ physical safety. Again, the precedent set by cameras provides insight into the ramifications of unrestricted exposure: in 1980
a trial court in Miami chose to televise a trial. When the verdict was
announced a riot erupted and fifteen people were killed.58 If this instance of violence serves as any sort of indicator as to how exposure
can incite violence against the courts, then the unlimited exposure
of the global village becomes an eerily daunting prospect. Indeed,
one must wonder how new media and the global village could have
contributed to the recent increase in violence against judges. 59
57

Robeprobe, http://robeprobe.com/about.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2010);
The Robing Room, http://therobingroom.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2010)
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Concerns over the dignity of the courts that arose in Hauptmann
have been magnified in the global village. Online venues open up the
reputations of judges and other court figures to public criticism, and
as interest in court proceedings intensifies so too can concerns over
the safety and integrity of the courts.
B. Benefits that the Global Village Offers to the Courts
The opportunities of cheap and constant communication enable
the courts to represent themselves more completely than ever before.
As F. Dennis Hale remarks, “Unlike many sources of quotations and
facts, information from court decisions is legally safe to publish….
The good news about appellate court decisions as sources of information is that today they are more public and convenient than ever
before.”60 To some, posting court materials online may seem more
negative than beneficial, yet as the courts adopt new technologies
they similarly gain access to unprecedented opportunities for representing themselves, opportunities which may allow them to circumvent the hordes of the media that some have claimed harm the
image of the judiciary.61 Supreme Court correspondent Tony Mauro
said, “Presidents and legislators have used television and radio for
decades to speak to the public without the filter of the media; for
broadcast-shy judges, the Internet offers the same direct pipeline to
the public.”62 The global village, therefore, puts power in the hands
of the courts to partially fashion public oversight and make it what
judges and other legal professionals have always wished it would be.
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62

Tony Mauro, Covering the Appellate Courts: Five Ways Appellate Courts
Can Help the News Media, 9 J. App. Prac. & Process 311, 316 (2007).

The Global Village and the Courts

99

VI. Analysis and Suggestions
The incidents listed above are by no means an exhaustive treatment of how the global village affects the courts; rather, they are examples of how an environment of constant communication can alter
the setting and circumstances within a courtroom. Because technology is changing constantly it may seem unproductive to prescribe any
sort of specific actions to address the global village, yet there are some
general actions that the courts, both federal and state, can undertake
in order to combat problems without sacrificing potential benefits.
A. Implement a System of Continuous Assessment.
There must be a uniform, central entity established within each
of the state and federal court systems devoted to following technological advancements and updating the legal community on how the
progress of new media is affecting the courts. By forming a single
authoritative entity rather than leaving the matter up to a conglomeration of entities spread out between different legal associations,
the courts will be able to centralize all efforts and ensure that they
have the most current information about the constantly evolving
global village. This central entity could serve as both an authoritative source on how communication technologies affect the practice
of law and could also facilitate an online forum where different professionals could post concerns, questions, and experiences with new
media. An online forum would similarly help the legal community
to avoid “reinventing the wheel” and would be an efficient, low-cost
way for the courts to remain up-to-date on rising issues.
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B. Use New Media Offensively to Minimize Damages Caused by
Transparency.
New media and other communication technologies are weapons
against themselves 63 Online forums and social networking sites provide the judiciary with numerous online venues for reaching different demographics and increasing public awareness of judicial news.
The cost and time required to maintian these online profiles are minimal and can be adopted into individual courts or the court systems
at large without great difficulty. This could help to demystify the
legal world to the layman, making it more comprehensible and less
imposing in the mind of the public.
C. Uphold Uniformity and Consistency across Court System
Much in tune with the federal court system’s current opposition to
cameras in the courtroom,64 the administrative bodies of the separate
court systems’ must take an immediate stance against the admittance
of externally controlled new media technologies inside the courtroom.
While some facets of the global village offer great advancements in
terms of communication and raising public awareness, a varied and inconsistent stance will open the courts to the risk of negative exposure and
could undermine the dignity of the judicial process and its participants.

VII. Conclusion
The global village has altered human communication, making
it faster, more efficient, and more constant. The impact of new electronic technologies and the transparency that they introduce can be
both positive and negative. If handled properly, the global village
can become a great opportunity for the courts rather than becoming
a tremendous burden.
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Cyberharassment: A Call to Federal Action
by Nick Peterson*

O

I. Introduction

n May 15, 2008, 49-year-old Missouri resident Lori Drew
was summoned before a federal grand jury in connection
with the suicide of 13-year-old Megan Meier. Drew, the
girl’s neighbor, was accused of creating a fake MySpace profile of an
attractive 16-year-old boy named Josh, supposedly to gain Megan’s
trust and to discover what she was saying about Drew’s daughter
online. Megan began an Internet relationship with Josh, but after a
number of weeks his tone changed. Affection suddenly turned into
invective as “Josh” unleashed a barrage of nasty comments and cruel
bulletin posts, culminating in this final pronouncement: “You are a
bad person and everybody hates you. Have a sh[---]y rest of your
life. The world would be a better place without you.”1 Minutes later,
Megan hung herself in her closet.
In time, the news of Megan’s death and the Internet hoax spread
throughout the country. After local prosecutors could not find laws
under which to charge Drew, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles charged Drew with violating MySpace’s Terms of Use.2 Drew
*
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was convicted by the jury on the highly controversial grounds of
violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, but she was subsequently acquitted by a federal judge.3 With no existing legislation in
place to specifically address cyberharassment, Drew was not judged
according to her questionable dealings with Megan, but according to
violation of an agreement with a website.
The nation’s legal system is not equipped with the proper legislation to handle such a case as United States v. Lori Drew, nor will it
be until serious acts of cyberharassment are defined and prohibited.
Although free speech4 must be protected on the Internet, the vicious
communication that characterizes serious acts of cyberharassment
should not be considered protected speech; because this behavior
can be so severe, and because it is a significant nation-wide problem,
federal legislators should prohibit serious acts of cyberharassment
and provide oversight of the enforcement of such law.

II. The Problem of Cyberharassment
Megan was a victim of what is now termed “cyberharassment,”
an emerging form of harassment that impacts people throughout the
nation. Cyberharassment, also termed “cyberbullying,” is defined as
“willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers,
cell phones, and other electronic devices.”5 The two terms are generally used synonymously,6 although cyberbullying often concerns
minor-to-minor interaction and cyberharassment usually refers to
acts committed by adults.7 With the relatively recent advent of the
Internet and the lack of legal direction and court precedent, cyber3
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harassment at present remains largely unchecked. Thus, victims are
often left without effectual recourse, and most perpetrators remain
undeterred and unpunished.
Cyberharassment can take the form of harassment, defamation, threat of harm, infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, public disclosure of confidential information, and so on.8
Of the various forms of cyberharassment, many instances of such
behavior would constitute actionable conduct when committed via
non-electronic communication. Such acts may result in considerable
harm, including substantial loss of self-esteem, loss of reputation,
humiliation, severe emotional and physical damage, and even suicide.9 While other cases may not be as severe, Megan’s suicide demonstrates how damaging—even deadly—cyberharassment can be.
A few recent instances of cyberharassment in Missouri are perhaps more typical cases of such behavior. In the first application of
Missouri’s new cyberharassment law,10 a 40-year-old woman was
charged with felony harassment for posting a 17-year-old girl’s photo,
address, and other personal contact information on Craigslist’s “Casual Encounters” section, a supposed “prank” which could have had
frightening consequences for the girl.11 Another adult woman was
charged with harassing a 17-year-old girl by sending a number of
lewd and threatening text and voice messages, some of which threatened rape, after hearing that the girl had a physical encounter with

8
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the woman’s boyfriend.12 These cases illustrate the reckless, even
dangerous behavior that can be associated with cyberharassment.
Furthermore, the victimization entailed in cyberharassment is
quite a different matter from traditional harassment and, in some
ways, more troubling. The very nature of electronic communication
(particularly over the minimally regulated domain of the Internet)
creates an environment for perpetrators seemingly free of repercussions. This perception of invisibility significantly “undermines the
impact of the potential for a negative consequence administered by
an authority or through social disapproval…[and makes] it easier to
rationalize an irresponsible or harmful action.”13 Perpetrators not
only feel safe from exposure, they also do not have to see their victims suffer. Without the “tangible feedback of face-to-face interaction…[perpetrators] are distanced from a perception of the harm that
their behavior has caused. The lack of tangible feedback undermines
feelings of remorse…[and] makes it easier to rationalize an irresponsible or harmful action.”14 Thus, the impersonality of such electronic correspondence drastically lowers social inhibitions. Moreover,
the near-universal accessibility of the Internet enables offenders to
strike at almost anyone from almost any location. All of these factors
combine to make electronic communication lend itself to brazen,
harmful, thoughtless acts of harassment and abuse.
Over the last decade, because of the increasing prevalence of
electronic communication, the problem of cyberharassment has
grown significantly.15 In 2006, a survey commissioned by the National Crime Prevention Council found that “slightly more than four
in ten teens (43%) report[ed] that they have experienced some form

12
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of cyberbullying in the last year.”16 A similar survey by Hinduja and
Patchin found nearly identical results.17 Furthermore, cyberharassment is also a growing issue among adults and in the workplace.18 Regardless of the venue of the harassment or the ages of those involved,
such behavior can result in irreparable damage; in fact, although the
circumstances surrounding Megan’s suicide are more extreme than
most cases of cyberharassment, several other recent suicides have
been directly linked to cyberharassment.19 People across the nation
are at risk, and without significant reforms this problem will only
worsen in this society of steadily increasing electronic interaction.

III. The Controversy of United States v. Lori Drew
The case of United States v. Lori Drew exposes a legal system
ill-prepared to handle cyberharassment. Although Drew’s actions
ignited an uproar of opposition because of the highly controversial
grounds of Drew’s charges, this case has also sparked a great deal of
criticism.20 However, when allegations against Drew became public,
it was clear that Drew’s behavior at least warranted legal scrutiny.
A fraudulent MySpace account had been created to lure, deceive,
16

Teens and Cyberbullying: Executive Summary of a Report on Research
Conducted for National Crime Prevention Council, Harris Interactive,
(2009), http://www ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/Teens%20
and%20Cyber bullying%20Research%20Study.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2010).

17

Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Fact Sheet, Cyberbullying.us, (2009), http://cyberbullying. us/cyberbullying fact_sheet.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010).

18

Greg Pitcher, One in 10 Workers Experiences Cyber-bullying in the
Workplace, Personnel Today, July 26, 2007, http://www.personneltoday.
com/articles/2007/07/26/41707/one+in+10+workers+experiences+cyberbullying +in+the+workplace html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).

19

Hinduja, supra note 5, at 66-68.

20

See Eugene Volokh, Federal Felony to Use Blogs, the Web, Etc. To Cause
Substantial Emotional Distress Through “Severe, Repeated, and Hostile’
Speech”, The Volokh Conspiracy, (2009), http://www.volokh.com/posts/
chain_1241740320 html (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

106

and manipulate Megan; humiliation and emotional damage were inflicted that ultimately resulted in Megan taking her own life. Despite
all of this, with no cyberharassment legislation in place, local attorneys could not find any substantial criminal charges with which to
prosecute Drew.21 It took a federal grand jury in California to convict
Drew of violating website policy for any legal scrutiny of her questionable behavior to ensue.22
Without cyberharassment laws or court precedent, U.S. Attorney Thomas O’Brien charged Drew with violating the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act by breaching MySpace’s Terms of Use Agreement, which requires users to provide truthful information about
themselves, to refrain from soliciting personal information from
minors, and to refrain from using MySpace services to harass or
harm other people.23 Initially the jury found Drew guilty, but after
an appeal in a federal appellate court, U.S. District Judge George
Wu dismissed all charges against her—stating in his opinion that
“If any violation of any term of service is [enough] to make the access unauthorized…it would…render the statute incredibly overbroad” (emphasis added).24 Judge Wu recognized that convicting
Drew would have had clearly chilling implications for the country’s
Internet-using population—many of whom likely never read a word
of the fine print before clicking “I Agree.”
The charges against Drew are not only highly questionable,
but they do not strike at the heart of the issue: with this approach,
the victim was not Megan but MySpace, and the charge against
Drew was not cyberharassment but violation of a tenuous website agreement. The issue at hand, however, is not the culpability
of Drew’s actions. The problem is that, with no cyberharassment
legislation in place, there is still no way to even determine the
guilt or innocence of Drew’s most significant actions. Without
public policy directly related to cyberharassment, loosely-relat21
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ed legislation was stretched far outside of intended bounds, and
thus, the seriousness of Drew’s actions escaped examination.

IV. The Need for Legislation
Present Internet policy and harassment laws do not provide victims of cyberharassment with sufficient opportunity for redress. At
present, most victims have three main options: they may (1) confront
the harasser in person, (2) report the harasser to the Internet Source
Provider (ISP), or (3) pursue civil litigation. The first option is clearly
inadvisable in many circumstances and could likely exacerbate the
issue. Of the second option, if the ISP does actually take any action,
at most it will only revoke accounts, remove comments, shut down
websites, or respond with other such measures.25 This does not significantly deter perpetrators, who can easily set up another account
under a different name and resume antagonism.
Most victims of serious cyberharassment are left with one remotely feasible option: civil litigation. However, while this may be
a viable option for some cases of cyberharassment, present harassment tort law is not designed to apply specifically to electronic media. Non-electronic harassment and electronic harassment should be
treated separately and distinctly, just like harassment in person and
over the telephone currently are; the behavior may be essentially the
same in certain respects, but the medium carries with it considerably different social ramifications and implications (i.e., the Internet
is the only social domain where one can be completely anonymous;
also, offenders are not limited by proximity to the victim, nor are
they deterred by the fear of confronting authorities). As a result of
these distinctions, civil or criminal non-electronic harassment policy
does not apply well to the open domain of the Internet.
Furthermore, civil law cannot account for instances of cyberharassment that are criminally severe in nature. In some circumstances, “cyberbullying rises to the level of criminal behavior,” for
25
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example, when it involves a viable threat of physical harm.26 While
many instances of cyberbullying may fall short of deserving criminal classification, some more exceptional, vicious, and harmful
circumstances may warrant criminal prohibition. To illustrate this
distinction, consider different acts of telephone harassment. A single
petty prank call is often more of a passing irritation than a criminal
act. However, when an individual targets another with malicious intent and begins a pattern of harassing, obscene, or threatening phone
calls, the offender abandons the bounds of protected speech and trespasses into the territory of criminal behavior.27 Such is the case with
cyberharassment; just because most instances of electronic communication should be protected does not mean that criminal behavior
over an electronic medium should go unpunished.

V. Federal Legislation and Enforcement
In April of 2009, Representative Linda T. Sanchez (D-California) proposed a federal Bill against cyberbullying titled the Megan
Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act.28 Of the proposed legislation,
Sanchez stated that “without a federal law [prohibiting] cyberbullying…cyber bullies are going unpunished….This bill sends a clear
message to anyone who commits cyberbullying: online actions will
have severe offline consequences.”29 On September 29, 2009, the bill
was sent to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime,

26
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Terrorism, and Homeland Security where it has remained since.30
The proposed cyberbullying law reads as follows:
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
any communication, with the intent to coerce, intimidate,
harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person,
using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) the term “communication” means the electronic
transmission, between or among points specified by
the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent
and received; and
(2) the term “electronic means” means any equipment
dependent on electrical power to access an information service, including email, instant messaging, blogs,
websites, telephones, and text messages.31
Although this bill is a step in the right direction, it has come
under a lot of fire since its introduction to the House. The major
concern most critics have with Representative Sanchez’s bill is that
it would infringe upon protected speech rights. Professor Eugene
Volokh, a renowned and outspoken defender of free speech, argues,
“The law, if enacted, would clearly be facially overbroad (and probably unconstitutionally vague), and would thus be struck down on its
face under the First Amendment.”32 Admittedly, in its present state,
30
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some of the bill’s language is problematic and overly vague, and it
does not convey the intent to uphold protected speech.
To improve the wording of the proposed bill, changes such as
the following ought to be enacted: (1) the bill should address the
overarching behavior of cyberharassment, rather than simply cyberbullying (to make it clear that this legislation is not only related
to minors); (2) speech should be liable only when it meets certain
specific qualifications beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., the speech
is transmitted with malicious intent, has no legitimate purpose,
would likely induce emotional distress or fear of physical harm in
any reasonable person in the same circumstances, and so on); (3)
the particular venues of the speech may require different standards
(i.e., speech on public blogs and websites may be viewed differently from more private means, such as email, text messages, instant
messages, and so on); and (4) the punitive measures should be differentiated between minor-to-minor behavior and behavior involving adults. There are likely other ways in which the language of the
legislation could be improved, but changes such as these would help
narrow the bill’s scope.
In the words of Representative Sanchez from a recent House
committee hearing, it is important to recognize “how difficult it will
be to craft a prohibition on cyberbullying that is consistent with the
Constitution.”33 However, with changes such as, but not limited to,
those mentioned above, her legislation would reflect her desire to
create a law that “distinguish[es] between an annoying chain email,
a righteously angry political blog post, or a miffed text to an ex-boyfriend—all of which are and should remain legal…and serious, repeated, and hostile communications made with the intent to harm.”34
Such a law could enable attorneys and officials to discern between
harmless and harmful instances of electronic communication and
could clearly prohibit serious acts of cyberharassment.
This position, however, prompts the following question: where
does one cross the lines between harmless teasing, significant harassment, and criminal behavior? The answer, as with many legis33
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lated issues, lies in legal definition and case-by-case judgment. For
a sexual harassment claim to be actionable, certain qualifications
must be met; the same is true with libel, hate speech, obscenity, and
other such tortious and criminal behavior. Federal legislators can explore the issue and prescribe rules or tests with which to determine
whether cyberharassment behavior warrants legal prosecution. Law
enforcement and government officials would be responsible to use
good judgment to apply such criteria to the actions of those charged.
With such measures in place, legislation can be broad enough to be
effective, and yet narrow enough to avoid infringing on free speech
rights, thus bringing justice to both victims and perpetrators.
In addition, federal legislators should provide for federal oversight over the enforcement of such law. One way to implement enforcement of cyberharassment legislation would be to house it under
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) section on Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property. Within this section of the DOJ, the Internet
Crime Complaint Center (IC3) was established to provide avenues of
reporting Internet crimes and to provide for analysis and pursuit of
such claims. The IC3 offers the following procedure:
IC3’s mission is to serve as a vehicle to receive, develop, and
refer criminal complaints regarding the rapidly expanding
arena of cyber crime. The IC3 gives the victims of cyber
crime a convenient and easy-to-use reporting mechanism
that alerts authorities of suspected criminal or civil violations. For law enforcement and regulatory agencies at the
federal, state, and local level, IC3 provides a central referral mechanism for complaints involving Internet related
crimes.35
Similar reporting and enforcing measures used to combat other
forms of Internet crime could be adopted to address cyberharassment. While not all cases will amount to actionable behavior, the
injured party will at least be instructed on how to proceed and ad35
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dress the issue. To avoid being inundated with petty claims or false
accusations, the DOJ may have to establish qualifications with which
to sift through the claims to find those that are legitimate and viable.
With this information in mind, however, the purpose of this paper is
not to specify every particular of the implementation of federal law
and enforcement, but to demonstrate that there may already be organizations and systems in place that handle cyber crime that could be
adjusted to confront the national problem of cyberharassment.

VI. Responding to Objections
Potential critics might argue that cyberharassment legislation
could unduly limit free speech. While such rights must be upheld,
the government ought to ensure the protection and well-being of
its citizens. In the case of severe cyberharassment, the protection
of the health and safety of American citizens should supersede the
protection of senseless, hostile speech. Boundaries should be set for
language employed solely to degrade, denigrate, and endanger the
innocent. As briefly mentioned above, telephone harassment is separately treated and federally criminalized by the Communications
Act. This addendum to the U.S. Code makes placing telephone calls
“with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person” a
federal offense worthy of a hefty fine or up to two years imprisonment.36 Since the federal government deems it necessary to protect
the safety and well-being of its citizens from unreasonable telephone
harassment, it is reasonable to expect such protection from similar
(or even more serious) behavior over the Internet or other electronic
media.
Furthermore, in recent years legislators have expanded the scope
of the U.S. Code’s stalking prohibition to encompass electronic media. The statute now states that if any person “uses the mail, any
interactive computer service, or any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial
emotional distress to that person or places that person in reasonable
fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury,” then that person is
36
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guilty of a federal offense.37 While the intent of this prohibition is to
address the specific behavior of cyberstalking, a similar prohibition
of cyberharassment seems an intuitive extension of the same reasoning behind this prohibition of stalking over electronic media. In fact,
criminalizing serious acts of cyberharassment may even avert patterns of behavior that might develop into more dangerous patterns
of cyberstalking.38
The issue of cyberharassment legislation is especially controversial because it involves governmental regulation of free speech
over the Internet, something many people oppose. The ACLU, for
example, maintains that the “government should not be in the business of deciding what we all can and cannot see or do on the Internet. Those decisions are for all of us to make, and for all parents to
make, not for [the] government to make.”39 While the government
has largely taken a sort of laissez-faire approach to online speech,
there are certain cases in which the government—in the interest of
the well-being of its citizens—has regulated free speech on the Internet. For example, the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to
protect consumers from deceptive commercial speech and practices
online. Of the FTC’s mission, Acting Director Eileen Harrington
stated the following:

37
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The [FTC’s] Bureau of Consumer Protection works to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent
practices in the marketplace. The Bureau conducts investigations, sues companies and people who violate the law, develops rules to protect consumers, and educates consumers
and businesses about their rights and responsibilities. The
Bureau also collects complaints about consumer fraud and
identity theft and makes them available to law enforcement
agencies across the country.40
Thus, this federal agency regulates and restricts Internet speech to
protect consumers’ financial interests. Similar legal justification for
FTC Internet fraud and safety policy should be extended to Internet
harassment. Not only do citizens deserve protection from harmful
speech in the commercial realm of the Internet, but they also deserve
protection in the social realm of electronic communication.
With all of this in mind, it doesn’t mean that teasing, name-calling, or appropriate public venting should be criminalized; intuitively,
language that could be spoken out loud without legal repercussion
should not be penalized merely because it is typed. However, behavior
that would be tortious or even criminal in the case of non-electronic
communication should be prohibited online as well. While some demeaning and derogatory language may be protected as opinion under
the freedom of speech on or offline, behavior that is senseless, malicious, severely harassing, or clearly threatening should be prohibited
regardless of the particular medium of communication involved.
Potential critics of federal cyberharassment legislation might
also argue that the problem should simply be dealt with on the state
and local level. However, cyberharassment is a nation-wide problem
unbound by state and local lines—thus it should be addressed uniformly throughout the country. In the years since cyberharassment
has surfaced as a serious issue, only a handful of states have adopted
legislation that directly prohibits cyberharassment; most state cyberbullying measures merely direct schools to establish cyberbullying
40
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policy.41 While schools should take action against cyberharassment
within their own spheres of influence, most cases of cyberharassment happen off school property and out of the hands of school administrators. Moreover, cyberharassment is not simply an issue of
disrupting the school environment, but it can be a matter of severe
harassment and denigration for youth and adults alike. The existing
sparse patchwork of public policy will not suffice in providing victims with recourse, bringing offenders to justice, or deterring potential cyberharassers.
Furthermore, while cyberharassment predominately happens
between acquaintances, it can also happen between strangers and
across state boundaries. The 2006 survey commissioned by the National Crime Prevention Council found that 41% of victims were unaware of the perpetrators’ identities or locations, many of whom may
have been in different states from their victims.42 All else aside, the
simple fact that this behavior can cross state lines mandates that, if
it is criminalized throughout the country, federal measures must be
in place for when it does become an interstate matter. The Internet
is a public, national domain not easily divisible by state boundaries; this does not mean that states should refrain from establishing
clear prohibitions of cyberharassment, but it means that this issue
often involves multiple states. If each state adopts different and even
conflicting cyberharassment laws, how can our legal system aptly
address conflicts of interstate communication? Just as the federal
government has established its jurisdiction over interstate Internet
commerce43 and our nation’s telephone network,44 so too should cyberharassment be dealt with on the federal level.
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VII. Conclusion
Cyberharassment occurs throughout the nation’s electronic networks, and it is time for federal legislators to take action against this
problem. However, the purpose of this paper is not to claim that federal legislation is the silver bullet for cyberharassment, nor to claim
that this issue should not be addressed by state legislatures. As with
many other laws, a certain degree of overlap between federal and
state measures can ensure that this problem is dealt with thoroughly
and effectively. While such measures will take care of the most serious cases, many instances of cyberharassing behavior will likely fall
short of warranting criminal investigation and prosecution. Nevertheless, federal legislation will lay the foundation for the nation’s
fight against Internet harassment. Without federal consensus and
legislation, people do not know how to confront cyberharassment;
they are uncertain about the limits of free speech, and about when
and how to seek legal redress. With such legislation, state officials,
law enforcement, educators, and parents will be prompted to consider this issue and to adopt more specific policies to prevent more
victims from sharing Megan’s fate. Cyberharassment can be combated, and through federal legislation the federal government can
and should lead the way.

Semantic Change in Supreme Context:
Semantics in the Privacy Line and Originalist
Interpretation
by Adam Prestidge*

W

I. Introduction

hether as characters on a page or as uttered syllables, language can carve nations. The meaning of a word gives it
power and application in society and conveys the intended communication of the writer or speaker. Semantics is the study
of these meanings.
The Constitution is the foundation of all law in the United States,
and all legal decisions must be in line with that foundation. It is the
“democratic task of the Supreme Court . . . to interpret the Constitution of the United States.”1 The judges of the Court fulfill this task
by determining the meaning of the words of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights, as well as the words of subsequent legislation and
court decisions. Those who interpret the meaning of the Constitution
are sometimes divided into two seemingly conflicting categories:
those who view the Constitution as a “living” document, evolving in
meaning over time, and those who view the Constitution as a static
document, written with definite meanings that hold true to their semantic origin and are justly applicable today. Those who subscribe
to the latter approach, called “originalists,” rely on “old dictionaries
*
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and other evidence of how the words in the Constitution were used
at the time of the founding”2 and apply that foundation as a factor of
modern legal decisions.
Two words that carry great semantic weight in the United States
legal tradition are privacy and liberty.3 These words are cornerstones
of the founding documents and modern decisions alike, and Supreme
Court Justices are frequently confronted with deciding what those
words have meant in the past and what they mean today. With the
significant and complex notions the words carry, privacy and liberty
shape American culture. What are those semantic implications, and
how are they to be interpreted and applied in American law?
While every word in language implies certain notions of meaning, these meanings can change. Semantic change is a function of all
language, with words gathering new notions that expand meaning,
narrowing to exclude previous notions, or shifting to entirely new
meanings. But when the meaning of a word in a law changes, the
meaning of that law also changes, which “raises an obvious issue for
the interpretation of our written constitutions.”4 As judges and legislators redefine a word through judicial decisions and laws, the cultural
understanding of that word (i.e., its meaning) will gradually shift and
conform, perpetuating semantic change.
This paper will discuss how semantic change poses fundamental
problems for the theory and practice of judicial originalism. Relying
on the presented evidence of semantic change and its impact in the
Privacy Line, I will discuss how semantic change affects the theory
of Originalism. I will make the argument that semantic change, occurring as shown, creates an inconsistent foundation of meaning on
which to base originalist interpretation. In this case with the meaning of liberty and privacy constantly in motion, it becomes unclear
from where and when original notions should be extrapolated. How2

Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 519, 519 (2003).
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ever, I will argue that in spite of semantic change, the legal system
actually does need some form of original semantic notions in law. As
a solution, I will present a linguistics-based approach to interpretation that accounts for semantic change, original law, and the needs
of an ever-evolving society.
A. Cases Referenced and Semantic Methods
In addition to referencing the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, this study makes significant reference to the so-called
“Privacy Line” of Supreme Court cases. This paper focuses on four of
the most influential and debated cases in the Privacy Line: Griswold
v. Connecticut,5 Roe v. Wade,6 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
PA v. Casey,7 and Lawrence v. Texas.8 In each of these groundbreaking cases, arguments on the meanings of liberty and privacy has been
central themes, and the changing semantics of those words have
played a pivotal role in their outcome.
In order to understand how the changing meanings of these
words have impacted American law and culture, we must turn to an
examination of semantic meaning and change. As the meanings of
liberty and privacy change, their effects in legal texts change; hence,
an argument based on liberty made in 2003 will have different connotations from an argument made in 1803, even though they are
based on the same literation.

5

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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II. The Semantics of Liberty and Privacy
A. Semantic Change Explained
“English words have been changing their meanings for centuries, and words are still changing their meanings today.”9 While linguists have identified many common types of semantic change that
words undergo, there are a few general principles that underlie these
changes. One of the principal tendencies of semantic change is for
the meaning of a word to often shift to what the speaker believes it
to mean. This may be influenced by individual circumstances and
schema, and by broader social and cultural forces. What the tendencies of semantic change have in common is a propensity for words to
shift from literal to figurative meaning.
Consider these simple examples: The word wave originally
referred only to a “movement in the sea,” yet in the mid 1800s, it
broadened to include the figurative notions of any “swelling, onward
movement,”10 such as a wave of emotion or a crime wave. A similar
shift can be seen in the word mountain, which could now be used as
a mountain of trouble, or of debt.
The evidence presented in this paper shows that the words liberty and privacy have also been affected by this “pervasive force
in semantic change,”11 shifting in meaning from the literal to the
figurative. This shift will be demonstrated by using dictionaries pub-

9

Hodder Arnold, Trask’s Historical Linguistics 43 (Robert McColl Millar ed., Hodder Arnold 2nd ed. 2007) (1996).
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lished from 1755-2003.12 Because dictionaries are written with both
prescriptive and descriptive elements,13 they offer the clearest reflection of what words mean and how they are used.
B. Semantic Progression of Liberty
Liberty has evolved through a long and steady progression,
adopting new notions that have changed the meaning of the word
significantly. The word has shifted from a freedom from literal oppression to a figurative freedom to act as one pleases.
In 1755, liberty was a notion of freedom from something, namely
slavery, tyranny, or oppression, with little or no consideration to individual
liberty in terms of choice or action.14 In 1853, the idea of liberty expands
to include notions of individual liberty of the will and mind, retaining,
however, the defining notion that liberty was something granted within
just restraints of formal government.15 The 1895 definition includes for
the first time notions of autonomy, “self-government,” and “freedom of
action.”16 This is the first instance in which the liberty of the individual
seems to operate somewhat independently of restraints of government.
12		Highlighting change through a series of progressing dictionaries shows
how some notions of liberty and privacy, which may have been peripheral
to the meaning in the past, have shifted to the core meaning in modern
times. While this does not verify every element of diachronic change in
the most empirical manner, it is representative of certain change that has
been occurring over the last two centuries. It should be noted that in the
field of historical linguistics, there is not an established convention for the
empirical verification of semantic change that is suitable for this study. In
the absence of such an empirical method, the lexicographical data cited in
this study seems to be a reasonable and valid approach. This method begins
with Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, the first of its kind.
13
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by its speakers.
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In 1937, the term liberty seemed to be contrary to any notion of
restraint, whether just or unjust. The phrases “exemption from compulsion or restraint in willing or volition” and “freedom beyond the
ordinary bounds” eliminated limits of liberty.17 With this elimination
of restriction, in 1969, liberty became drastically different than it
had been at the drafting of the Bill of Rights, coming to imply unrestricted choice based completely on individual desire: “The state
or condition of one who is free; exemption from restraint; power of
acting as one pleases; freedom.” In this instance, this definition is
completely void of any notion of restriction.
This modern idea of liberty without restraint is obviously contrary to the meaning of liberty in 1853, when Noah Webster wrote:
“The restraints of law are essential to civil liberty.”18
C. Semantic Progression of Privacy
The word private originated with the same foundation as the
word privacy 19—that of secrecy, seclusion, and solitude—but it also
carried certain notions that privacy did not, namely notions of particularity and peculiarity. These notions took on a sense of individual independence, and in the 1895 definition there developed a sense
of freedom associated with the word private, as in “characterized by
freedom from observation.”20
That sense of individuality became central to the meaning of
privacy. In 1937, the notion of independence and particularity became the primary entry of the definition, and the word continued
to develop, implying not only individuality, but a lack of formal17

The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language
490 (Virginia Thatcher ed., 1969).
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Webster, supra note 15, at 417.
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ized restrictions upon that individuality.21 In 1979, private was “not
open to, intended for, or controlled by the public.”22 By 2003, the
idea of something being private completely separated it from not
only observation or scrutiny, but from outside influence or restriction of any kind, “carried on by the individual independent of the
usual institutions.”23
This shows a clear shift from literal meaning to figurative.
Semantically speaking, the word private, and its resultant state of
privacy, has evolved from a simple secluded state to one of unrestricted independence.
D. Semantic Fusion of Liberty and Privacy
The result of the progressions of liberty and privacy is a semantic connection, a point where the meanings of the two words coincide. As liberty and privacy have evolved, they have shed notions
of restrictions on individual behavior while expanding the scope of
what is considered acceptable.
The 1979 definition of private was something that is “not open
to, intended for, or controlled by the public.”24 In 2003, when something is private,25 it was “carried on by the individual independent
of the usual institutions.” The idea of privacy became a protection of
unrestricted individuality.
Similar restrictions are dropped from the term liberty; in 1969,
liberty became the “power of acting as one pleases,”26 a concept
seemingly void of restraint. In 2003, liberty included the right to “the
21

Webster’s Universal Dictionary 1309 (Joseph Devlin ed., 1937).
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positive enjoyment of various social, political, or economic rights
and privileges.”27 What happens when the right to liberty without
restraint guarantees us a right to privacy without outside constraint?
Is anything then permissible behind closed doors?

III. Semantic Change in Supreme Context
The semantic shifts of privacy and liberty have had a drastic
impact on the Privacy Line, and it is easy to see how the words have
been used with their developed meanings. This section highlights
those changing uses and discusses how they affect the argument of
the specific opinions, demonstrating the reality of semantic change
in law.
A. The Fifth Amendment (1791)
No person… shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation. 28
Knowing that the country had recently declared independence
from England, and that slavery was a common practice, gives useful
context for considering the use of liberty in the Fifth Amendment.
Fittingly, the 1755 definition, “freedom, as opposed to slavery,”29 is
focused on freedom from the unjust restrictions of tyranny or inordinate government, and is a more literal definition because it has
not semantically gathered the notions of individuality and reduced
restrictions, as it does in later uses.
Likewise, we can assume based on the 1755 definition, that private, in reference to property, does not carry the notions of individual behavior and freedom that it does in later uses. With these

27

Merriam-Webster, supra note 23, at 412.
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notions, the Fifth Amendment is the foundation from which law and
semantics of the Privacy Line have shifted.30
B. The Fourteenth Amendment—Section 1. (1866)
Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. 31
Nearly a hundred years after the Bill of Rights was drafted, the
use of liberty is very different in the Fourteenth Amendment, at least
based on evidence from period dictionaries. Because these documents are worded so similarly, it would be natural to assume that
these amendments are guaranteeing the same rights, but examination of semantic shift reveals otherwise.
In Noah Webster’s 1853 dictionary, liberty is “freedom from restraint, in a general sense, and applicable to the body, or to the will
or mind.”32 The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall
“deprive a person of liberty [i.e. freedom from restraint].” Thus, by
saying that the state will not deprive a person of the freedom from
restraint, it could be argued that the Amendment is saying that without due process, the state will impose no restrictions on any person.
This argument undoubtedly favors those who would seek a removal
of government restriction on social behavior such as abortion or homosexuality a century later.
C. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Ninety-nine years after the Fourteenth Amendment was written, the case of Griswold v. Connecticut came before the Supreme
Court, examining liberty and privacy within a marriage in regards
30

The Fifth Amendment is not the sole foundation of the arguments in the
Privacy Line; several other amendments of the Bill of Rights are often
cited in these Supreme Court opinions, including the Ninth and the Fourteenth. It is however, the only amendment where both liberty and privacy
appear, and for this study is considered the semantic foundation of these
words as they appear in the Privacy Line.
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to the prescription and use of contraceptives. In his concurring
statement, Justice Byron White declares that the “Connecticut law
as applied to married couples deprives them of ‘liberty’ without due
process of law.”33
Around the time of the 1965 case, the 1969 definition of liberty
is “exemption from restraint; power of acting as one pleases.”34 Assuming that Justice White intended this use of liberty, his logic is understandable: telling a married couple that the use of contraceptives
is illegal is a restriction of their power to act as they please.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the court intentionally “has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,” but
does declare that the “concept of liberty protects those personal
rights that are fundamental.”35 While it is unclear which “fundamental” rights the Court is referring to, the opinion does include
discussion of the Ninth Amendment,36 which contains a provision to
protect more rights than simply those that are explicitly stated in the
Bill of Rights. But does liberty protect implied rights that evolve out
of semantic change, such as the liberty to act “as one pleases”? According to the majority of the Supreme Court in 1965, it does.
But Griswold v. Connecticut was not only a debate about liberty. It was also about privacy. In writing the majority opinion, Justice Douglas states: “The present case, then, concerns a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”37
But what is acceptable within that zone of privacy? In the late
18th century, when the Bill of Rights “guaranteed” a right to privacy,
private meant “not open or secret.” However, in the 1960s, those
guarantees expanded through the semantic expansion of private,
guaranteeing a protection of things that are “peculiar to one’s self;
33
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belonging to or concerning an individual only; personal.”38 It appears that the ruling of Griswold, allowing a married couple to use
contraceptives, is not a defense of secret behavior: it is a defense of
personal behavior.
As a result of adjudicating based on modern semantics in Griswold, the original notions of liberty and privacy were left in a state
of archaism. Based on the newly ratified modern notions, the rights
afforded by the Privacy Line continued to expand.
D. Roe v. Wade (1973)
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the modern legal meanings of liberty and privacy were established: the right to liberty protected a
right to privacy. With that decision as precedent, modern semantics
became ratified and a similar approach would be taken in Roe v.
Wade. While the cultural debate surrounding Roe centers on the morality of abortion, the Supreme Court case itself centered on whether
the right of a woman to have an abortion was a right protected by a
guarantee to liberty and privacy, and whether states had the right to
abridge that liberty:
The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas
statutes is that they improperly invade a right, said to be
possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate
her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the
concept of personal “liberty” embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital,
familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill
of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut…39
(emphasis added).
With Griswold having set the precedent, the decision in Roe makes
perfect sense in terms of semantics. Writing in a concurring opinion,
Justice Stewart wrote: “Several decisions of this Court make clear
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
38
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life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”40 Griswold v. Connecticut is one of those
previous decisions that established the semantic standard.
Roe v. Wade, with all of its emotion and hotly-debated issues
aside, was not the creation of a newer, more evolved meaning, but a
decision that was based on the meaning which developed and were
seen in Griswold, which had been ratified only seven years prior,
establishing a newer legal foundation.
E. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey (1992)
Twenty years after Roe, the issue of abortion was revisited in the
Supreme Court; not coincidentally, the semantic issue of liberty was
also revisited. The opinion written in Casey is longer than Griswold,
Roe, and Lawrence v. Texas combined, and it mentions liberty more
than 120 times.
Casey does not merely mention liberty repeatedly, but it actually
redefines it yet again: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.”41 While unpopular to some, the argument in Casey was built around this modern notion of liberty, that is,
“defining one’s own concept of existence.”42
The opinion builds on the modern semantics of privacy as well,
stating, “Our precedents ‘have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’”43 This statement presents the
idea that there is a private realm where individual liberties cannot be
restricted by the state. With this notion of privacy, it is not surprising
how subsequent cases in the Privacy Line have been decided.
This adoption of liberty and privacy as freedom from restrictions creates a predicament for the Court, which is charged with the
40
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41
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contradictory burden of placing restrictions on liberty, which is itself
a (semantically evolved) freedom from restriction. Acknowledging
this task, the Justices jointly write:
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption marks
the outer limits of the substantive sphere of such ‘liberty.’
Rather, the adjudication of substantive due process claims
may require this Court to exercise its reasoned judgment in
determining the boundaries between the individual’s liberty
and the demands of organized society.44
Yet in the same decision, having taken on the task of determining
the boundaries of liberty, the Court affirms that there is an area—a
private realm—where the state cannot enter, and therefore cannot set
boundaries. The result is not surprising: having built upon evolved
semantics, the right to semantically-modern liberty and privacy (in
this case, the right to abortion) is upheld as one that is not only protected, but “sacred.” 45
F. Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
Liberty and privacy both appear more frequently in Lawrence
than in any of the cases discussed, though it is the shortest, which
indicates the centrality of these words in this decision. However, the
discussion surrounding these words is very different. In the previously discussed cases, the opinions addressed the question: “What
do liberty and privacy mean?”
Lawrence v. Texas is unlike those opinions because it clearly defines the entitlements of liberty and privacy. In Lawrence, “the court
explicitly and unequivocally” 46 declares that the action committed,
44

See id. at 924.

45
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homosexual sodomy, is within the protection of liberty and privacy.
There is no question of what notions are implied, no mention of the
Ninth Amendment, only a strict application of the modern semantics
of liberty. Not surprisingly, in 2003 the definition of liberty reached
its furthest point from its origin in the Bill of Rights.47 Based on this
definition, the decision in Lawrence is automatic. If all people are
guaranteed a right to the “positive enjoyment of social, political, or
economic rights and privileges” as well as the right to “do as one
pleases,”48 two consenting individuals should absolutely be permitted to engage in any sexual activity they desire. This is especially
true in the privacy of their own home, where, according to the 2003
definition of privacy, actions are “carried on by the individual independent of the usual institutions.”49
In the following excerpts, there is little doubt what semantic notions Justice Kennedy applied as he defined what was legal within
the rights of liberty and privacy [italics added for emphasis]:
“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in
the confines of their homes and their own private lives. . .
.”50 “The Nation’s laws and traditions . . . show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex. . . .51 Petitioners’ right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention.”52
Liberty and privacy are cited hand-in-hand as seemingly complementary rights, a product of the semantic fusion discussed in the
previous section. While the previous cases defined what these words
47
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meant and ratified their modern semantics, Lawrence v. Texas definitively continued to define what is acceptable under the umbrella
of these modern notions. The case provided a final verdict on the
modern semantics of liberty and privacy—they had been defined,
ratified through use in judicial decision, and now stood as the standard by which laws would be measured.
Without mentioning the cultural consequences of this decision,
one thing is clear: semantic change did occur, and it had an indelible
role in the outcome of landmark Supreme Court cases.
G. Semantic Fusion and Constitutional Confusion
As is evident from Justice Kennedy’s intertwined usage of liberty and privacy, the two words became complementary guarantors
of the same right: the freedom to act as one desires behind closed
doors. As a result, the defense of liberty in Lawrence cannot be
made without a defense of privacy, and vice versa.53 Because of the
semantic overlap of liberty and privacy, any modern social issue regarding privacy “is now concerned less with institutions like marriage and the home and more with personal independence.”54 This
shows a clear difference from semantics prevalent at the writing of
the Bill of Rights.
Due to semantic shift in the Privacy Line, previous Court rulings55 and laws have been overturned and certain actions previously
prohibited have been legally accepted into society (contraception,
abortion, sodomy, et al.). What is left in the wake is a country divided on moral issues, with opposite sides claiming the Constitution as
the infallible source that proves their views correct. And depending
on interpretation, the Constitution can prove either side correct. An
examination of the Fifth Amendment with shifting semantic notions
illustrates what a confusing situation semantic change creates.
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With an originalist interpretation, employing the 1785 definition
of liberty, the Fifth Amendment states: “No person…shall be deprived of [freedom from slavery or tyranny.]”
With a modern interpretation, employing the 2003 definition,
the Fifth Amendment states: “No person…shall be deprived of [the
power to do as one pleases, or, the positive enjoyment of social, political, or economic rights and privileges.]”
As opposed as these theories may be, however, the law has been
declared based on modern semantics, and those modern notions have
a permanent place in American society.

IV. Semantic Change and Originalism
A. Impact of Semantic Change
Semantic change presents linguistic inconsistencies in the theory
of constitutional originalism. Originalism relies on a belief “that the
original understanding provides the authoritative source of constitutional meaning” and that “there is something normatively special
about the role, status, or institutions of the origination.”56 Judicial
opinion is based on a thorough understanding and reverence for that
original, with strict application of its meaning.
Yet semantic change makes it difficult for originalism to function as a reliable and consistent basis of interpretation. Shifting
meanings create a shifting interpretation of the original, and as that
interpretation becomes ratified through legal and judicial action, it
becomes more difficult to identify the original foundation, its meaning, and its role in modern interpretation.
B. Where Is the Foundation of Originalism?
One of the major flaws of originalism is that its basis is constructed on words that have an unclear and shifting foundation.
56

Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1482, 1484
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While the Constitution is the primary source for original interpretation, “[t]he applicable conventions were not fully settled at the time
of ratification, and the Constitution’s ‘meaning’ was correspondingly open.”57 Yet originalism is interpretation based on the adherence to original meaning that even the Framers themselves “did not
consider…to be fully settled.”58
For example, the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment are of equal standing in the Constitution; the wording is similar in both, and both are cited in cases in the Privacy Line. But it is
impossible to equally apply the same strict originalist standard of
interpretation to these amendments as they pertain to modern law.
While both amendments mention that “liberty shall not be deprived,” it is not clear whether the original meaning of liberty should
be drawn from the Fifth Amendment of 1791, or the Fourteenth
Amendment of 1866. If originalism holds true to the first-written
documents, and the meaning is interpreted to reflect the 1791 semantics, such an interpretation does not account for the semantic
change that might have altered the way that liberty was used in 1866.
In short, a strict interpretation based on late-1700s semantics disregards that later use, applying outdated semantic notions to a word
that had already shifted from those notions. Perhaps the writers of
the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware of the changed semantics of liberty, and their original intent was to have those notions
included. Shouldn’t their original intentions be honored?
However, it is no better to base original meaning off of the laterdrafted Fourteenth Amendment. As has been discussed extensively,
liberty of 1866 was different from liberty of 1780, and to base interpretation off of the Fourteenth Amendment simply dismisses the older
meaning of liberty in favor of the newer meaning. Despite this problematic contradiction, a word’s newer meaning typically dominates
its preceding meaning. Modern understanding becomes the rule, taking prevalence over previous interpretations. Likewise, an equal con-
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sideration of both meanings is prohibitively flawed, because a finite
original meaning cannot be based off of two divergent foundations.
If a foundation of originalist interpretation is not easily identified within the Constitution, perhaps it can be identified elsewhere.
This paper is written under the premise that original meanings cited
by originalist interpretations are based off of the Constitution, but
the words of the Constitution were used prior to the 1700s, and semantic change had been altering words for centuries. According to
strict originalist theory, should liberty be interpreted with consideration of its oldest English meaning? Or should liberty be interpreted
with consideration of the semantics of its Latin root?
Originalist interpretation is fundamentally based on the meaning of the “original,” but it is rendered seriously flawed when there
is no definite original.
C. Originalism and Legal Change
The lack of a clear textual original is not the only problem in
establishing the foundation of semantics in originalism, as judicial
interpretation is bound “not only by the text of code or Constitution,
but also by the prior decisions of superior courts.”59 Though a judge
may interpret the meaning of liberty in the Bill of Rights under very
strict originalist terms, he or she cannot ignore that a much broader
view of liberty was applied in Casey in 1992. “[W]hen the Supreme
Court . . . decides a case . . . the mode of analysis that it applies will
thereafter be followed by the lower courts within that system, and
even by that supreme court itself.”60 This creates a confusing obstacle when the notions of words used in a modern law “differ markedly
from the ‘original meaning’ of the identical words” as they appear in
the Constitution. 61 The incongruence becomes even more divergent
when the majority of the Court continues to adjudicate in line with
semantic change. This makes it more difficult for originalist judges
59

Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175, 1177 (1989).

60

Id.

61

Nelson, supra note 2, at 522.
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to adjudicate based on originalist interpretations because often “the
original understanding appears at odds with modern broad constitutional protection of civil rights.”62

V. Possible Approach
A. Why Originalism Is Still Necessary
In spite of the presented flaws, originalism is still part of the
solution. American law needs originalism. Without originalism, the
“dichotomy between ‘general rule of law’ and ‘personal discretion
to do justice’” becomes more extreme, with “personal discretion”
becoming the dominating factor in law.63 Left primarily up to personal discretion, “individuals’ own interpretations of law provide
the ‘push,’ shaping the new versions of legality.64
Respect for original meaning is what enables laws to be developed based on a system more consistent than individual interpretation: “Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the
formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory of construction.”65 While
originalism may be linguistically flawed, it “best promotes the virtues of certainty, predictability, and administrative efficiency.”66

62

Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 909, 913 (1998).
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Scalia, supra note 45, at 1176.
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Anna-Marie Marshall & Scott Barclay, In Their Own Words: How Ordinary People Construct the Legal World, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry, 617, 618
(2003).
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Scalia, supra note 45, at 1184.
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Simon, supra note 42, at 1485.
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B. The Linguistic Approach
As necessary as originalism is, this paper has established that
the originalist theory does have linguistic flaws because of semantic
change. So emerges a seemingly paradoxical question: How can law
retain original notions in a culture that both legally and linguistically
evolves beyond those notions?
Rather than suggesting a new theory of Constitutional interpretation, I will suggest a linguistic approach that may answer these
questions. The solution to this paradox may lie in combining original semantics with flexible pragmatics. This means that the original
meanings of words would be retained from when they were written,
but their application in a modern cultural sense would be more flexible in order to adapt to cultural needs.
While semantics deals with the meaning of a word and all of
the notions that it implies, pragmatics deals with understanding
in cultural context. For example, depending on context, a simple
phrase such as “I’m going to take you out” has very different pragmatic application. It could be a suggestion for a night out, a threat,
a promise of rescue, or something else entirely, depending on the
circumstances of its use.
Using this linguistic approach, a judge could have a very different
view of the phrase “no person shall be deprived of liberty.” With the
method here proposed, liberty could retain its original semantic meaning—freedom from bondage—but its pragmatic application in modern culture could be flexible and left to the determination of the judge.
For example, in interpreting a case in the Privacy Line with
original notions, a judge might have asked, “What did the ‘right to
liberty [i.e. freedom from bondage] mean at the time of the Constitution, and how can that be applied now?” This question takes original semantics and original pragmatics, and then attempts to fit them
to modern culture. Presumably, at the time of the Constitution, the
right to freedom from bondage meant not being bound in shackles
and forced to labor under a master or tyrant. But does that pragmatic
application still have the same effect today? Probably not.
However, using the linguistic approach here suggested, a judge
could instead ask, “What does ‘right to [freedom from bondage]’
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mean today?” Or, more specifically, “What does ‘right to [freedom
from bondage]’ mean in the case of a woman who desires an abortion, or in the case of a homosexual couple?”
This approach maintains a connection to the original anchor of
our country, the Constitution, the foundation of American rule of
law. While keeping this foundation, however, it would also allow the
interpretation of laws in question to be flexible, with their application adaptable as necessary to govern a constantly evolving nation.
Whether they are liberal or conservative, judges could cite the Constitution and its original meaning in their decisions. The pragmatic
application of certain phrases in the Constitution could be addressed
in modern context and changed as decided, without disregarding
original meaning or instigating further semantic change.
With this approach, perhaps the inconsistencies caused by semantic change in originalism might be resolved. Instead of continually redefining the meaning of the words of the Constitution, judges
could decide how those words apply in modern society. In essence,
judges could decide what the phrase “liberty for all” actually is, rather than simply “define the liberty of all.”67

67

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

Textualism and the Modern Judiciary
by Chris Rawlins*

T

I. Introduction

he confirmation hearings of Justice Sotomayor to the Supreme Court demonstrate that there is still much controversy
over the role of the federal judge and how he or she should
best execute this role.1 In a recent debate between Supreme Court
Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia concerning constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia argued that judges should rule
based on the original public understanding of the text, largely regardless of consequences (a theory aptly named textualism). Justice
Breyer, on the other hand, defended interpreting the text based on
broad constitutional principles in light of the consequences a ruling would have on society. Justice Breyer said that if Justice Scalia
were right, we should have nine “historians” on the Supreme Court:
men and women trained to find the original public understanding of
generations long past. Justice Scalia countered, saying that if Justice
Breyer were right, we should have nine “ethicists” on the Supreme
Court: men and women practiced in the study of right and wrong.2
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(Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://fora.tv/2006/12/05/Justices_Stephen_
Breyer_and_Antonin_Scalia [hereinafter Address].
139

140

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

Of course, we have neither historians nor ethicists; we have nine
lawyers. And while the study of the law is still considered to be
independent of other scholarly disciplines, the law now influences
many other areas of our lives. 3 This suggests that judges, in addition
to being historians and ethicists, must also be linguists, economists,
and administrators. This increasingly complicated role places more
pressure on the judiciary to contribute to a more perfect union and a
better-functioning society. Textualism is not a satisfactory nor complete method for interpreting the Constitution because it fails to account for these modern expectations of the government and the role
of the judiciary.
As a method of statutory and constitutional interpretation, textualism seeks to look only at the original public meaning of the text
of the statute or the constitutional provision in question.4 Textualism
suggests that judges be given a clear mandate of how to do their job
in order to prevent judges from exercising unrestrained judicial activism. Justice Scalia advocates textualism as a defense against the
dangers of judges making the law, rather than interpreting the law.
According to textualism, judges should decide cases on the words
that the lawmakers said, rather than trying to decide what the law
ought to say (the latter view being a theory that has been branded
“the living Constitution”), or looking for what the legislature or
framers meant to say (another theory known as “original intent”).
According to textualism, judges should rule only on the clear meaning of the text.
For Justice Scalia, The Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
is an example of a case when textualism should have prevailed but
did not. In this case, a church in New York hired an Englishman to
be its pastor. However, federal law clearly stated that it was illegal to
“in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any
alien…into the United States…under contract or agreement…made
previous to the importation or migration of such alien…, to perform
3

Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962–1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 762, 767 (1987).

4

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law 38 (1997).
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labor or service of any kind in the United States.… ”5 The law even
included a specific list of professions that were exempt from the statute and pastor was not included on the list. However, the Supreme
Court held that the church did not violate the law because “[it could
not] think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present case.”6 By ruling on its idea of what the
law should have been rather than the clear meaning of the actual law,
the Court effectively changed the law that Congress passed. Justice
Scalia argues that even if the legislature had intended something different, the Court should have held that the Church had violated the
law since the reasonable interpretation based on the text forbade it
from hiring the minister.7
Why does Justice Scalia feel that judges should behave in this
way? The ultimate authority upon which Justice Scalia bases both
the necessity and logic of textualism is the principle of democracy:
we are a nation based on the notion of popular sovereignty, with a
government following the principle of separation of powers.8 Textualism seeks to protect these institutions from the threat of judges
who rule based on what they think ought to happen without regard
for what the actual text of the law.9
There is also strength in Justice Scalia’s position that the “whole
purpose [of a written Constitution] is to prevent change,” change
that could presumably come at the hands of judges trying to respond
to changes in society.10 Justice Scalia refers to a now-famous line of
the Massachusetts State Constitution, “A government of laws, not
of men,”11 as evidence of the colonists’ efforts to eliminate de facto
5

Id. at 19.

6

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 458–59 (1892).

7

Scalia, supra note 4, at 22.

8

Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 49, 54 (1997); see also Scalia, supra
note 4, at 9.

9

Scalia, supra note 4, at 22–23.

10

Id. at 40.

11

Id. at 17.
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rule by capricious judges. The colonists wrote down the limits of
government in the Constitution and their individual rights in the
Bill of Rights.12
Another argument for textualist-based judicial restraint is that it
is very difficult for the people to overturn a Supreme Court decision
through the legislative process, especially in the case of constitutional amendments; the court normally has to reverse itself to overturn
a faulty opinion. Justice Scalia accepts the principle of stare decisis
(the practice of the current court respecting the decisions handed
down by previous courts) even when it requires upholding non-textualist opinions.13 Consequently, he must not favor frequent Supreme
Court reversal as a form of constitutional adaptation either. Judicial
activism is largely a one-way road; it is easy to lay down constitutional precedent, but it is difficult to overrule that precedent.
Critics of textualism doubt whether textualism can really work
as a guiding theory for judicial opinions. Even if our country came to
a clear consensus that our judges should be firm textualists, textualism still may not would provide clear judicial guidance. Textualism
depends on an original public understanding that modern judges can
recognize and adjudicate; however, in some cases it may be difficult
to for judges to determine the original public understanding or the
original public may not have foreseen the specific issues with which
we deal, and thus no public understanding exists.
Justice Scalia responded to such questions by asserting that his
job was not to show that textualism was perfect but simply to show
that it was better than any other method.14 Therefore, if textualism is
an internally workable theory and the original public understanding
can be known, understood, and applied, the question becomes “is
this what we want from our judges?” If textualism does not best assist judges in serving the needs of our society, then we should adopt
a different method of interpretation.

12

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 536–38
(1998).

13

Scalia, supra note 4, at 138–40.

14

Address, supra note 2.
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Proponents of textualism may immediately object to that idea.
To them, constitutional interpretation is inherently a textualist endeavor; if the role of the judiciary does not conform to textualism,
then the role of the judiciary should change. However, as Cass R.
Sunstein, a professor of law at the University of Chicago and a leading constitutional law scholar, asserts, “No approach to constitutional interpretation is mandatory. Any approach must be defended by
reference to its consequences, not asserted as part of what interpretation requires.”15 We must therefore analyze textualism according to
its consequences.
The debate concerning the proper role of judges is by no means
new. In fact, important transformations of society’s view of judges
began early on and continued throughout the revolutionary era. As
Gordon Wood, a leading founding era historian explains, judges went
from being much-maligned agents of the royal magistrate to being
seen as one of the three independent divisions of government power
subject to the people.16 In this latter role, judges were celebrated and
promoted as the only check available against tyrannical legislatures.17
With this justification, the framers of the Constitution established an independent judiciary as part of the broader government
system based on the separation of powers.18 Surprisingy, the Constitution is significantly imprecise about the role of the judiciary. The
judicial branch is broadly given judicial power extending to “all Cases, in Law and Equity.”19 However, the framers did not include in the
Constitution instructions as to how the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution, amendments to the Constitution, or statutes.20
In fact, the Constitution does not explicitly establish the Supreme
15

Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds 19 (2009).

16

Wood, supra note 12, at 452, 453, 460, 462.

17

Wood, supra note 8, at 50–54.

18

Wood, supra note 12, at 536–37.

19

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

20

Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 117 (2005); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 65, 76
(1997).
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Court as the final authority to interpret the Constitution. Some of
the founding fathers thought that each branch of government had the
right to interpret the meaning of the Constitution.21
However, in 1791, the Bill of Rights was passed. The Bill of
Rights significantly shaped the role of federal judges and established
the role of the Supreme Court. Also, early in the nation’s history,
interpreting the “fundamental law” of the Constitution came to be
seen as the prerogative of the Court, a shift manifest most strongly
by the Marshall Court.22 The combination of the passing of the Bill
of Rights with the acceptance of the Court’s claim to constitutional
interpretation meant that the judicial branch now had to protect individual rights from the overreaching Congress.23 The Supreme Court
was entrusted to be the legal check to protect the rights of the people.24 Such a responsibility entails significant amounts of interpretation of a relatively short text. Exactly what is the right to bear arms?
How far does the freedom of speech extend? What constitutes an
infringement of a right?
The difficulty of the Court’s role was accentuated as other
amendments were added to the original Bill of Rights. Following
the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment broadened the Supreme
Court’s sentry duties to include state laws and also introduced the
debate concerning incorporation of rights to the individual states, a
debate that still exists today.25
Even after the drastic changes following the Civil War era, more
drastic transformations followed. Since the 1960s, government has
become more involved with divisive issues such as abortion, sexual
rights, prisons, schools, the environment, and welfare.26 As govern21

Wood, supra note 8, at 61–62.

22

Wood, supra note 8, at 62.

23

Wood, supra note 12, at 543.
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ment has expanded into more areas of our lives, other areas of scholarship have expanded into the study of law.27 Also, at the same time
that statutes started dealing with a broader range of social issues, the
law seemed to move away from the common law toward a focus on
statutory law.28 This means that both the scope and volume of statutory law has increased, and this is part of the difficulty the Court is
facing. If the Court follows textualism in dealing with these changes,
it will become increasingly determined to seek the original understanding of the legislature.
However, it is also possible that judges will have to accept the
fact that a larger, more involved government requires judges who
base decisions not only on original public understanding but also
on realistic goals for government. In serving as a check on the other
branches of government and protecting people’s rights, the judiciary
will have to take on new roles.29 If we want our government to be
involved with the regulation of markets, then judges have to at times
be economists. Similarly, when dealing with individual rights and
the welfare of the state, judges at times will have to be ethicists.
There certainly are dangers associated with the expanding role
of government, and with it, the role of the judiciary. As government
(including the judiciary) receives more power, unelected individual
judges will have a great deal of control over our society. This is the
outcome that textualists try to prevent: judges imposing their own
will, rather than the will of the people as expressed through the laws
passed by the people’s representatives.30
However, a closer look at textualism shows that its weaknesses
prevent it from being the best theory for interpreting the Constitution. Textualism presumes a uniform, or at least a coherent and
discoverable, original understanding of statutes and constitutional
clauses. However, it is possible in many situations that there is not
a conclusive understanding about history and, even if there were, it
27

Id. at 767–68.

28
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would be very difficult for judges to find it.31 Justice Scalia makes
an analogous argument while criticizing the use of legislative intent when interpreting statutes. Citing Dean Landis, he dismisses the
idea that judges should search for the legislative intent as a guide for
deciding cases by pointing out that this practice can be a cover for
judges to in fact rule the way they think the case before them should
be decided32 (just as a common law judge).33 The objection to the use
of legislative intent is valid; if you are asked to decide what a reasonable person meant, you will probably say what you (as a reasonable
person) would have meant.34
Justice Scalia further argues that even if you agree with the principle of looking for legislative intent (which he of course does not), it
normally does not exist. Speaking of using legislative history (which
is the record of what congressional representatives said or had put
in the committee report) to determine the intent of the legislature,
Scalia made the following statement:
with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction
reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that
any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to
be false. Those issues almost invariably involve points of
relative detail, compared with the major sweep of the statute in question…. For a virtual certainty, the majority [of
both houses of Congress] was blissfully unaware of the existence of the issue, much less had any preference as to how
it should be resolved.35
Similarly, applying Justice Scalia’s argument about using legislative intent to constitutional interpretation, there is no original public
understanding of how the constitutional provision would deal with
the specific issue before the court. When ruling on cases stemming
31

Breyer, supra note 20, at 126.

32
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33
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from issues of a modern society and individual rights, understanding of the past will not always contain indications on how to rule in
a present-day case.36 In this type of situation, textualism does not
respond to the demands placed on the judiciary.
Even if the “original public understanding” could be found,
should we be bound by the public understanding of a society that
existed 200 years ago? Thomas Jefferson did not think so and suggested that each generation should write its own constitution.37 Jefferson’s idea obviously has not caught on; we must adopt a system
that allows for adaptation despite a relatively static constitution. Noted legal scholar Ronald Dwarkin points out in his response to Justice
Scalia’s article that the framers of the Constitution were “Enlightenment statesmen” who knew how to be precise in their language
when they felt the need to do so.38 Therefore, if certain constitutional
provisions seem frustratingly vague to modern readers, they likely
were meant to be so.39 They knew that they were setting up a government to deal with real lives and that these vague assertions would
have to find root in more concrete laws. Textualism presumes that
the framers expected the concepts of the Constitution to be filled in
by the understanding of their generation and that the original understanding would be accepted as the authoritative context for all future constitutional interpretation.40 As Professor Laurence H. Tribe
concluded, there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting that the
original understanding should become binding when the Constitution was ratified or when subsequent amendments were passed.41
Modern values of things such as gender and racial equality, perceptions of the role of government in the economy and welfare, and
36
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tolerances of speech and opinion differ from those existing at the
time the Constitution was established. If our understanding of the
law changes, then it is reasonable that judges uphold that new understanding. For example, textualism suggests that the freedom of
speech spoken of in the First Amendment refers to the freedom of
speech enjoyed by 18th century Englishmen, for that is the original
public understanding of the founding generation.42 However, that is
certainly not the understanding that we attribute to the clause today. Even if we can know the original public understanding, “we the
people” should be judged by our understanding. As we look to the
courts to uphold our rights as modern Americans, judges must use
modern understandings.
An objection to this idea is that it is not the judge’s right to codify the new understandings of law. In referring to the interpretation
of statutes, Justice Scalia says that a textualist “need not be too dull
to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed…
to serve; or too hidebound to realize that new times require new
law. One need only hold the belief that judges have no authority to
pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws.”43 Applied
to constitutional interpretation, this means that until the Constitution
is amended, judges should bind themselves to the former view. However, the conditions of our society are changing much faster than the
formal amendment process of the Constitution can facilitate corresponding changes to the Constitution.
For instance, the Sixth Amendment guarantees “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted by the witnesses against him.”44 In a case involving the sexual
abuse of a young girl, state law provided that the girl could give
her testimony in a separate room while the defendant, judge, and
court reporters watched on closed circuit television. A majority of
the Supreme Court upheld this practice as constitutional, but Justice
Scalia dissented even though he admitted the practice was reason42

Tribe, supra note 20, at 79–80; see also Scalia, supra note 4, at 135.

43
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able.45 In his mind, the language of the Constitution has only one
correct interpretation: “There is no doubt what confrontation meant–
or indeed means today. It means face-to-face, not watching from another room.”46 Aside from the fact that one could see this scenario
as reasonably satisfying the Sixth Amendment, the larger question
is whether the courts should follow such a method of interpretation,
thus requiring an amendment to allow such a situation.
This is not an excuse for unrestrained judicial activism, and
certainly some changes to the Constitution must be either forced
through the rigorous amendment process or not effectuated. But to
require an amendment process for every new situation that, while arguably reasonable, does not find basis in the clause’s original public
understanding (such as allowing a child’s testimony on closed circuit
television satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment)
would be a socially untenable solution. Such an insistence would
be an impediment to the more perfect union and promotion of general welfare clearly promulgated by the framers as the reason for
the Constitution. The harm to this end outweighs the benefits of a
more restricted judiciary.47 Justice Scalia makes many good points
and textualism has merit; however, modern expectations of government and the role of the judiciary require judges who do more than
look just at the original public understanding of the text. Therefore,
as a method of judicial interpretation, textualism is inadequate for
the needs of our society.

45

Scalia, supra note 4, at 43.
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Software Innovations and Patent Law Reform
by James Reber*

T

I. Introduction

o fulfill its constitutional duty,1 Congress established two
separate mechanisms to give exclusive rights of distribution
to the creators of useful materials: copyrights and patents. A
copyright is a claim on a particular expression of an idea (such as a
book about how a machine operates), while a patent is a claim on the
idea itself (such as the operation of the machine).2 However, the line
between copyrights and patents is not always so clearly demarcated.
However, the distinction between patents and copyrights becomes unclear in the software development industry. From the initial
widespread use of computers in 1945 to 1995, copyrights were the
only formal protection available to software developers. However, a
series of court cases expanded patent protection to cover software
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innovations. 3 The move toward patents on software culminated in
1995 when the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
allowed patents on software.
Despite this change, several problems persist in applying patent
law to software innovations. The current U.S. patent system discourages third parties from researching and improving patents in two main
ways. First, the current system discourages third parties by making
would-be researchers of existing patents liable for willful patent infringement.4 Second, the patent system fosters uncertainty regarding
the scope5 of software patents issued by emphasizing the function of
a software innovation over the logical structure of the innovation.6

3

See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526 (1994); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (1994). See generally Gregory
Stobbs, Software Patents, § 4.02 (2d ed., Aspen Law and Business
2000).

4

A party is guilty of willful patent infringement when they deliberately
copy the patented work of another, completely disregarding the property rights of the second party. A finding of willful patent infringement
includes determining the guilty party’s intent to infringe and reasonable
belief that the patent was invalid, and can have the consequence of multiplication of damages (Pall Corp. v. Micro Separations, 66 F.3d 1211, 1221
(Fed.Cir.1995)).

5

The scope of a patent refers to subject matter protected by the patent. The
scope is determined by the claims of the patent. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, A Guide To Filing A Utility Patent (2008),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/pdf/brochure_04.pdf.

6

There are larger issues of the patent system that will not be addressed in
this article. For instance, a low threshold for obviousness in granting patents (along with broad interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents) allows
an early implementation of a software innovation to preempt subsequent
disparate implementations of that innovation. In other words, an improved
version of an innovation may be found to infringe an earlier (and presumably inferior) patented version of that innovation, even though the two
versions are similar only in the results they produce (but are completely
different in how they obtain those results).

Software Innovations and Patent Law Reform

153

To remedy these problems, three proposals should be adopted by
Congress for patents regarding software7 innovations:
1) Publish software patent applications prior to
examination and solicit public help in collecting
applicable prior art8 citations.
2) Require either written notification of patent
infringement from the patent holder or willful copying
from a patented source before making a patent infringer
liable for willful patent infringement.
3) Make software claimable solely in terms of its
logical structure and give any awarded patent scope
commensurate with the patent’s degree of enablement

II. Current Patent System Discourages Third-Party
Innovation
The U.S. patent system requires that inventors provide descriptions of their inventions that are clear and concise enough “to enable
[others] . . . to make and use the same.”9 However, this does not happen within the software development industry for three reasons: first,
the description of the patented innovation is not useful for research
because patent claims emphasize the physical nature of the innovation, rather than the logical structure of the innovation (as software
engineers understand it); second, any software product inspired by a
patented work may unintentionally expose its owner to liability for
patent infringement10 due to the uncertainty caused by describing
7

The term “software innovation” in this article refers to an innovation
where the software component is a major inventive step in the innovation;
“software patent” refers to patents on software innovations.

8

“Prior art” is the phrase used to describe materials (such as previouslyissued patents, articles, or publications) similar to a particular patent application. When multiple articles of prior art are found which in combination
overlap all the claims of a particular patent application, the prior art is said
to anticipate the patent application, and the patent is denied.

9

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2008).

10
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BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

154

only the physical structure of the original patent; and third, the act
of reading a patent may make a software developer liable for willful
infringement (and the accompanying triple damages) for an existing
software product.
A. Requiring Physicality in a Patent Obfuscates the Patent’s
Description
The language of software patents is unsuitable because the patent system has historically required physicality of an invention.11 Before software and business method patents became commonplace in
the 1990s, patent protection was mostly given only to those systems
which were either physical objects themselves or induced a physical
transformation in another object.12 The written description required
for patents describes the nature of the object or the steps of the process necessary to induce physical transformation in the other object.
This means that the description outlines what the object is and what
it does, not how it performs its operations.
Unlike traditional patented items, software is abstract and intangible.13 Yet this standard for the written description still mandates
that software be described in terms of a physical structure. Such a
description is difficult for software engineers to comprehend. Engineers describe software in terms of its abstract operations and logical
elements; merely describing the physical manifestations of a software
innovation hides these operations and logical elements and prevents
software engineers from productively innovating previous patents.
11

Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for Software Patent Reform, 7 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 30-34
(2003).

12

Id. at 16-17.

13

For instance, common operations in software such as appending two
sequences of characters or manipulating processes on a computer are
abstract concepts and have no analogue in the physical world. While it
is true that such operations in software produce physical changes in the
computer, the physical changes are coincidental. The software engineer
conceives of the abstract operations, and typically does not care about the
physical manifestations of those operations.
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B. Current Patent Infringement Doctrine Discourages Using
Patents for Research
A second reason the current patent system discourages thirdparty follow-up is that software products inspired by a patented work
expose the developer to liability for willful infringement.14 When
an individual or company is suspected of infringing on the patent
of another, the patent holder files suit. If the accused is found to be
infringing on the patent, then the accused is fined in proportion to
the severity of the infringement. If the infringement is knowingly
and willfully done, then the infringer is liable for up to three times
the fine levied by the court.15 These punitive damages discourage
malicious competitors from profiting should they deliberately copy
the patented product of another.
Unfortunately, these triple damages also have the consequence
of discouraging research based on patents. People with an interest
in researching patents are also primarily people engaged in those
patents’ markets, either as competitors or as researchers. These researchers are likely to have existing products similar to patents they
research. If these researchers read patents applicable to their market
and are later found to have infringed any of those patents with their
existing products, they may be liable for willful infringement, even
though their products were not intended to infringe on the patents
they studied. To avoid this predicament, many would-be researchers
do not read patents so that their knowledge of the patent cannot later
be turned against them. Desirable third-party innovation is consequently lost due to the fear of being liable for willful infringement.

14

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2008).

15

35 U.S.C § 284 (2008).
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C. Current Patent System Permits Overly-Broad or Non-Novel
Patent Scope
Another detrimental effect of the current U.S. patent system is
that it unintentionally permits patents on non-novel innovations.16
Patent examiners spend between 18 to 20 hours on average reviewing each patent application.17 This is the time for examiners to review
and understand the application, find relevant prior art, compare the
application to the prior art, and draw conclusions about the application’s validity. Some argue that this short amount of time leads to the
approval of patents which are anticipated by prior art.18

III. Attempts to Improve the Patent System
The problems described above can be corrected. Three proposals
are now presented. For each proposal, the benefits and flaws of that
proposal are analyzed. Remedies for the flaws will be addressed later.
A. Third-Party Review
As stated previously, the hurried patent review process leads to
patents of questionable validity, posing threats to the software development industry where innovations occur incrementally.19 One solution proposed to address this problem is the Peer to Patent program.20
16

See N.Y. Law Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy, Community Patent Review Project Summary (2007), http://dotank nyls.edu/communitypatent/
p2p_exec_sum_feb_07.pdf at 2-3.

17

See id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, 10 (2003).

18

See N.Y. Law Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy supra note 17; see Fed.
Trade Comm’n, supra note 18, at 10.

19

See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 18, at 6.

20

Peer to Patent was a collaborative project between New York Law School
and the Patent Office. It ran as a pilot program from June 2007 to June
2009. The success of the program is currently under review by both New
York Law School and the Patent Office. See generally N.Y. Law Sch. Inst.
for Info. Law & Policy supra note 17.
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This program sought public participation in finding, verifying, and
applying prior art references to patent applications. 21 Patent applications were published online and volunteer reviewers examined the
published applications over a period of four months. The reviewers
submitted prior art references, commented on patent claims or on
entire patent applications, and rated prior art submitted by others. At
the end of the four month period, the prior art references were forwarded to both the application’s patent examiner and the applicant.
The examiner then conducted the examination procedure and was
free to use as many or as few of the references needed.22
There are several benefits to using a third-party review system.23
Patent examiners benefit when third-party reviewers provide both
prior art references and commentary to explain those references.24
The general public and the industry related to each individual patent
benefit when third-party reviewers provide prior art submissions because these submissions impeach an overly broad or obvious patent.
Even the patent applicants benefit; should they receive a patent after
their application undergoes third-party review, the applicants have
greater confidence that no prior art will be uncovered during litigation which could overturn their patent.
Unfortunately, a third-party review system also has drawbacks.
The language used in patent applications is difficult for some software engineers to understand,25 limiting the number of individuals
who may participate as reviewers. With the large number of pat21

In particular, volunteer reviewers would be sought among those trained
in the field of each particular patent, such as university academics and
researchers, and industry professionals.

22

N.Y. Law Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy, supra note 17, at 9.

23

N.Y. Law Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy , supra note 17, at 3-6.

24

The possibility exists that unskilled reviewers may overload the examiner by supplying numerous irrelevant prior art citations. This is unlikely
to happen: Reviewers rank prior art submitted by other reviewers, thus
giving higher ranking to the most relevant citation. The examiner is then
free to take as many or as few of these references as appropriate. (See N.Y.
Law Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy , supra note 17, at 4.)

25

Plotkin, supra note 12, at 35.

158

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

ent applications filed each year (456,321 total patent applications in
2008 alone),26 the number of reviewers needed may easily exceed
the number of individuals willing to participate. This potential lack
of reviewers contributes to a second criticism of the peer-to-patent
system: in a contest to impeach each other’s patents, large corporations may expend resources that small businesses or individuals
cannot match, and so could easily find prior art to cause the small
company’s patent application to be narrowed or rejected. With its
limited resources, a small business would struggle to impeach many
of its larger competitors’ patents. Thus, while it has many benefits,
the Peer to Patent program may allow large corporations to gain an
unfair market advantage over smaller competitors.
B. Alter Requirements for Willful Infringement
By making patent researchers liable for willful patent infringement, current United States law discourages third parties from further innovating existing patents. A solution proposed by the Federal
Trade Commission would require the patent holder to provide written notice to the alleged offender before they may be accused of willful patent infringement.27 This proposal would change current patent
practice by protecting those infringers who did not deliberately copy
a patented source.
For instance, consider three parties of patent infringers. The first
party consists of those who do not research patents and who market
a product which unknowingly infringes on patented materials. Under both the proposal and current patent law, this first party would
be liable for patent infringement but not willful infringement. The
second party consists of those who may or may not use patents for
research and market a product which contains deliberately copied
patented materials. Under both the proposal and current patent law,
this group would be liable for willful patent infringement. The third
26

United States Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics
Calendar Years 1963 – 2008, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.

27

Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 18, at 18.
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party consists of those who conduct research using existing patents
and who market a product which still unintentionally infringes on
any number of those patents which they researched. Under current
patent law,28 this party is liable for willful patent infringement because they found out that their product infringed a patent. Under the
proposal, while this group would still be liable for patent infringement, they would not be liable for willful patent infringement unless
they were first informed by written notice from the patentee that
they were infringing. This provides a window for the party to address their patent infringement. As a result, this proposal removes
a major disincentive for third parties conducting research using patents by protecting these researchers.
This written notice proposal does not, however, automatically
encourage third parties to research patents. The proposal does not
address the difficulty that skilled professionals face in understanding patents. As addressed earlier, the language used to describe software is another obstacle to third-party follow-up innovation. This
flaw does not hurt the proposal’s feasibility, but does mean that the
proposal is an incomplete solution.
C. Make Software Claimable in Terms of Its Logical Structure
Patent claims should describe the structure of software innovations, rather than just describing the behavior of the software.29 For instance, consider U.S. patent 5,883,995, which describes software that
limits how many times a user may run a particular computer program:
9. A[n] . . . on-line method for demonstrating software
programs to a potential purchaser of the programs, comprising the steps executed by a computer of: receiving
from an electronically accessible system a software program to be demonstrated . . .
10. The method of claim 9 wherein the enabling step
further comprises the step executed by the computer of
28

35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2008).

29

See Plotkin, supra note 12.
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preventing the enabling of the software program when
the user has already sampled the software program a
predetermined number of times.
These claims explain the behavior that the software performs. Because patent law has historically been applied to physical machines
or processes, these claims recite the physical nature of the invention (referred to as the physicality of the invention).30 This recitation must be sufficient to allow one skilled in the applicable field to
duplicate the invention.31
This description is adequate for many technological fields but
describing software this way is more problematic. While describing the behavior of a machine or process is adequate to infer how
to construct that machine or process, a description of the behavior
of software may refer to multiple ways of achieving that behavior.
For instance, in claim 10 of the ‘995 patent quoted above, the step
of preventing execution of the sampled software could occur in any
number of ways. First, the potential purchaser’s computer may have
software which tracks the date and time of each use, and so tracks
when the maximum number of uses has been met. Second, the potential purchaser’s “computer” may be a video game system which contains an embedded chip with circuitry that opens with each use of the
software and so can stop the system when the desired video game has
been overused. Third, the purchaser’s “computer” may be a cellular
phone, the operating system of which tracks the number of times the
phone accessed the program’s application server, and so it can sever
the connection when the maximum number of uses has been met.
While all three examples implement the behavior recited in claim 10
of the ‘995 patent, each example uses a different approach. Nevertheless, each example would be preempted by claim 10.
A solution would be to require software innovations to be claimed
in terms of logical structure. For instance, if written in terms of its
logical structure, the patent quoted above would recite as follows:
30

See Plotkin, supra note 7, at 30-34, for a more detailed analysis of how
the physicality requirement came to be and how it affects software patents.

31

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2008).
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10. The method of claim 9 wherein the enabling step
further comprises a list of dates and times when the program is loaded.
11. The method of claim 9 wherein the enabling step further uses the list of dates and times to determine when
the user has already sampled the software program a
predetermined number of times.
As in this example, claiming software in terms of its logical structure
allows software modules with similar behavior, but different ways of
achieving that behavior, to still be independently patentable.32

IV. Improving the Patent System
Two of the three proposals considered above have flaws. However, if these proposals are taken as a package, the benefits of the
other proposals help mitigate the flaws of each proposal considered
individually.
The changes proposed herein incorporate the three proposals
above: using a system of third-party review to find prior art references for software patent applications, requiring written notification
prior to liability for willful patent infringement, and mandating that
software inventions be claimed in terms of their logical structure.
The benefits of these proposals have already been shown. The effects
the complete set of proposals will have on the flaws of two of the
proposals are now considered.

32

This is important in computer science, where multiple algorithms exist
to address the same problem. For instance, to sort a set of objects (an
important step in many computer programs), a programmer may choose
to use a quick sort, a merge sort, a bubble sort, a heap sort, or an insertion
sort, to name a few. These different sort algorithms all perform the same
operation, but achieve that operation very differently. Under the logical
structure proposal, these algorithms would each be separately patentable
despite performing the same operation.
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A. Implement a Third-Party Review System
The effectiveness of a third-party review system is limited by
the language in which software patents are written. The proposal to
claim software innovations in terms of their logical structure will
make software patents more intelligible to software engineers, and
makes the patent applications more accessible to potential reviewers.
The problem of having too few reviewers is thus mitigated.
The second problem with a third-party review system is the possibility of parties using their power to impeach their competitors’
patents, while their competitors are financially unable to retaliate.
This problem may be resolved by publishing the patent anonymously
during the period when public review is permitted. While this solution does not prevent a party from indiscriminately attacking all
patents they feel encroach on their markets, it does prevent that party from deliberately attacking a single competitor, stopping a given
party from using the review process to undermine their competitors.
B. Alter the Requirements for Willful Patent Infringement
As described previously, the proposal by the Federal Trade
Commission to alter the requirements for willful patent infringement does not by itself allow researchers to easily read software
patents for research purposes. Describing a software invention in
terms of the physical nature of the invention obfuscates how the
software actually operates, degrading its quality as a research tool.
Describing software in terms of its logical structure (instead of its
physical structure) is more common among software professionals. A description of the software’s logical structure would provide
the software professional with a more complete description of how
the software operates and would thus more completely fulfill 15
U.S.C. § 112: “The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention . . . to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains . . . to make and use the same. . .” Including the logical structures proposal will help bring about the effect the willful
infringement proposal seeks.
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V. Conclusion
Computer software continues to change the way humans interact. Software has exploded in complexity and diversity since the
early days of computer in the 1950s. But the nuances and nature
of software have caused inconsistent treatment of software by the
law. This is evidenced by the variety of court decisions regarding
software patents.
The proper treatment of software innovations by patent law will
continue to be debated. In the mean time, there are changes that can
be made to help the United States patent system better fulfill its purpose “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts . . .”33 While
the package of changes proposed herein do not resolve all weaknesses
of the patent system, it nonetheless helps the patent system produce
higher quality patents on software innovations and better encourage
software innovation.

33

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

Tortured Logic: Why Attempting to Punish the
Authors of the “Torture Memo” Is
Unprecedented and Unjustified
by Catharine Richmond*

W

I. Introduction

ho tortured prisoners captured in the Iraq war? Reasonable guesses might include members of the military, prison guards, or CIA operatives. Some might argue even the
President himself, in his roles as Commander-in-Chief and Chief
Executive, is ultimately the person who should bear responsibility.
Most guesses, however, would probably not include lawyers from
the Office of Legal Counsel, which, until very recently, was a relatively obscure office in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) known
as the “OLC.” Human rights accusations leveled against the Bush
Administration for its conduct of the Iraq war have now brought the
OLC out of obscurity.1 These accusations cast a spotlight on OLC
lawyers who authored a memorandum meant to provide “top secret”
attorney-client privileged answers to questions posed by their client,
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See Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, The Nation, Apr. 9, 2008, at 1;
see also Dana Preist & R. Jeffery Smith, Memo Offered Justification for
Use of Torture, Wash. Post, June 8, 2004, at A1.
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the CIA, concerning the legality of certain interrogation techniques.2
3
As these OLC lawyers are increasingly threatened with personal
consequences for the interrogation techniques used by their client,
the CIA, a question arises: to what degree should the OLC lawyers
be held accountable for the advice they gave their client in a memo?
While OLC lawyers must adhere to certain ethical and legal
standards, they should not be held accountable for the actions of
their client, the CIA, if the advice they gave was legally justified.
Nevertheless, public outcry has raised the issue of what possible
grounds exist to hold the OLC lawyers accountable for interrogation techniques used by the CIA.4 At least five grounds have been
advanced on which possible punishment for the OLC lawyers could
be considered.
First, and most logically, the CIA, as a client, could allege legal malpractice against the OLC lawyers, essentially claiming the
OLC lawyers acted unreasonably in providing their legal advice.
Although this would be the normal approach for holding lawyers
accountable for legal advice provided to clients, this remedy has not
been sought, first, because the CIA is presumably not dissatisfied
with the advice it received from the OLC, and second, because of

2

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Legal Counsel, Memorandum for John Rizzo,
Acting General Counsel of the Cent. Intell. Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf (hereinafter cited as “Torture Memo”).

3

There are several memoranda that are often, and incorrectly, referred to
as the “Torture Memo.” This paper will address only the August 1, 2002
memo from the OLC to the CIA’s acting general counsel John Rizzo,
id., as it was the only memo that was directly addressed to the CIA. The
context for the claims and accusations against the lawyers is based on the
attorney-client relationship between the OLC and CIA. As such, this particular memo best represents the communications within that relationship.

4

Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture “May Be Justified,” Wash.
Post, June 13, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13 html; Peter Murtagh, Inside the U.S.
Torture Machine, The Irish Times, Apr. 25, 2009, at 1, available at http://
www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2009/0425/1224245355009.
html.
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procedural complications inherent in potential malpractice claims
between two parts of the Executive Branch.
Second, the District of Columbia Bar, or some other appropriate
state bar, could attempt to discipline or disbar the OLC lawyers on
grounds they had violated ethical rules, such as the rules requiring the
application of skill and care to attorneys’ work. Such complaints have
been filed against both Jay Bybee and John Yoo, who are the signatory and principal author of the so-called “Torture Memo,” respectively.
Third, one of the OLC lawyers, Jay Bybee, who was subsequently appointed to a federal judgeship, could possibly face impeachment.5 There have already been public calls for impeachment,
although no formal congressional action has been taken as of yet.
Fourth, the enemy combatants on whom the interrogation techniques were used could try to file lawsuits claiming damages for
violation of their constitutional rights against OLC lawyers as individuals. This kind of litigation has already been initiated against Yoo.
Fifth, the U.S. Attorney General could try to prosecute the lawyers for participating in a conspiracy to torture prisoners. Public
calls for such criminal charges have already been made.
Following a background section and a section about responsibility, this Note will examine each of these five potential bases for
punishment, and will end with a discussion of what action, if any,
is appropriate given the circumstances. For the sake of clarity and
convenience, a diagram appears at the end of this Note, depicting
the interrelationships among the various branches and offices of the
federal government and the five potential bases for punishment.

II. Background
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the President
committed “every tool of intelligence” toward “the destruction and

5

Calitics, Torture Memo: Impeach Judge Bybee, http://www.calitics.com/
diary/8575/torture-memos-impeach-judge-bybee (Apr. 17, 2009).
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to the defeat of the global terror network.”6 In the following months,
the CIA captured enemy combatants associated with terrorist activities. The CIA asked the U.S. Attorney General for legal advice
about certain enhanced interrogation techniques it wanted to use on
particular Al Qaeda combatants. The Attorney General delegated
the responsibility of responding to the request to the OLC, which is
an office in the Department of Justice that answers legal questions
arising within the Executive Branch.7 The OLC prepared a memo
within a few days of the request and submitted it to the CIA in August 2002. The memo, which was written by OLC lawyer John Yoo,
was signed by the head of OLC at the time, Jay Bybee.8 Although
there were subsequent OLC memos on the same or similar subjects,
this particular memo has come to be known as the “Torture Memo”
and is the focus of this Note. The label “Torture Memo” is, of course,
prejudicial, but nonetheless widely accepted. The Torture Memo was
released to the public in early 2009.

III. Attorney-Client Privilege Issue and Determining Responsibility

The release of the Torture Memo, and subsequent memos on the
same subject, raises interesting questions itself. According to attorney-client privilege law, a client, but not the attorney, has the right
to release its own confidential materials. As a client, the Executive
Branch (which the CIA is a part of) was the holder of this privilege,
and could decide to waive the privilege that would have otherwise

6

Address of President Bush Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the
United States: Response to the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pub.
Papers 1140, 1142 (Sept. 20, 2001) (reporting the president’s answer to
his rhetorical question, “how will we fight and win this war” on terror?).

7

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/olc/ (last visited Nov. 30,
2009).

8

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 18.
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shielded the Torture Memo from public scrutiny.9 However, those
same attorney-client privilege rules, at least as applied in a litigation
setting, generally prohibit selective waiver; that is, the client cannot selectively reveal as a “sword” those privileged communications
which favor the client, while continuing to “shield” those communications which are not favorable.10 Under these rules, the entirety of
the OLC’s work, along with the CIA’s and White House’s work, on
wartime interrogation arguably should have been released as well.11
12
This attorney-client privilege issue is not the focus of this Note, but
it provides important context because without the disclosure of the
Torture Memo, the OLC lawyers never would have been subjected
to the considerable public criticism they have received; without the
criticism, the possibility of punishments probably would never have
been raised.
In addition to the questionable release of the Torture Memo, the
choice of who to punish for wartime interrogation techniques appears arbitrary. The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mr. Obama
drew a distinction between those who carried out the interrogations
and those who argued for them, reiterating that he didn’t think those
9

Barry M. Sabin & Matthew R. Lewis, Protection of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in Criminal Investigations, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 105 (2007) (discussing issues regarding the Department of Justice Criminal Division).

10

Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Nguyen
v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1999); Piedmont Resolutions
L.L.C. v. Johnston, Rivlin & Foley, No. Civ. A. 96-1605, 1997 WL 16071,
at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1997) (disclosing information in a manner that is
inconsistent with confidentiality waives privilege).

11

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 182; accord von Bulow, 828
F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing “fairness considerations” that arise
when clients attempt to selectively waive the attorney-client privilege with
respect to certain documents so that they can use them as “swords,” while
declining to waive the privilege for other documents to “shield” them
from disclosure).

12

The White House, CIA, and OLC would be obligated to release their work
because they are all part of the Executive Branch. However, it is possible
that protective motions could be filed in an attempt to prevent the release
of certain documents if the issue was raised in a litigation context.
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who followed legal guidance should be prosecuted.”13 As a result,
the CIA was prematurely absolved from any wrongdoing. A subsequent report by the CIA Inspector General showed, however, that the
CIA, without the approval of the OLC, greatly increased the degree
of severity of the interrogation techniques originally approved by
the OLC.14 15 If someone will suffer consequences for the use of the
enhanced interrogation techniques, it seems recently revealed information, like the Inspector General’s report, should be considered in
determining who is responsible and who should be punished.
Nevertheless, the OLC lawyers still face the possible consequences of a malpractice suit, disbarment, impeachment, civil litigation, or criminal charges. Each of these possible punishments is
considered in turn.

13

Jonathan Weisman, Probes of Bush Officials Loom, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 22, 2009, at 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124033320765839635 html.

14

Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, Special Review,
1-7, 24, 25, 37, 42, 43, 44 (May 7, 2004) (admitting that the CIA’s Inspector General’s “review of the [interrogation] videotapes revealed that the
waterboarding technique applied at [REDACTED] was different from the
techniques as described in the DOJ opinion and used in SERE [military]
training . . .. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the
Agency’s use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training
. . ..” This acknowledgement came after members of the CIA repeatedly
denied the OLC was unaware of the increase in severity of the interrogation techniques (23, 24, 36)).

15

Id. In addition, the Inspector General’s report states: “individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern
because the DOJ had not specifically approved them . . .. For all of the
instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any
authoritative determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these
allegations are illustrative of the nature of concerns held by individuals
associated with the CTC Program . . . they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.”
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IV. Argument
A. Legal Malpractice Liability
The first, and most natural, consequence that might flow from
the OLC lawyers offering legal advice to their client is a legal malpractice suit. A malpractice suit is a lawsuit a client files against its
lawyer alleging professional misconduct; allegations of misconduct
usually arise from negligence or inattention, but occasionally result
from incompetence. Legal malpractice suits are not generally used
in a government context and are typically limited to private litigation; nonetheless, as a technical matter, the CIA as a client could
consider alleging legal malpractice against its legal advisors, the
OLC attorneys. It is important to review the possibility of a malpractice suit for two reasons: (1) it is the most recognized way in which
clients seek redress from their lawyers for bad legal advice, and (2)
it highlights the difficulties inherent in applying other, more tenuous
forms of punishment against the OLC lawyers.
A malpractice suit must first begin with a dissatisfied client.
However, as far as it is known, the CIA has no complaints about the
advice it received from the OLC with respect to the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques. With a satisfied client, there is normally
no further consideration given to the confidential and privileged advice provided by attorneys. The CIA asked for legal advice, received
it, and presumably was satisfied. No other person beyond the client
asked for the advice, received it, or acted on it. To the extent anyone
was or is dissatisfied with what the CIA did with the advice, the focus of the dissatisfaction should be on the client, not on the lawyer.
Although there is no evidence of a dissatisfied client, public outcry
suggests that an analysis of whether malpractice was committed is
nevertheless warranted.
The rules governing malpractice suits are determined state by
state. Since the OLC lawyers worked at the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in Washington, D.C., malpractice statutory law in the District
of Columbia applies. According to D.C. attorney-client law, Article 45, Section 107, “an informed professional judgment made with
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reasonable care and skill cannot be the basis of a legal malpractice
claim.”16 That is, even if the CIA was a dissatisfied client, a malpractice suit could not be brought against the OLC lawyers simply
because their client did not like the professional advice the lawyers
provided. The CIA, as client, would have to demonstrate that the
attorney acted unreasonably or incompetently; if the attorney acted
competently with skill and care, there would be no claim.17
Attorneys are obligated to properly and competently research
their clients’ issues. This includes doing enough research to author
“well-founded opinions.”18 Especially if a body of law is unsettled
with respect to a particular issue (i.e., it is an area of confusion), an
attorney has a responsibility to research the applicable body of law
before offering the client advice.19 Here, the area of law the OLC lawyers were asked to examine is not a clearly developed body of law;
as recognized by a commentator in the Santa Clara Law Review, “a
true definition of what constitutes ‘torture’ under international law
has yet to be determined.”20 Although determining whether or not
a written legal analysis is well researched is somewhat subjective,
there are several strong indicators that the Torture Memo was well
researched. To start, the Torture Memo referenced several existing
treaties and laws on torture.21 In addition, the treaties and laws referenced were not obscure, nascent documents; they were widely recognized as the determining body of law, however minimal, on torture
at that time.22 Also, the Torture Memo’s advice was not arbitrary
16

D.C. Code Ann. § 45-107 (2009).

17

Id.

18

Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349 (1975).

19

Id.

20

Julianne Harper, Defining Torture: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric
and Reality, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 893, 895 (2009).

21

Torture Memo, supra note 2 at 15-18 (listing the following as evidentiary
support for their position: 8 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A; Torture: Victim
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.
255, 267 (2000); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991); Tenn.
v. Reise, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002)).

22

Id.
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or haphazard. The law was applied, as best it could be determined
by the authoring individuals, to a precise set of facts supplied by
the CIA. This application of law resulted in “an informed opinion.”
There is nothing that prevents lawyers from offering their clients
informed opinions, despite the fact that those opinions may be based
on murky or undeveloped law. Hence, lawyers can give opinions in
areas of law that are not fully developed as long as they act in good
faith and apply skill and care to their work.
This is important. Legally, the Torture Memo was not required
to be perfectly substantiated and entirely correct—it was only required to be good enough. As the commentator in the North Dakota
Law Review recognized, “an attorney is not an insurer of a good
result. Nor is he the insurer of his opinions. Application of the standard of care to an attorney’s conduct does not require perfect results.
A non-negligent mistake or error in judgment in an area which is
subject to dispute does not create liability.”23 Although lawyers must
give “informed professional judgment[s],” which were “made with
reasonable care and skill,” perfection is not required.24 Attorneys
must apply skill and care “as a prudent man would exercise or use
under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.”25 “By
definition, reasonable skill does not mean that the highest degree
of skill and care must be exercised;” it only means the median skill
level of all attorneys must be applied.26
Although it could be argued that attorneys should be held to
the highest professional standard possible, demanding such a high
standard would create a discrepancy between the realistic results an
attorney can be expected to produce and an idealized standard of
work, not readily attainable. The result is that if the median level of
care and skill are applied, “a decision made in an area of confusion,
if made in good faith, will probably not result in the attorney being
23

Franklin D. Houser, Legal Malpractice—An Overview, 55 N.D. L. Rev.
185, 196 (1979).

24

American Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 6
(1980).

25

15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (2009).

26

Houser, supra note 23, at 196.
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held responsible.”27 Thus, the authors of the Torture Memo were not
expected to produce perfect results; they were only expected to act
with reasonable skill and care such that they could provide an “informed professional judgment.”28
There are some who allege that the OLC lawyers acted without care or skill. H. Marshall Jarrett, counsel for the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), explained that in
addition to whatever was required by District of Columbia law, his
office would also be “examining whether the legal advice in these
memoranda was consistent with the professional standards that apply
to Department of Justice attorneys.”29 The OPR’s report was released
early in 2010, after nearly seven years of investigation.30 The report,
which was changed several times, initially concluded that both Bybee
and Yoo committed professional misconduct.31 32 After reviewing the
OPR report, however, the Deputy Attorney General’s office rejected
the report’s conclusions, finding the OLC lawyers committed no

27

Id. at 198.

28

D.C. Code Ann. § 45-107 (2009).

29

Gillers, supra note 1, at 1.

30

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Final Report, (Jul. 29, 2009), available at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.
pdf.

31

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report (Feb. 20, 2009), available
at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRSecondReport09.pdf; see
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report (Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFirstReport081222.
pdf.

32

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report at 400 (Jul. 29, 2009),
available at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.
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misconduct and that no discipline was warranted.33 34 This internal
DOJ finding effectively negated OPR’s conclusions and exonerated
the lawyers of misconduct by their own Department’s standards.
While the OPR’s report, and its subsequent rejection by the DOJ,
is significant, it does not alter the CIA’s legal rights to any malpractice claim against its lawyers. The OPR’s findings on this matter are
only one of several authorities to which the courts would look in
deciding whether malpractice was committed. If the CIA wanted to
assert malpractice, it could still rely on the other authorities to do so.
While a malpractice claim is theoretically possible, it seems
unlikely. Although a malpractice suit seems to be the most appropriate and natural consequence flowing from advice received by a
dissatisfied client, assuming there was one, it is unclear how one executive department of the federal government could effectively pursue a malpractice claim against another. The President is expected
to settle disputes within the Executive Branch; internal Executive
Branch disagreements are sometimes aired in the press, but not in
the courts. It is difficult to see how the CIA could pursue a court case
leading to an award of damages against the OLC lawyers as it would
simply result in the reallocation of the federal budget. Apart from being unprecedented, the CIA has never expressed dissatisfaction with
its lawyers’ advice. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the CIA would
pursue any type of malpractice claim.

33

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Leg. Affairs, Letter to the Honorable John
Conyers, Jr., (Feb. 19, 2010) (reporting that Assistant Attorney General
Ronald Weich reported to John Conyers, who is the Chair of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, that David Margolis from the Deputy Attorney General’s office did not support the conclusions of the OPR report),
available at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/Weich100219.pdf.

34

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for
the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General, (Jan. 5, 2010)
available at http://judiciary house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf.
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B. Bar Association Discipline
The second possible consequence that could result from the legal advice provided by the OLC lawyers is disciplinary action by
a state bar; such complaints have already been filed against Bybee
and Yoo.35 Each state has a bar association that regulates and disciplines lawyers in that state or, in this instance, the District of Columbia.36 Each bar is subject to its own rules and maintains complete
autonomy over controlling who is admitted to the bar and allowed to
practice law in that state. With potentially more severe consequences
than a malpractice suit, lawyers can be referred for discipline to the
bar under which they practice for various reasons including unethical behavior, misconduct, or incompetence.37 In this case, the OLC

35

Memorandum from Velvet Revolution to the Bd. on Prof’l Responsibility, D.C. Court of Appeals, Re: Complaint Against Jay S. Bybee (May 18,
2009) (available at http://votersforpeace.us/StateBarComplaints/Bybee_
complaint_1_VR-1.pdf); see also Memorandum from Velvet Revolution
to the Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., Re: Complaint Against John
Choon Yoo (May 18, 2009) (available at http://votersforpeace.us/StateBarComplaints/Yoo_Complaint_1_VR.pdf).

36

The American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/ (last visited Dec.
9, 2009).

37

Disciplinary action by a bar association could potentially be more severe
than a malpractice suit because a bar association can revoke or suspend a
lawyer’s license to practice law—this would render the lawyer ineligible
to practice law whereas a malpractice suit could result only in damages
against the lawyer, but leave him or her free to continue practicing.
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lawyers, presumably, were members of the District of Columbia Bar
and hence would be subject to its requirements.38
With respect to unethical behavior, the D.C. Bar delineates seven
areas of unethical behavior that would constitute misconduct:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another; (b) Commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (d) Engage in conduct that seriously interferes with
the administration of justice; (e) State or imply an ability
to influence improperly a government agency or official;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct
that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or
other law; or (g) Seek or threaten to seek criminal charges
or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a
civil matter.39
Putting aside other possible grounds, one area of relevance might be
found in section 8.4(c), which prohibits “dishonesty, fraud, deceit,

38

Relatively few lawyers are admitted to the D.C. Bar via successful
completion of the District of Columbia’s Bar Examination. The D.C. Bar
has a fairly lenient “waive-in” policy. That is, lawyers can take the bar
examination for a different state (say California or Massachusetts), and
if they pass with a sufficiently high score on the multi-state portion of
the examination, request to be “waived-in” to the D.C. Bar. If the OLC
lawyers were punished, or even disbarred, in the District of Columbia, this
would not necessarily result in discipline by the bar associations of other
states, even from those states from which they “waived-in” into the D.C.
Bar. However, discipline by the D.C. Bar could certainly be the basis for a
complaint to another bar association. Interestingly, it appears that Yoo has
had a bar complaint filed against him in Pennsylvania but not in D.C.

39

District of Colombia Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct §
8.4, (Feb. 1 2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics_rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_rules/rule_eight/
rule08_04.cfm.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 24, 2010

178

or misrepresentation.”40 To implicate the OLC lawyers for acting
“dishonestly” or “fraudulently,” evidence would need to be discovered proving that the lawyers intended to mislead the CIA. Here,
the legal statutes and case law used in the Torture Memo both existed and were relevant.41 They were not misrepresented such that the
client was subject to dishonest or fraudulent information. Without
evidence, there can be no claim; and, as of yet, no such evidence
of dishonesty or fraudulence has been provided. Consequently, the
OLC lawyers should be cleared of being dishonest or fraudulent.
The question remains whether the lawyers were deceitful or
misrepresented their client or the law. The lawyers had an obligation not to be deceitful to their client—the CIA. The Torture Memo
was written in response to particular questions, based on a supplied
set of facts, to a specific client. The conclusions answered specific
questions. The OLC lawyers were not deceitful to their CIA client in
answering these questions according to the D.C. Bar’s rules. Public
commentary about the alleged deceitfulness of the Torture Memo’s
conclusions is irrelevant to the question of their defensibility from an
ethical standpoint. As explained by a National Review author, “some
types of treatment of prisoners, while perhaps not acceptable either
to the administration or to the American public, might nonetheless
be legally defensible under both international and American law.”42
The Torture Memo did not say whether the CIA should employ the
various means of interrogation; it only stated whether the CIA could

40

Id. at 8.4(c).

41

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 15-18.

42

Byron York, A Tortured Debate: The Media-Fed Hysteria Over the Treatment of Terrorist Prisoners, National Review, Jul. 12, 2004, at 3.
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employ them, based on the available facts and legal authorities.43 It
was up to the CIA or the White House to decide whether the enhanced interrogation techniques, although legal in the OLC’s opinion, should actually be employed. Thus, despite how others may feel,
the OLC lawyers did not deceive their CIA client under the Bar’s
standards.
Another potential area the D.C. Bar could examine is whether
the OLC lawyers were incompetent. According to the D.C. Bar, “a
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”44
More specifically,
In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite
knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors
include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the
matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation
and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and whether it
is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with,
a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.45
However, “a lawyer need not necessarily have special training or
prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the

43

Id. (In fact, the Torture Memo suggests that the CIA should have “the constant presence of personnel with medical training who have the authority
to stop the interrogation should it appear it is medically necessary [to do
so]; it is assumed that the waterboarding technique in question is the same
one ‘used in SERE training,’ which is standard U.S. military training; it
is also assumed, based on the CIA’s supplied set of facts, that the CIA
had “conducted the due diligence [and]… reviewed the relevant literature
on the subject and consulted with outside psychologist” in determining
whether the techniques would inflict prolonged mental harm.”).

44

District of Colombia Bar Association, § 1.1 (defining competence), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_rules/rule_eight/rule01_01.cfm.

45

Id. at § 1.1.1.
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lawyer is unfamiliar.”46 Most important, the “competent handling of
a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual
and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”47
Were the OLC lawyers who authored the Torture Memo “incompetent” based on these standards, or did they act and perform in
a manner that demonstrated reasonable competence? There is little
dispute that the OLC lawyers were not recognized experts on torture. But lawyers are often not experts on the topic on which they
are offering advice. Moreover, the D.C. Bar does not expect lawyers
to be experts in order to be competent enough to give counsel on any
particular topic.48 What the D.C. Bar does expect is “inquiry into
and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and
use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners.”49 If lawyers are not expected to be experts, but are expected only to demonstrate proper “inquiry and analysis” into a matter, did the OLC lawyers fulfill these requirements of competency?
The answer is found in the Torture Memo itself. The Torture Memo
is of significant length and discusses pertinent case law. It addresses
the applicable sections in Title 18 of the U.S. Code and the United
Nations’ Convention Against Torture.50 The analysis and commentary on these laws is specific and thorough. Even though the contents
of the Torture Memo are not universally agreed upon, the fact that
46

Id. at § 1.1.2.

47

Id. at §1.1.5.

48

American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1, Comment 2 (2009) (explaining
that “a lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar . . .. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent,
the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal
problems . . .. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly
novel field through necessary study.”), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/rule_1_1_comm html.

49

Id.

50

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 15-18.
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it was thoroughly researched and analyzed, even if only from one
given perspective, satisfies the requirement for competence.
That leaves the question whether the Torture Memo’s conclusions were otherwise appropriate. The conclusions did not have to
be “right” in the sense that there was only one correct way of answering the questions posed. In other words, legal reasoning is not a
science: it requires interpretation, which can lead to results that can
be both reasonable and different at the same time. Individual interpretation of the law is the bedrock of the legal system, and differing
opinions do not constitute incompetence. In his book, The Terror
Presidency, Jack Goldsmith, who succeeded Bybee as head of the
OLC and is now a political scholar at Harvard, criticized the Torture
Memo as being “legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone,
and overbroad.”51 Yet even these accusations fail to substantively
demonstrate the OLC lawyers were incompetent. All they prove is
that Goldsmith disagrees with the conclusions; they do not prove that
the conclusions were outside the realm of reasonable conclusions. In
fact, in a later interview Goldsmith acknowledged,
I don’t impugn the integrity of anyone. I really do believe
that everyone . . . w[as] acting in good faith. . .. We were all
acting under intense pressure. . .. Therefore, we had to try as
hard as we could. . .. We all have our own views of the law
and how to approach the legal principles. And in some sense
it was a legal dispute.52
Thus, although there may be legitimate grounds to dispute the conclusions of the Torture Memo, those disputes are not sufficient evidence of incompetence on the part of the OLC lawyers.
Although it would be difficult to prove incompetence, a disciplinary investigation by the Bar is nonetheless a real possibility
as evidenced by the complaints that have already been filed. Had
the OPR’s report of gross professional misconduct under the DOJ’s
standards been accepted, the Bar may have more easily determined
51

Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, 151 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2007).

52

Daniel Klaidman, ‘The Law Required It,’ Newsweek, Sept. 8, 2007, at 4,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/42694/page/4.
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that the lawyers also failed to satisfy the Bar’s standards. As previously mentioned, however, the Bar and the OPR have different standards—as a result, the lawyers could still be disciplined or disbarred
under the Bar’s different standards as described above.
C. Impeachment
The third possible consequence is the impeachment of Judge
Bybee, who signed off on the Torture Memo as the head of the OLC
at the time.53 President Bush appointed Jay Bybee to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2003.54 A federal
judgeship is an Article III lifetime appointment; to be removed from
this office a judge must be impeached by the House of Representatives and stand trial in the Senate.55 Article II, Section Four of
the United States Constitution establishes that “the President, Vice
President, and all other civil Officers of the United States shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”56 Judges
are rarely impeached, and when they are, their crimes are usually
gross in nature, such as taking bribes or committing other serious
felonies that would erode confidence in the judiciary.57 In over two
53

While it may seem odd to impeach a judge for a crime committed before
taking the bench, this action is not specifically prohibited. It would certainly be a rare, and unconventional, approach, but as of yet, has not been
established as improper.

54

Nominations Submitted to the Senate, 49 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1
(Jan. 10, 2003).

55

U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2.

56

U.S. Const. art. 4, § 2.

57

Federal Judicial Center, Impeachments of Federal Judges, http://www fjc.
gov/history/home.nsf/page/topics_ji_bdy?OpenDocument (detailing misconduct for which judges have been impeached for including: intoxication
on the bench (J. John Pickering); waging war against the U.S. government
(J. West H. Humphreys); improper business relationship with litigants (J.
Robert W. Archbald); tax evasion and of remaining on the bench following criminal conviction (J. Harry E. Claiborne); perjury and conspiring to
solicit a bribe (J. Alcee L. Hastings)) (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).
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hundred years, only thirteen federal judges have been impeached,
and of those only seven convicted.58
Considering that the only evidence against Judge Bybee is a government memorandum, and the subsequent seven-year analysis by
the OPR resulted in a finding of no misconduct and recommended no
discipline, the House would probably not have substantial grounds
to impeach him. To gain political cover, investigating House committees may wait until other legal action has been taken against
him, such as formal sanctioning or disbarment from the D.C. Bar.
While impeachment seems an extreme action to take against a judge
based on the contents of a memorandum written long before the
judge took the bench, the power of public outcry may nevertheless
prompt continued calls for the impeachment of Judge Bybee.59 Indeed, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, John Conyers, announced on February 19, 2010, that his committee would hold
hearings because, in his view, the OPR’s report and related materials
“make plain that those memos were legally flawed and fundamentally unsound, and may have been improperly influenced by a desire
to tell the Bush White House and the CIA what it wanted to hear.”60
Another member of that committee, Jerry Nadler, is already on record that Judge Bybee “ought to be impeached.”61
Thus, even though the Executive Branch, through the OPR, has
found no misconduct and no grounds for discipline, Congress remains
free to conduct hearings and, potentially, to impeach Judge Bybee.
58

Id.

59

Memorandum from the Center For American Progress Action Fund to
the Honorable John Conyers, Re: Impeachment Hearings Against Jay S.
Bybee (April 26, 2009) available at http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/
uploads/2009/04/conyers-april-26-2009.pdf (written by John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to President Clinton); see also Editorial, The Torturers’
Manifesto, N.Y. Times, April 19, 2009, at WK9.

60

U.S. House of Reps., Comm. on the Judiciary, Press Release for
John Conyers (Feb. 19, 2010) available at http://judiciary house.gov/
news/100219 html.

61

Ryan Grim, Nadler: Impeach Torture Memo Author, The Huffington Post, Apr. 20, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/04/20/senior-judiciary-committe_n_189026 html.
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D. Civil Litigation
The fourth possible consequence could be a civil lawsuit filed
against the OLC lawyers, as individuals, alleging they purposefully violated the rights of detainees. Such a lawsuit has already been
filed; Jose Padilla, an accused terrorist, has sued Yoo for allegedly
violating his constitutional rights.62 The case was allowed to proceed
beyond a dismissal motion in a federal district court and is now on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.63 64 In spite of the OPR’s open investigation at the time, the DOJ’s Civil Division filed an amicus brief on
behalf of Yoo in the Ninth Circuit as it had in the district court.65
Typically, government officials are immune from being sued as
individuals under the common law tradition of sovereign immunity
inherited from England. As it was adopted in American law, government officials are protected by qualified immunity. The qualified immunity granted to government officials in the United States provides
them with protection from being sued for damages as individuals,
but only insofar as they did not knowingly or willfully violate any
person’s constitutional rights. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.”66 However, the Supreme Court has failed to adopt

62

See Padilla v. Yoo, No. C 08-00035 JSW (complaint filed in Jan. 4, 2008).

63

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (order denying in part and
granting in part defendant’s motion to dismiss).

64

Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478 (9th Cir. notice of appeal filed July 9, 2009).

65

Amicus Curiae Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Padilla, No. 09-16478 (9th
Cir. filed Dec. 30, 2009).

66

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
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clear guidelines on qualified immunity, and “the result has been incoherent, inconsistent, and often counterintuitive decisions.”67
The first, and most significant, Supreme Court ruling on qualified immunity was nearly four decades ago in the Bivens case.68
In Bivens, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to determine
whether a remedy could be sought against government officials for
monetary damages: (1) whether alternative remedies existed, and (2)
whether there were “special factors” that should be considered.69 In
the 39 years since Bivens, the Supreme Court has narrowly extended
it only twice—once in a due process case and once in an Eighth
Amendment case.70 The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that
Congress is vested with the appropriate powers to address such matters.71 Especially “where there are special considerations or sensitivities raised by a particular context, the courts recognize that it is
appropriate for the courts to defer to Congress and wait for it to enact
a private damage action if it so chooses.”72
Padilla’s case should have been dismissed on both parts of the
Bivens test. First, alternative remedies existed. Padilla claimed he
was mistreated and illegally held in a Navy brig. Two days after
being taken into custody, Padilla filed for a writ of habeas corpus.73
67

Lynn C. Percival, Bivens Gone Wild: A Critique of the Recent Recognition of a Novel Bivens Remedy in Padilla v. Yoo, (Campbell U. Sch. of L.,
working paper) (Dec. 9, 2009) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1533952.

68

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

69

Id.

70

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).

71

Western Radio Services v. U.S. Forest Service, 578 F .3d 1116, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “the Supreme Court has focused increased
scrutiny on whether Congress intended the courts to devise a new Bivens
remedy, and in every decision since Carlson, across a variety of factual
and legal contexts, the answer has been ‘no’”).
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Amicus Curiae Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Padilla, No. 09-16478, 2
(9th Cir. filed Dec. 30, 2009).

73

Padilla v. United States, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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His writ was initially denied due to improper filing, but was later
declared moot anyways by the Supreme Court due to his relocation
to a federal prison.74 This clearly shows Padilla had a reasonable
and alternate legal remedy available to him. As the DOJ’s amicus
brief recognizes, “the fact that the habeas statute provides no damage remedy or redress against Yoo personally, is not a ground for
supplementing that remedy with a judicially-created money-damage
claim.”75 Apart from legal remedy, Padilla also could have reported
the lawyers to the Bar or the OPR, which others have already done.76
Second, there are numerous “special factors” involved in this
case. First, the potential limiting of the President’s war powers is
a critical factor weighing against permitting a suit against the OLC
lawyers. As the DOJ’s amicus brief points out, “there can be little
question that the claims here directly implicate war powers of the
President, with respect to the military’s detention and treatment of
those determined to be enemies during an armed conflict, that have
never been the subject of money-damages actions in our nation’s long
history.”77 In addition, “courts have traditionally been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs” because they are ill equipped to do so.78 The DOJ’s
amicus brief explains, “recognizing a Bivens action in this context is
especially inappropriate because the plaintiff is seeking to impose liability for legal advice relating to war powers and national security.”79
A second factor weighing against a private lawsuit is that allowing a Bivens action could influence foreign policy decision
making—Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant influences
how future policy will be shaped in defining wartime enemies. “To
74

Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S.
1062 (2006).

75

Amicus Curiae Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Padilla, supra note 73, at
24.

76

Id. at 20, 21.

77

Id. at 15.

78

Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).

79

Amicus Curiae Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Padilla, supra note 73, at
3.
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determine whether drastic measures should be taken in matters of
foreign policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication,
but of policymaking.”80
A third factor is that the military would be forced to turn over
sensitive information to the courts regarding wartime practices if the
case proceeds. This would endanger the security and usefulness of
information about current wartime military practices.
A fourth factor is the “threat . . . such claims could deter the invaluable, frank, and full discussion within the Executive Branch . . . [and]
the need for candid advice . . . is vital.” 81 As a commentator states:
Rather than fully devote themselves to counseling members of the Executive Branch, and aid in policymaking efforts, executive lawyers—who are frequently called upon to
grapple with activities that push the ill-defined boundaries
of illegality and constitutionality—will be preoccupied with
avoiding personal liability. Once the primary means of conveying legal concepts and advising others, the legal memoranda may instead be viewed as potentially incriminating
evidence. The prospect of litigation also chips away at the
confidentiality of executive legal advice—a cornerstone of
the legal profession.82
Apart from limiting presidential powers, the possibility of deterring
frank legal advice in the Executive Branch could be the most lasting
damaging effect of allowing private suits against the OLC lawyers.
Fifth, and finally, extending a Bivens remedy against Bybee and
Yoo would explore new areas of constitutional law. It has been long
recognized by the Supreme Court that “if there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality
unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”83 More specifically, in ac80
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cordance with the constitutional avoidance doctrine, “the court will
not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”84
Although Padilla claims his constitutional rights were violated,
seeking a money-damages remedy through a Bivens action is not
the proper course to pursue. Potential threats to limiting presidential
wartime powers, unduly influencing foreign policy, revealing sensitive military information, limiting frank legal advice in the Executive Branch, and establishing new constitutional law are all factors
weighing against imposing civil damages on the OLC lawyers.
E. Criminal Charges
The fifth possible consequence could be criminal charges filed
against the OLC attorneys by the Attorney General or a U.S. Attorney alleging participation in a conspiracy. Such allegations have
already been made. Stephen Rohde of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) recently suggested filing such charges in a public
Federalist Society debate with John Eastman.85 Rohde recommended the OLC lawyers be scrutinized under the same laws they used
to justify enhanced interrogation techniques for the CIA, which is
found in section 2340 of Title 18 in the U.S. Code. The Patriot Act
modified section 2340 to include anyone who conspires to commit a
crime be charged with the same penalties.86 If carefully read, however, the code states there must be “an act committed by a person”
which carries “the threat of imminent death” to constitute a violation; here, those who committed these alleged acts have already
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been absolved by the President.87 88 In addition, the code states that
“whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture” will be charged under this section.89 It seems that the OLC
lawyers, who certainly did not commit an act of torture outside the
United States, could not be possibly charged as if they had. Rohde,
however, maintains that the Torture Memo was prepared as a cover
for conduct that was already occurring, and was the “lynch-pin” in
a conspiracy to commit torture.90 If the lawyers can be charged at
all, a “conspiracy” must first be proved to exist; as of yet, no such
conspiracy has been uncovered.
While conspiracy charges seem to be a remote possibility, the
public nature of their allegation suggests they could become more
likely in the future.

V. Appropriate Actions
If the above actions, namely a malpractice suit, Bar discipline,
impeachment, civil litigation, or criminal charges, are not the proper
actions to be taken, what are, if any?
First, it bears repeating that the Torture Memo was a privileged and confidential document prepared in an attorney-client relationship. All of the threatened consequences for the authors of the
Torture Memo have either been suggested by parties outside that relationship or have not been pursued by the client. Tellingly, the CIA
has never sought any remedy against the OLC—presumably because
the CIA was satisfied with the advice provided by the OLC lawyers.
Had the CIA been dissatisfied with the OLC, it could have raised
malpractice accusations or reported the lawyers to the Bar or OPR.
The continued pursuit of punishment for the OLC lawyers through
alternate methods suggests a desperate attempt of those outside the
87
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privileged attorney-client relationship to punish lawyers who gave
advice in a murky area of law under wartime pressures.
In addition to those possibilities, there have also been suggestions in the media and by members of Congress that congressional
hearings are in order.91 Had other remedies not been sought, this
might have been a legitimate option to pursue. In light of the extensive OPR report and possible Bar and judiciary action, however, it
seems redundant for Congress to initiate its own inquiry. It would
also waste government funds—the OPR has already spent valuable
funds investigating this matter for seven years. Those in the government who are responsible for maintaining ethics have already made
a substantial inquiry into this matter. The ultimate conclusion of that
inquiry was absolving for the OLC lawyers. Any further investigation would seem to be redundant and a waste of resources.

VI. Conclusion
The legal advice in the Torture Memo has been widely criticized,
and was even later rejected by the OLC itself.92 Although the client,
the CIA, was entirely satisfied with the OLC lawyers’ advice, it is
now clear that many government officials were not. Dissatisfaction
does not prove wrongdoing or incompetence, however. The subsequent criticism of the Torture Memo is similar to military historians
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who criticize decisions made in battles long ago—it is always easier
to see the flaws of others from a safe and retrospective distance.
Punishing the OLC lawyers would have significant consequences. If the lawyers are punished, there is a risk that every subsequent
administration’s lawyers could be aggressively pursued for perceived
problems with the administration’s policies. Legally, it would be establishing a dangerous precedent in which lawyers could be held accountable for the actions of their clients. Punishing the OLC lawyers
would set a precedent of false accountability. Lawyers would have to
live in fear of authoring any legal opinion, as they could potentially be
held accountable for any foreseeable or unforeseeable consequences
of their opinions, as implemented by their autonomous clients.93
The OLC does not establish or carry out executive policy. Instead, the OLC provides legal advice to its government clients,
which they are free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, as they
see fit. The OLC is not, and should not be, responsible for the morality of actions the government takes based on its legal advice if the
advice was legally justified. Authoring the Torture Memo and implementing its advice are two separate issues. Although the lawyers
may have provided a legal justification for what some believe to be
torture, they in no way endorsed it. Pursuing punishment for lawyers
who have authored legal opinions in good faith is a dangerous precedent to set, especially at the federal level.
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